A Burden or a Resource? Conditions for Returnee (Re)integration in Juba, South Sudan by Ersland, Linn Susanne
Centre for Peace Studies
Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education
A Burden or a Resource?
Conditions for Returnee (Re)integration in Juba, South Sudan
Linn Susanne Ersland




Repatriation has since the 1990s been the international community's preferred solution to 
conflict-induced migration. However, scholars continue to debate the question of whether returnees 
have positive or negative contributions – are they a burden or a resource to the return areas? As a  
response, this thesis focuses on returnees' potential to contribute to reconstruction and development 
in post-conflict societies. Do returning refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) bring with 
them resources of any kind? If yes, how can these resources be utilized in order to contribute to 
reconstruction and development on a macro level? Through analyzing the experiences of South 
Sudanese returnees who have returned from Khartoum to Juba, these are the main questions this 
study seeks to answer.
The  study  derives  from  qualitative  research  conducted  in  Juba  during  June  2013,  and 
includes the voices of both returnees, community members, power-holders, and external actors. By 
drawing on the theoretical concepts of returnee (re)integration and returnee capital, the study seeks 
to explore returnees' (potential) contributions to their return areas. The results suggest that returnees 
possess various forms of capital  (material,  human, social,  cultural) acquired either pre-flight or 
during exile. The case study showed a particularly high level of education and work experience 
among the returnees,  as well  as  social changes in  lifestyles,  attitudes and values. However,  the 
utilization of the returnee capital  depends on the prevailing conditions of the return areas.  This 
study shows that there are several aspects of the South Sudanese society that hinder an efficient  
utilization of returnee capital, with lack of employment opportunities, limited access to land, poor 
service  delivery,  and  social  discrimination  being  the  most  prominent.  As  a  result,  this  study 
concludes  that return migration theoretically  represents a  transfer of  resources to  the returnees' 
countries and/or areas of origin, however, the returnees are often unable to translate their capital 
into either micro or macro contributions.
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Regardless  of reasons for fleeing,  displaced people remove themselves  from their  home 
communities, change territory and resettle in new locations within or across state boundaries. The 
recent decades have seen a growing body of literature on conflict-induced migration, with special 
focus on patterns and reasons for flight, the need for humanitarian efforts, and the rights of refugees 
under international law. Simultaneously, the world has witnessed the growth of repatriation – the 
return of displacees  – as  the  most  preferable  solution to  the  international  refugee  problem. As 
conflicts come to an end, displaced people are generally expected to return to their places of origin 
and “return to normality, peace and stability” (Chimni, 2002: 163). Many people do return, either 
spontaneously or through organized programs, but to what?
A major challenge of this development is the feasibility and sustainability of repatriation as a  
durable solution for the world's displaced people. Are the returnees able to (re)integrate into society 
and sustain themselves within their new environments? Are the conditions they return to enabling or 
preventing their  (re)integration and utilization of resources? As the number of displaced people 
increases, there is a growing demand for an in-depth examination of the long-term effects of return 
migration to post-conflict  states. As argued by Arowolo (2000: 65);  “repatriation is perhaps the 
most challenging problem faced by many African countries that have been plagued by civil wars, 
ethnic hostilities or secessionist struggles during the past three decades or so”.
In response to this,  two diverging paradigms have emerged in an attempt to explain the 
effects of return migration. One highlights the problems of (re)integration in post-conflict societies 
and the potential negative impacts on the return communities1. Conflict-torn states have often had 
their developmental achievements reversed by years or even decades, and are in no condition to 
absorb a large number of, often aid-dependent, returnees. More specifically, returnees need food, 
housing and social services that the government may not be able to provide them. Contrastingly, the 
second  approach  seeks  to  illuminate  the  positive  potential  of  returnees  to  act  as  agents  of 
development and reconstruction in their countries of origin2. These scholars argue that returnees, by 
bringing with them material and non-material resources, can contribute to transforming society into 
1 See  e.g.  Chimni  (1999;  2003),  De  Wit  & Hatcher  (2009),  and  Nilsson  (2000).  Much  of  the  literature  on  the 
challenges of refugee populations can be transferred to returnee contexts as well (e.g. Jacobsen, 2002).
2 See e.g. Ajak et.al. (2012), Helling (2007), Petrin (2002), Rogge (1994) and UNHCR (2006).
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an increasingly more stable entity both developmentally and socio-economically. Helling (2007: 9) 
goes  as  far  as  to  argue  that  the  sustainable  (re)integration  of  returnees  is  “crucial  to  increase 
regional stability and global security”.
As an attempt to bridge this gap within forced migration studies, this thesis will attempt to 
search  for  a  feasible  way  of  approaching  the  returnee  (re)integration  issue.  By  building  on 
theoretical  ideas  from social  science,  development  studies  and  refugee  studies,  this  study  will 
consider returnees as social actors and search for ways of approaching a more theorized strategy for 
such analysis. Furthermore, a central concern will be the analysis' basis in historical and contextual 
understandings – in this case, exploring the perceptions of returnee (re)integration in post-conflict 
South Sudan. More specifically, by examining the perspectives of various micro and macro actors in 
the  capital  Juba,  this  study  seeks  to  gain  insight  into  the  current  challenges  of  returnee 
(re)integration and the utilization of returnee capital in the post-conflict environment. It is in the 
researcher's  belief  that  such an approach will  provide  a  solid  basis  from which  to  explain  the 
realities faced by returnees during the post-return period; assess the returnees' possession of and 
potential to utilize material and non-material resources in the return areas; identify enabling and 
preventing  factors  for  a  possible  future  returnee  (re)integration  framework;  and  illuminate  the 
potential dangers of the current international refugee regime. 
This chapter seeks to briefly introduce the study, its background and aims. More specifically, 
the fundamental concepts – returnee (re)integration and returnee capital – that forms the basis of the 
analysis will be introduced, as well as the study's problem statement, subsequent research questions, 
and  place  within  the  field  of  peace  studies.  Furthermore,  the  researcher's  motivation  for  this 
particular study will be explained, highlighting the pressing situation in South Sudan. Finally, a 
basic structural outline of the thesis will be provided for the reader's convenience.
1.1   Conceptual Terminology
This study primarily builds on Dominik Helling's concept of 'returnee capital', which has 
derived  out  of  ideas  from  several  different  disciplines.  In  order  to  give  the  reader  a  general 
introduction to the analysis' theoretical framework, this section will briefly present the study's most 
central  concepts,  returnee  (re)integration  and  returnee  capital.  These  concepts  will  be  further 
expanded upon in chapter 4.
1.1.1   Returnee (Re)integration
When people repatriate – return to their areas of origin – they are usually referred to as 
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'returnees'.  Although some understand returnees solely as former refugees, this study also includes 
internally displaced people (IDPs) within the labeling. Based on Helling's definition (2007), this 
implies that returnees are individuals who have been displaced either within or outside the borders 
of their country and who have now returned to their original areas in order to settle down and 
reestablish sustainable livelihoods. This process – after the actual physical return – is within forced 
migration studies referred to as the process of returnee reintegration.
In line with Helling (ibid),  this analysis  has decided to apply brackets to  the concept  – 
returnee (re)integration. This derives from one of the major disagreements within forced migration 
studies, namely the debate concerning the relationship between people, place and identity. This is 
usually referred to as the sedentarist-nomadic debate; two main approaches that disagree on whether  
human identity is  rooted in  certain physical places or if  identity is  separated from space3.  The 
sedentary approach argues that displaced people are 'out of place', and that the most natural solution 
is to return 'home' (Brun, 2001). This implies a static spatial perspective, in which the area of origin 
is expected to be in an identical state as when it  was left behind. When taking the duration of  
displacement – which in this empirical case can be several decades – and the effects of war and 
conflict  into consideration,  it  is doubtful that no changes have taken place.  In other words, the 
environment the displacees left behind may have changed considerably during their absence, and it 
may even be impossible to return to the exact same place as one originally came from. In this 
regard, this study has decided to use the term '(re)integration',  in which the brackets imply that 
integration can take place in significantly changed or even new environments.
Overall, (re)integration implies much more than simply transporting people back 'home'. It 
involves  a  long-term,  complex  process  of  social,  economic,  political,  cultural  and  civil 
(re)integration, in which the returnees resettle and adapt to a different environment. Thus, in one 
way  one  might  claim  that  the  aim  of  returnee  (re)integration  is  to  secure  developmental  and 
reconstruction goals. This analysis will use the concept of returnee (re)integration as its research 
focus in order to investigate returnees' potential to contribute to post-conflict reconstruction and 
development.
1.1.2   Returnee Capital
The key framework for investigating this is Dominik Helling's proposed concept 'returnee 
capital'. Building on ideas of both sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and forced migration scholar Karen 
Jacobsen, Helling (2007) argues that displacement does not rob people of their ability to maintain 
and develop capital. Capital, as he sees it, consists of a pool of material and non-material resources, 
3 See e.g. Brun (2001), Cresswell (2006), Kibreab (1999), and Malkki (1992).
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including both physical capital (money and property), human capital (education, work experience 
and social knowledge) and social/cultural capital (social networks, attitudes, ideas, etc.). Moreover, 
Helling argues that returnees can act as stimuli for increased attention and assistance from macro 
actors,  such  as  governments,  international  non-governmental  organizations  (INGOs)  and  non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). The concept of returnee capital,  he argues,  can be used to 
examine a society's benefits of return migration; can returnees contribute to society in a fruitful and 
productive way, and if yes, how does it manifest?
Although  this  study  bases  itself  on  Helling's  idea,  it  also  takes  opposing  voices  into 
consideration. Several scholars argue that returnees can be a potential burden on already scarce 
resources,  and therefore threaten local and regional  stability and security4.  The criticisms focus 
mainly but not exclusively on the challenges of weak state management, unwanted urbanization, 
access to land and property, access to employment,  and social challenges. These issues will  be 
further investigated in chapter  4, yet it  should already be stated that they are argued to prevent 
returnees from utilizing their returnee capital. As an attempt to acknowledge such criticism and to 
illuminate the importance of contextual factors, this study has decided to make use of an equation 
introduced by Ajak, Biar and Larson (2012: 14):
returnee integration = returnee capital + prevailing conditions
By incorporating Helling's concept of returnee capital, and simultaneously attempting to identify the  
prevailing (contextual)  conditions that enable or  hinder  returnees  to  utilize  their  resources,  this 
study hopes to gain a comprehensive and realistic understanding of the effects of return migration.
1.2   Problem Statement
The purpose of this study is  to examine the effects  of return migration on  post-conflict 
reconstruction and development. Through qualitative analysis, this thesis seeks to demonstrate how 
the concept of returnee capital can be used to understand returnees' abilities to act as agents of 
development and reconstruction in post-conflict societies. As we have seen above, the main focus of 
analysis  is  the  process  of  (re)integration,  which  is  expected  to  provide  us  with  comprehensive 
knowledge of the factors that promote and prevent the returnees' abilities to utilize their resources. 
By bringing focus to this post-return process, the study aims to highlight an often forgotten phase of 
displacement.
This study acknowledges that,  in  order  to  truly understand returnee (re)integration,  it  is 
4 See e.g. Bascom (1998), Chimni (2002), Kibreab (2002), King (2000), and Petrin (2002).
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necessary to recognize all parties involved in the process. Migration impacts both the migrants and 
the wider society as a whole (Valtonen, 2008). Therefore, the study attempts to shed light on voices 
from both micro and macro levels of society. The individual returnee is the center of attention, yet  
the perceptions of both other grassroots actors, power-holders, and external actors will be included 
in the analysis. In doing so, this study seeks not only to give a thorough and rich understanding of 
the issue, but to highlight the complexity of each individual's situation.
1.2.1   Hypothesis and Assumptions
This study builds on the assumption that  all  human beings are social agents.  Displaced 
people  are  often  understood  as  a  relatively  homogeneous  group  of  vulnerable  and  victimized 
individuals  unable  to  do  anything  to  change  their  situation.  The  sole  focus  on  their  physical 
displacement “robs the displaced of their voice and belittles the substantial contributions they make 
in shaping their own lives” (Vincent,  2001: 1). While displacement removes the individuals from 
their  physical space and social networks,  it  does not  however remove their  potential  as human 
beings. Thus, this study hypothesizes that returnees bring agency, in form of returnee capital, with 
them to  the  return areas.  In  doing so,  we are  able to  examine  how returnees  respond to their  
physical, structural and social environments.
1.2.2   Research Questions
Based on this background, the primary question raised is: What are the effects of return 
migration to post-conflict environments? In order to thoroughly investigate this issue, the following 
questions will be addressed:
1 What is the potential of returnees to participate in the post-conflict reconstruction and development of 
their communities?
2 Which factors promote or hinder the use of returnee capital?
3 Which challenges or benefits does return migration produce for the return areas and the country as a  
whole?
4 Can repatriation be seen as a source of local development – or alternatively as a source of conflict?
1.2.3   Delimitations and Considerations
Taking  the  complex  situation  of  South  Sudan  into  consideration,  this  study  sees  it  as 
necessary  to  make  a  certain  delimitation,  namely  the  avoidance  of  a  specific  focus  on  ethnic 
identity.  As the next chapter will  point out,  ethnicity and clan affiliation have historically been 
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extremely important elements in the South Sudanese context. History shows that ethnicity continues 
to be a crucial factor in South Sudanese social structures, development and mobility, yet the focus 
of this analysis will not be directed to ethnic identity and its role within conflict-induced migration 
and  returnee  (re)integration.  This  decision  mainly  derives  from two reasons;  the  scope of  this 
research project and ethical  considerations. Concerning the former, the available time scale and 
financial  frames  of  this  Master's  project  made  the  acquisition  of  such  information  infeasible. 
Furthermore, ethical considerations would make it difficult to get a thorough understanding of the 
ethnic  demographics  of  Juba  through  the  utilized  research  methods.  The  researcher's  limited 
previous  knowledge  of  the  study  area  further  complicated  this.  However,  the  significance  of 
ethnicity in South Sudan has made it impossible to avoid completely. The analysis will thus for 
example touch upon the connection between employment opportunities and ethnic identity, but only 
when mentioned by informants themselves. The researcher has avoided being the impetus for such 
discussions. A larger study on the role of ethnic identity within returnee (re)integration is needed for 
more comprehensive knowledge on the subject.
1.3   Relevance to Peace Studies
When considering how this project relates to the field of peace studies we must consider the 
recent decades' shift from international to intra-state conflicts. Today's trend of internal warfare is 
considered  significantly  less  deadly,  yet  it  produces  large-scale  displacement  both  within  and 
outside state borders (Mack, 2007). The end of conflicts have thus, as stated by Chimni (2002: 163), 
“come to be associated with the return home of refugees and internally displaced persons, and a 
return to  normality,  peace  and stability”.  In  the midst  of this  we find  the relevant  concepts  of  
repatriation and returnee (re)integration.
To have its returning population successfully (re)integrated into both economic, political and 
social  life  is  crucial  for  any  post-conflict  society.  It  contributes  to  sustaining  a  more  stable 
environment and prevents human beings from becoming potential spoilers. Failure to (re)integrate 
returnees can lead to new displacement cycles or, according to Arowolo (2000: 66), “lead again to 
internal strife, political agitation and civil war, with its predictable negative consequences on the 
economy and society”. This clearly demonstrates the connection between (re)integration and peace; 
adequate (re)integration is linked to stability and security, as well as developmental issues. It can 
therefore be argued that studies on returnee (re)integration are linked to the achievement of both 
negative and positive peace. As argued by the presidents of the Central American countries (in 
Kibreab, 2002: 53); “there can be no lasting peace (...) without initiatives to solve the problems of 
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refugees, returnees, and displaced persons”.
With millions of people being displaced from the Sudanese civil wars – and various conflicts  
in the region in general – this statement can arguably be the case for this analysis as well. As the 
renewed conflict (2013-14) in South Sudan illuminates, the level of integration in society is highly 
crucial; people's ability to relate peacefully to individuals from other groups, their identity being 
based on either returnee status, ethnicity or religion, is determinative for the future of any country. 
As Jok (2011: 15) claims; “[c]oexistence in South Sudan is not just a nice thing to say or a rhetoric 
of  political  correctness.  It  is  a  matter  of  the  survival  of  the  whole”.  In  these  terms,  returnee 
(re)integration should be seen in connection to the concept of peace, in that it has a large-scale 
potential  to contribute to the underlying conditions for positive peace.  In other words,  returnee 
(re)integration and positive peace mutually reinforce each other.
1.4   Motivation for Research
At the time of writing this thesis, there are more than 45 million forcibly displaced people 
around the world5. This means a new refugee or IDP every 4,1 seconds (UNHCR, 2013b). It is in 
the researcher's belief that these vulnerable people deserve to have their voices heard. Yet, as the 
situation currently is, this is not always the reality.
Return migration is a neglected field within forced migration studies. King (2000: 7) claims 
it is “the great unwritten chapter in the history of migration”, and Helling (2007: 21) refers to it as a 
“virgin area of empirical research”. Despite the 20th (and now the 21st) century's enormous focus on 
repatriation, little research has been done on the issue. There is a growing body of literature on 
displacement itself;  the causes of forced migration, patterns of flight, the international rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers, and the management of refugee populations within host states6. Some 
research  also  shed  light  on  repatriation  and  the process  of  actually  returning  people  to  their 
countries of origin. However, there has been done remarkably little research on returnees and their 
experiences  after return. The actual available literature tends to be empirical in nature, and there 
have been few attempts of developing a theoretical framework (Ghosh, 2000; Helling, 2007; King, 
2000).
It is within this context that this study positions itself. By linking the theory presented in 
chapter 4 to the empirical case of South Sudan, the thesis seeks to contribute to filling this gap 
5 UNHCR (2013b) estimates that there were 45,2 forcibly displaced worldwide at the end of 2012. This does therefore  
not include the most recent displacement crises, such as Syria and the Central African Republic.
6 This list is by no means complete, but it  highlights some of the most prominent topics within forced migration 
literature (Bascom, 1998; Shanmugaratnam et.al., 2003).
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within forced migration studies. Through thorough and theoretically based analysis, the study aims 
to better understand the experiences of returnees themselves. The choice of South Sudan as the 
focus of study was due to its major scope and contemporary nature. The Sudans went through one 
of Africa's longest standing conflicts, resulting in approximately 4 million IDPs and about half a  
million  refugees  (De  Wit  &  Hatcher,  2009).  With  the  signing  of  the  Comprehensive  Peace 
Agreement in 2005 and the independence of the Republic of South Sudan in July 2011, many IDPs 
and refugees have decided to return to their ancestral country.
Today, South Sudan is a new and developing state in the process of recovering decades of 
warfare. It is important that every facet of the post-conflict return migration are examined in order 
to facilitate greater (re)integration, and to understand the potential challenges and benefits of the 
process of return migration. The researcher fully agrees with Manger (2004), who argues that the 
peace agreements between Sudan and South Sudan were not only the end of decades of war, but 
also the beginning of something new – the (re)building of the independent state of South Sudan. In 
this crucial moment, it is therefore vital to have a clear overview of the available resources to be 
able to facilitate an efficient and sustainable development of the country.
In a wider perspective, this study should also be of interest to scholars and policy makers 
alike, in regards to the durable solutions to refugee issues;
“Western countries have increasingly closed their borders for immigrants (...) Thus, setting 
'state (re)construction' up with 'returnee (re)integration' is obviously in the interest of, if not 
even  explicitly  driven  by  the  Western  dominated  refugee  regime  in  order  to  save 
international peace and stability.”
Helling (2007: 44)
If repatriation is to continue to be perceived by the international community as the most natural and 
preferred  solution  to  the  world's  refugee  problem,  then  its  potential  to  be  integrated  into  the 
development discourse should be evaluated sooner rather than later. When large proportions of a 
population are displaced, the process of returnee (re)integration becomes a 'make or break' situation 
(Kibreab, 2002: 56). In other words, it seems impossible to treat repatriation and development as 
two separate discourses.  If  we are to agree with Petrin (2002: 5), “[t]he  well-being of returnee 
populations serve as an indication of how transitional states manage development goals [in] the 
post-conflict period”. South Sudan is not a singular case. Currently we are facing massive conflict-
induced displacement from for instance Syria and the Central African Republic – people who will 
potentially  return  in  the  future.  By  studying  the  effects  of  return  migration  on  post-conflict 
reconstruction and development, we may be able to contribute to a richer discourse on the subject 
and a better future for the people involved.
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1.5   Structure of Thesis
This thesis is divided into  six chapters. Chapter 2 presents the case study of this analysis, 
namely South Sudan. It takes the reader through the history of the country, from pre-colonial times, 
through colonialism and the  great  north-south divide,  to  the 20th century's  two civil  wars.  The 
chapter  ends  by  reflecting upon the  contemporary  situation and its  implications  for  this  study. 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodological framework. It highlights the decisions made throughout this 
project, including the choices of study area, research methodology, data collection methods, and 
informant selection. Furthermore, the chapter presents a retrospective discussion on practicalities, 
safety  and  ethical  challenges  in  the  field.  Chapter  4  presents  the  conceptual  and  theoretical 
framework  applied  in  this  study.  The  concepts  returnee,  (re)integration,  and  returnee  capital 
introduced above will be further elaborated, as well as a more detailed discussion on the use of 
returnee capital as a theoretical tool. This theoretical framework forms the basis of chapter 5, which 
presents  the  findings  and  analysis  of  the  study.  Chapter  5  is  divided  into  four  separate,  yet 
intertwined sections; 1) data on the displacement and return, 2) the possession of returnee capital in 
Juba, 3) the prevailing conditions, and 4) returnees' overall potential to contribute in society. Finally,  
chapter 6 will summarize the findings, reflect upon the contemporary developments in South Sudan,  
and suggest some concluding remarks.
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2 Understanding South Sudan's History
“Any struggle must be anchored in history.”
John Garang (2002, in Johnson, 2003: xvi)
South Sudan is  today experiencing a large-scale transformation.  With  one of the largest 
numbers of IDPs in the world and a constant history of conflict and migration, the country currently 
faces a crucial period of its survival and development as an independent state. According to Jok 
(2011: 2), South Sudan came into existence  “...inheriting poor infrastructure, a volatile political 
climate, limited capacity for governance, weak state institutions, a financial crisis, violent ethnic 
divisions,  and  an  uncertain  regional  and  international  political  atmosphere”.  This  challenging 
infancy has proven to be problematic  for the country,  and can arguably have an impact  on the 
(re)integration of returnees in the current environment.
When attempting to understand the contemporary processes in South Sudan, it is therefore 
essential  to  examine  historic  events;  to  carefully  investigate  the  relevant  history  of  the  South 
Sudanese people and the major historical events which have determined their path. This contextual 
background is crucial for obtaining a comprehensive understanding of the challenges the returnees 
face in today's South Sudan. This chapter hence seeks to shed light on the situation in South Sudan,  
through a general historical overview as well as a more specific review of certain issues related to 
this  study's  focus.  The chapter  takes us through the South Sudanese history – from clan-based 
acephalous societies and precolonial regimes, through almost six decades of colonial rule under the 
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, and two prolonged civil wars in the 20th century – with a focus on 
the  sharp  north-south  division  and  conflict-induced  displacement.  Finally,  the  recent  peace 
negotiations and the current situation in South Sudan will be examined.
2.1   Pre-Colonial Sudan: Centralization, Slavery and Religion
Bilad al-Sudan – Arabic for 'the land of the Blacks' – has a long history of states emerging 
and disappearing from prehistoric times until colonialism in the late 19th century. A mixture of states 
and kingdoms have thus defined the economic, political, and social relations within the vast land of 
Sudan (Johnson, 2003). From the early kingdom of Kush (1070 BC – 350 AD), through numerous 
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states, to the 19th-century's Turco-Egyptian (1821-83) and Mahdist (1883-98) rules, what was to 
become Africa's  largest  country  began to  develop  (Holt  & Daly,  2011;  Manger,  2004;  Young, 
2012)7. The roots of the Sudanese wars are often drawn back to the colonial times, however, we 
should not ignore the importance of earlier developments in the region.
Various states have existed along the Nile river and across the northern Sudan – Nubia, Funj, 
and Fur being some of the most prominent. Although there were local nuances, the region was in 
general characterized by nomadic, clan-based societies often referred to as acephalous societies – 
decentralized and segmented social systems (Hylland Eriksen, 2010; Simensen, 2004). The scope of 
the segmentary organization depended on the context and the need for political integration8. At 
various  times,  these  clan-based  societies  were  controlled  by  different  centralized  states  and 
kingdoms; the center of the states held the power, while the hinterlands provided manpower, food 
and wealth (Johnson, 2003). Both state power and trade agreements were based on slavery, which 
were upheld by slave-raiding among other acephalous societies or neighboring states' populations. 
During this period, merchants began arriving from the Arabic world, bringing Islamic traditions to 
the region (ibid; Manger, 2004). As a result of commercial relations, some power-holders gradually 
began embracing such Islamic  traditions,  which  also  opened up for  the  introduction  of  Arabic 
linguistics9. This created a cultural divide between the centralized states and their peripheries.
The southern part of Sudan was mostly outside of the states' reach until the 19th century. 
However, this was to change with the Turco-Egyptian conquest in 1821. As a result of both greater 
resources  and  demands,  the  regime  reached  into  the  south  for  slave-raiding  and  commercial 
exploitation (Johnson, 2003). The majority of the slaves were taken from the south, and 'slaves' and 
'blacks' were soon to be synonymous. Furthermore, a new form of taxation was established, which 
left impoverished farmers with no choice but to work for commercial companies in the south. This  
reinforced the  scope of  slavery by increasing  the  number of  slaves considerably.  According to 
Johnson (ibid), these two developments represent the beginning of the north-south divide in Sudan; 
the developed and powerful center (north) versus the exploited and oppressed periphery (south).
When Muhammad Ahmad – or 'Mahdi' – overthrew the Turco-Egyptian regime in the early 
1880s, the south again became ignored by the central powers (ibid; Sharkey, 2012). It was not until 
7 This refers to Sudan pre-2011, when Sudan and South Sudan together constituted the continent's largest country.
8 Such segmentary social systems are roughly built up of lineages, sub-clans, clans and tribes, and alliances can be 
made on different levels. The Nuer, for instance, have historically been united on the tribe level against the Dinka  
tribe. According to Hylland Eriksen (2010), this segmentary organization was also evident in the civil wars, when 
the 'Africans' in the Southern Sudan stood united against the 'Arabs' in the north.
9 It is important to note the variety of Islamic traditions in the early Sudanese states – as well as in the modern Sudan  
(Johnson, 2003). In addition to following different Islamic traditions, many Sudanese rulers combined Islamic and 
indigenous beliefs. The introduction of Islamic legal texts was also mixed with customary laws. Thus, it would be a 
mistake to understand the introduction of Islam in Sudan as a unified development.
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the British colonization from 1898 that the south should once again become relevant. As we will see 
below, the colonial period represented a new time for Sudan – yet the historical process of unequal 
development  and stratification  in  the  north  and south were only  to  be adjusted to  the colonial 
interests.
2.2   Colonialism in Sudan (1898-1956)
With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the British interest in Sudan and the river Nile 
emerged, and in 1898 the British took control over Sudan as a part of their “gateway to India” 
(Young,  2012:  2).  A year  later,  the  Anglo-Egyptian  Condominium  was  established  as  a  joint 
agreement between Britain and Egypt, although the condominium was to be administered mainly in 
a British tradition (Bassil, 2009; Sharkey, 2012). From the very outset of colonial rule, the northern 
and southern parts of Sudan were treated very differently. In the north the British feared a renewed 
Mahdist opposition, and resources were put into creating alliances with northern Sudanese groups 
(Johnson, 2003). In the south, however, there were no such threats, and the region continued as the 
periphery of a northern center. As a consequence, the north and the south were literally divided into 
two distinct parts of Sudan, differing in both administration, development, religion and language.
2.2.1   The North-South Divide
The  north  of  Sudan  was  the  center  of  the  Anglo-Egyptian  Condominium.  The  colonial 
administration was situated there, the northern Sudanese received more benefits and opportunities, 
and they held more power positions (Johnson, 2003; Young, 2012). Developmental efforts were 
almost  exclusively  reserved  for  the  areas  surrounding  Khartoum,  and a  new class  of  northern 
Sudanese  tenant  farmers,  industrial  workers  and  urban  professionals  emerged.  Arabic  was  the 
official  language  in  both  government  and  education,  and  Islam  and  Islamic  institutions  were 
promoted, while Christian missionaries were discouraged (Holt & Daly, 2011; Sharkey, 2012).
The south, however, stood in sharp contrast. The region was literally cut off from the rest of 
the colony and left to manage itself. The British gave extremely little attention to education and 
development  in  the  south,  and  rather  encouraged  Christian  missionaries  to  do  the  work  (ibid; 
Young, 2012). Instead, Britain's focus in the south was solely one of security. Out of a growing fear 
for Egyptian and Arabic influence, the British decided to close the south off completely in 1929. 
From now on “the South was classified as 'closed districts', in order to keep jallaba10 (...) out and 
10 The word 'jallaba'  originally meant a  peddler  or a petty merchant,  however,  the South Sudanese now use it  to 
describe anyone from the northern Sudan. Today, the term is also closely connected to Arab identity (Holt & Daly, 
2011; Johnson, 2003).
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keep Southerners  in”  (Holt  & Daly,  2011:  96).  Most  Northerners  were  denied  entry,  and  only 
foreign  missionaries  were  given  unhindered  access  (Ahmad,  2010).  English  was  the  official 
language, compared to the Arabic in the north. In some southern states even costumes and names 
related to Islam or Arabic were banned, as well as the Muslim call for prayers.
Unlike the emerging political system in the north, the Southerners were discouraged “from 
engagement in politics, political debate and action” (Nyaba, 1997, in ibid: 4). Any resistance were 
to  be  punished.  The lack of  political  and educational  opportunities for  Southerners were  to  be 
evident upon decolonization, when in 1954-55 only 8 out of 800 government posts were granted the 
south (Ahmad, 2010). In general, the south was from the late 1920s “administered as virtually a 
separate state”, in order to later merge with other similar ethnic groups in the British East African 
colonies (Young, 2012: 3). How history would have looked if this had been allowed to happen, is 
another story in itself and unfortunately outside of this thesis' focus.
2.2.2   The Imperial Logic behind the 'Southern Policy'
Scholars disagree on the causes of the sharp division between the north and the south under 
British rule. Young (ibid: 3) argues that the Southern policy was “one of benign neglect”11. During 
colonial times the British had a general policy aimed at preserving local cultures. In colonies like 
India, Ceylon and Nigeria, the natives were according to the policy differentiated based on ethnic, 
religious  or  linguistic  lines  (Salih,  1990).  With  this  differentiation,  however,  followed  often  a 
negative categorization and segregation.  The differences  between people were emphasized,  and 
people were treated differently according to their group affiliation. This was the case also in Sudan.  
The population was roughly divided into 'the north' and 'the south' – Arabs in opposition to blacks, 
Muslims in opposition to non-Muslims.
Bassil  (2009),  however,  explains  the  division  in  slightly  different  terms;  as  a  colonial 
'civilizing mission'. Due to historical developments, Arabs were seen as more civilized than non-
Arabs, while black Africans – synonymous with slaves – were seen as primitive and backwards. 
Thus, the British believed that the Arabs were more likely to reach a higher level of progress, while 
indigenous institutions “would be more appropriate for [the blacks] at the stage of development they 
had reached” (ibid: 214).
Regardless of explanation, the British sought to strengthen the identification within each 
group opposed to the 'other'. Consequently, the north and the south developed independently of each 
other and laid the basis for a profound disintegration. Scholars believe that this have had long-term 
effects on the Sudanese people. Ahmad (2010: 3) argues that  “isolating the southern part of the 
11 Italic added.
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country from the north (…) curtail[ed] any cultural or social move that could have led to future 
integration and unity”.  Salih (1990: 418) goes as far as to argue that “British policy must be held 
responsible  for  fostering  the  conditions  which  later  contributed  to  the  eruption  of  inter-group 
conflict”. The 'Southern policy' has arguably had a tremendous impact on the Sudanese – and now 
South Sudanese – history. The racial stratification created strong, opposing identities between the 
Southerners  and  Northerners,  nurturing  mutual  prejudices,  dissatisfaction  and  disintegration 
(Ahmad, 2010; Bassil, 2009; Salih, 1990).
2.2.3   Towards Independence
As the 1940s came to an end, a process of 'Sudanizing' the colonial administration was fully 
underway. However, power positions were reserved only for an elite of educated, Muslim, Arabic-
speaking, northern Sudanese (Sharkey, 2012). In 1949 the first northern Sudanese was appointed to 
lead the Ministry of Education, which lead to large-scale changes in language politics in the south. 
From the early 1950s, Arabic was introduced as the official language of education in the south, 
marking the beginning of a period of increased Arabization of the region. Otherwise,  very few 
changes were made in order to prepare for the departure of the British. 
Sudan became an independent state 1 January 1956. With no constitution, widespread social 
and economic difficulties, and a largely disunited and resentful population, the following decades 
would prove to be problematic. With six different governments between 1956-2011, Sudan “has not 
experienced stability since it got its independence from Britain in 1956” (Assal, 2011: 2). Instead, 
the country has experienced severe conflicts and large-scale population displacement.
2.3   Reasons for Displacement: A Brief History of Conflict
The Sudans have a long history of migration. Despite forced migration being a more modern 
phenomenon, the population is historically known for being highly mobile; “on average 40 percent 
of the total population in Sudan is believed to be on the move every year for different motives and 
durations” (Hamid, 1996, in Assal, 2011: 1). Nomadic movements, rural-to-urban migration, and 
famine related displacement are some of the diverse types of migration Sudan has experienced.
The conflict-induced displacement also has historical roots. During the Mahdist  rule, for 
instance,  internal  and external wars,  combined with a  strict  policy of military conscription and 
forced migration to  the capital,  resulted in massive population displacement (Assal,  2011). The 
displaced earned labels from the central Sudanese – depending on which region they came from. 
This created a divide between people, having important implications for the contemporary nation-
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building and integration (ibid).
By 2005, two Sudanese civil wars had led to more than four million IDPs and about half a 
million refugees (Shanmugaratnam, 2010).  Since then,  the numbers have varied widely,  due to 
continued  unrest  and  occasional  violence  in  the  south.  According  to  Assal  (2011:  2),  “[the] 
contemporary conflict-induced migration is a continuation of previous regimes of forced population 
movements that took place during different periods but for similar structural causes”. We will now 
look further into the modern displacement, its causes and effects.
2.3.1   The First Civil War (1955-72)
The  first  Sudanese  civil  war  began  already  before  independence,  in  1955.  Dissatisfied 
Southerners  mutinied in  Torit,  attacking both  militant  and civilian Northerners  (Johnson,  2003; 
Sharkey,  2012).  The government in  Khartoum soon hit  back,  and villages were burnt,  civilians 
killed, arrested and tortured, women raped, and many fled their homes. In 1964 it was estimated 
60,000  Sudanese refugees in Uganda alone (Holt & Daly, 2011). According to Mills (1977, in Akol, 
1987), more than 25 percent of the Southern population were displaced during this war. However, 
the exact number of internally displaced is unknown.
There  were  many  factors  behind  the  beginning of  the  first  Sudanese  civil  war,  yet  the 
heritage from the colonial times should be highlighted (Rolandsen, 2010; Sharkey, 2012). As we 
have seen, the south was virtually blocked off from the north during colonial times, hindering both 
equal development, integration, and a natural spread of Islam and Arabic culture. In contrast, the 
'Southern problem' was dealt with in a completely opposite manner during the first civil war. In 
order to repair the colonial 'damage', the Northerners initiated an intense spread of Islam and Arabic 
in the south. Christians were marginalized and in 1962 all foreign missionaries were expelled from 
Sudan (Sharkey, 2012). The government spent a large amount of resources on Islamic propagation, 
attempting to pressure Southerners to convert. As argued by Sharkey (ibid: 436), “the politics of 
religion, language, and education became inextricably tangled”.
Nonetheless,  the  policies  did  not  give  the  results  the  Northerners  were  hoping  for. 
Conversion to Christianity ironically increased as the missionaries were expelled and the churches 
attacked (Johnson, 2003). The Arabization and Islamization of the south did not create a feeling of 
unification – as expected – but rather one of cultural colonialism (Sharkey, 2012). The Southerners 
felt discriminated, and the dissatisfaction and resentment contributed to the seventeen years' long 
civil war. The fighting lasted until the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972.
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2.3.2   The Second Civil War (1983-2005)
The signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement promised the Southerners greater autonomy, and 
English was accepted as the administrative language in the south (Ahmad, 2010; Sharkey, 2012). 
However, the interwar years were characterized by broken promises, northern interference in the 
south, and, in 1983, the introduction of Islamic Sharia law for the entire country (Johnson, 2011; 
Sharkey, 2012). Thus, the relative stability came to an end and the second civil war broke out.
In 1983 a number of discontent South Sudanese soldiers in the Sudanese Army mutinied and 
formed the guerrilla movement the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). They were later joined 
by Anyanya rebels who had fought against the north in the first civil war. Led by John Garang, a 
Dinka  Lieutenant  Colonel,  the  movement  took  up  the  fighting  against  the  central  Sudanese 
government. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the political wing of SPLA, was 
soon established as well. Contrary to its predecessor, Anyanya I, during the first civil war and their 
secessionist  demand,  the  Sudan  People's  Liberation  Movement/Army  (SPLM/A)  fought  for  a 
unified Sudan (Johnson, 1991). In Garang's words, the SPLM/A called for a 'New Sudan' – a united 
Sudan  for  all  Sudanese  regardless  of  ethnicity,  religion  or  language.  The  central  Sudanese 
government,  on the other hand,  fought for control of the south and its vast  reserves of natural 
resources (ibid). Thus, the second civil war was mainly fought about the balance of power in Sudan 
as a whole.
According to Johnson (2011), the second civil war was much more deadly than the first. 
Both sides built up local militias, who more frequently attacked the civilian population. Villages 
were attacked if they supported the other side, people were killed, crops destroyed, and families 
split.  Estimates  claim  that  more  than  two  million  were  killed  (IOM,  2011).  The  fighting,  the 
systematic targeting of civilians, and a chronic food shortage, also led to mass-displacement of both 
Northerners and Southerners12.
However,  fleeing the war zones did not necessarily  grant  people security.  As argued by 
Johnson (2003: 155), the population displacement in Sudan became:
“...a major feature of the war. It is not an incidental outcome of the fighting but is one of its  
objectives; it involves not just the removal of whole groups and individuals from their home 
areas,  but  the incorporation of those populations either into competing armies,  or  into a  
captive labour force.” 
In other words, people became an integral part of the fight for resources. Impoverishment created 
incentives to join the armies, something both parties took advantage of. Slavery was revived and 
12 People fled to more secure neighboring villages, some entire groups moved out of war zones, some took refuge in  
government-held towns in the south, some fled north, and some fled to other countries (Johnson, 2011).
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used as a policy of terror against the Southerners. Displaced people around Khartoum enjoyed no 
rights, their shelters were systematically demolished, and they were often forcibly resettled into 
'production  sites'.  Hundreds  of  thousands  were  removed  from  the  outskirts  of  Khartoum  and 
forcibly put to work on various projects across the north.
Additionally, the fall of the Ethiopian president Mengistu in 1991 led to the evacuation of 
thousands of Southern refugees back to Sudan. Despite the urgent need for humanitarian assistance, 
the  lack  of  infrastructure  and  poor  cooperation  with  Khartoum  restricted  the  access  of  relief 
agencies. All in all, the second civil war hit the civilian population severely, and created scars for 
decades to come.
2.3.3   The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the 2011 Referendum
After almost half  a century of fighting,  a decade of attempted dialogue,  and large-scale 
international  attention,  the  Government  of  Sudan (GoS)  and SPLM signed the  Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. The CPA has been referred to as a political milestone in Sudanese 
history, including agreements on power sharing, wealth sharing, and security issues (Ahmad, 2010; 
Johnson, 2011; Manger, 2008). Of more importance for the south, however, was their approved 
right to self-determination. The parties agreed on a six-year interim period, followed by a southern 
referendum;  should  the  south  stay  a  part  of  Sudan or  should  it  become a  separate  state?  The 
Southerners spoke, and the Republic of South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011 
with 98,3 percent votes (Young, 2012).
It would be natural to think that the signing of CPA and the subsequent referendum would 
lead to broad changes for the displaced populations, yet, it has proven difficult. The two civil wars 
produced an estimated 4 million IDPs and about half  a million refugees. As one of the world's 
largest displaced populations, as much as 17 percent of the total population was estimated internally 
displaced prior to the CPA (Assal, 2011). The majority of these IDPs fled to Khartoum, as a result of 
government policies to concentrate services in urban areas. People fleeing the south constituted the 
largest  group. Life in  Khartoum was harsh (see Chapter  5.1).  Limited access to both land and 
employment made it difficult for displaced households to be sustainable. Many hence depended on 
food aid. This, however, dried out from 2002 when relief efforts were directed elsewhere.
Despite the hard life of displacement, many people were reluctant to return home. The CPA 
did  not  lead to  an immediate  state  of security  everywhere,  and many southern areas  were  not  
considered safe to return to. This is stated by Assal (ibid: 9):
“When the peace agreement was signed, there was general euphoria that peace had come, 
and there was the possibility that IDPs would voluntarily return to their original areas. But  
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that euphoria was premature: not only did very few IDPs return, but some returnees fled  
back to Khartoum; owing to the deteriorating security conditions in their home areas.”
Thus, many IDPs chose to remain in displacement – especially in Khartoum.
However,  according  to  the  International  Organization  for  Migration  (IOM)  (2011:  33), 
repatriation has been seen as “a priority aspect of the national recovery and peace-building policies 
and  the  international  support  to  Sudan”.  Between  the  CPA and  independence,  approximately 
116,000 IDPs returned through organized programs (ibid). However, the majority of returns have 
been spontaneous, and IOM estimates that a total of 2 million IDPs successfully returned during the 
period of 2005-2009 (ibid).
After the 2011 referendum, the situation for Southerners in the north became more pressing. 
The  government  of  Sudan  (GoS)  declared  that  all  Southerners  soon  would  become  'foreign 
nationals' in Sudan, giving them the choice of either leaving Sudan or apply for residence or work 
permits as other foreigners (Assal, 2011). Since then, 328,800, 160,400, and 93,900 returnees have 
arrived in South Sudan in respectively 2011, 2012 and 2013 (IOM, 2013a). The overall large-scale 
return migration has been followed by high demands of resettlement, (re)integration and livelihood 
opportunities  in  the  south.  A brief  overview  of  the  current  political,  economic,  social,  and 
developmental situation awaiting the returnees in South Sudan follows.
2.4   The New South Sudan: Returning to What?
“A peace agreement (...) is not only the end of a period of civil war; it is also the beginning  
of something. And this beginning is the potential building of 'a new Sudan'.”
Manger (2004: 117)
As argued by Manger, the last decade has seen the end of a long-lasting conflictual history in 
the Sudans. Agreements have been made, and a new state has emerged. Although Garang's vision of 
a 'New Sudan' never became realized, the world is currently witnessing the build-up of South Sudan 
as a new state and nation. Despite the euphoria following the referendum, the country is now facing 
severe challenges – security being one of the most acute.
When South Sudan became a separate state in 2011, many raised their  worry about  the 
political stability of the country (Jok, 2011). This has been legitimate when looking at the various 
episodes of inter-communal violence, armed rebellions, and local resource conflicts that have taken 
place in South Sudan the last couple of years. Local conflicts in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile  
states in the south, Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states in the north, and Darfur to the west, 
have led to widespread displacement and a state of insecurity in the region (UNHCR, 2013a). South 
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Sudan has also experienced an inflow of people fleeing the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic.  The continued disagreements 
with the government of Sudan (GoS) regarding border demarcation, oil transportation and revenues, 
and citizenship have further complicated the situation.
The escalating violence in South Sudan from late 2013 has put additional pressure on the 
population. The fighting between the factions of President Salva Kiir and former Vice President 
Riek Machar began in Juba in December 2013, and has since spread to six of the country's ten 
states. According to the UN (OCHA, 2014a), thousands have been killed and almost 900,000 people 
have fled their homes – the majority (738,000 people) being internally displaced. This clearly shows 
the vulnerability of the present South Sudan, and the state of insecurity and violence many South 
Sudanese are still faced with.
2.4.1   The Current State of Development
The long-lasting history of conflict  meant that South Sudan practically had to start from 
scratch. As stated by President Salva Kiir in November 2010 (in Maxwell et.al., 2012: 20); “There  
has been no development in South Sudan. We have no roads,  no bridges,  no water,  no power, 
nothing at all,  no hospitals, and no schools – everything is at zero”. The two civil wars hit the 
country  hard;  it  disrupted  livelihoods,  reduced  health  and  education  standards,  and  prevented 
economic and social development. The absence of efficient administrative institutions pre-CPA have  
also had its toll on the overall developmental level.
Overall, South Sudan is one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world. Its main 
revenue is the oil industry, accounting for around 80 percent of the GDP and 98 percent of the fiscal 
revenue (World Bank, 2013). This makes South Sudan the most oil-export dependent country in the 
world – which has been evident during the disagreements with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir 
and the repeated closing of pipelines.  Despite the oil  wealth,  the South Sudanese population is  
living under harsh conditions. Over half the population of 10,8 million live below the poverty line, 
more than 80 percent depend on agriculture or livestock for their survival, and only 27 percent are  
literate (ibid). Although South Sudan has very fertile  land, only 4 percent  of its arable land is  
cultivated  (Maxwell  et.al.,  2012).  Poor  or  non-existing  infrastructure  and a  subsequent  lack  of 
access to  markets hinder efficient  farming,  combined with disrupted harvests during periods of 
fighting.
Today, South Sudan is undergoing a rapid process of urbanization. Despite the government's 
policy of 'taking the towns to the people', the major urban areas are growing with high speed. A 
combination of conflict-induced migration to urban areas, economic prospects, and poor service 
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delivery in rural areas, are believed to be the main causes (ibid).
However, even the cities lack employment opportunities. The job market is limited and the 
majority of people are doing semi-skilled or unskilled work in the informal sector, including both 
residents, returnees and IDPs (Martin & Mosel, 2011). Only 10 percent of the South Sudanese 
workforce is believed to have formal employment, and foreign workers take up increasingly more 
of  the  jobs  available  (ibid).  Both  skilled  and  unskilled  workers  arrive  from  Kenya,  Uganda, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, who are estimated to constitute 
85 % of the skilled labor in Juba (Maxwell et.al, 2012). The high unemployment rates have been 
reported to force women to take on more responsibilities, as their husbands are unemployed or 
receive irregular salaries as civil servants or soldiers (Martin & Mosel, 2011).
For  the  majority  it  is  thus  challenging to  secure  livelihoods  in  South  Sudan.  However, 
employment is but one of many current challenges in South Sudan. Sufficient provision of clean 
water,  sanitation  and  electricity  are  also  lacking.  In  the  capital  Juba  only  30  percent  of  the 
population have access to safe water (Maxwell et.al, 2012).
2.4.2   South Sudanese Identity
Another  important  issue in  today's  South Sudan is  identity.  As stated  by Jok (2011:  4); 
“[n]ow that South Sudan has become a state, it also needs to become a nation”. With its multi-
cultural and multi-ethnic population, it has proved challenging to find common grounds in the new 
state. As this chapter has shown, the south has historically had one common enemy – the north. 
From the colonial marginalization to the fight for self-determination, the north has functioned as a 
unifier  “against  foreign  occupation  and  domination”  (ibid:  7).  Within  this  picture,  the  South 
Sudanese identity has developed based on its differences from the Sudanese. 
Today this unifier is generally gone, and the main question for South Sudan is “how to turn 
its ethnic and cultural diversity into a useful asset, forming the colorful and unified country that 
everyone had yearned for” (ibid: 3). The civil wars constitute a part of people's collective memory, 
yet it is questionable if this is enough. Jok (ibid) refers to the north-south divide as merely a source 
of 'negative unity'. Now that this source is no longer relevant, many scholars look with worry on 
South Sudan's viability as a nation (ibid).  Ethnicity is  a strong factor,  and can potentially be a  
source of disintegration. Political power is perceived to be closely related to ethnicity, and ethnic 
tensions have occurred several times13. The historical segmentary organization has left people with 
strong clan and tribe affiliation, while the loyalty to a centralized state is limited. As a result of the 
13 The conflict between former Vice President Riek Machar (Nuer) and President Salva Kiir (Dinka) since December  
2013 is a recent example of this.
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weak South Sudanese state, people's loyalty rather lies within lower segmentary levels such as clan 
and tribe.
Returnees particularly can be affected by an identity crisis. For instance, there have been 
reports on resentment towards those who fled during the war (Macdonald, 2010). The situation is 
particularly  difficult  for  people  who  have  been  displaced  in  Sudan  and  who  have  developed 
proficiency in Arabic (Sharkey, 2012). Due to the protracted conflict, many South Sudanese have 
been born in exile, and are therefore only fluent in Arabic. Upon return they naturally bring their 
language  with  them –  to  a  context  where  the  official  language  is  English.  These  'children  of 
Arabization' – as Sharkey (ibid) refers to them – are therefore facing challenges in the south, both 
when it comes to opportunities and their sense of belonging. Although they have adopted the Arabic 
language,  it  is,  however,  important  to note that this does not  necessarily mean the adoption of 
Arabic culture and identity. Residents, however, may make certain assumptions about the cultural 
identity of others that may not necessarily reflect the returnees' perception of themselves.
2.5   Summary
This chapter has examined the historical background of South Sudan, through an overview 
of precolonial societies, colonialism and war history. It has demonstrated that social organization, 
marginalization and identity have had a major impact on the development of a modern South Sudan.  
Moreover, the historical causes and effects of migration and conflict-induced displacement have 
been explored, with special emphasis on the 20th century's two civil wars between Sudan and South 
Sudan. Lastly, a brief overview of the post-conflict situation in South Sudan has been presented. 
Such  an  historical  overview  is  highly  relevant  in  order  to  understand  the  historical  and 
contemporary displacement in  the region,  as  well  as the current  situation of  politics,  economy, 
security,  and  social  issues.  Chapter  4  will  later  demonstrate  the  importance  of  this  contextual 
environment for sustainable returnee (re)integration, yet we will first turn to the methodological 
aspects of this study.
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3 Methodological Framework
The objective of this project is to examine returnees' ability to contribute to reconstruction 
and development in  post-conflict  South Sudan. In order to  address these issues,  this  study has 
sought  to  gain  qualitative  data  through  triangulations  of  both  research  methods  and  informant 
selection.  This  was  expected  to  provide  us  with  comprehensive  knowledge  of  the  factors  that 
promote and prevent  the returnees'  abilities to utilize their  resources.  In order to give thorough 
explanations and justifications for the methodological choices made throughout this project, this 
chapter will give an overall overview of the methodological framework utilized. The chapter first 
presents an overview of the study area and the logic behind the choice of a qualitative approach, as 
well  as the three research methods utilized,  namely semi-structured interviews, observation and 
document analysis. Furthermore, the process of selecting informants will  be explored, including 
both sample methods and an overview of informants.  Finally,  the chapter  will  reflect  upon the 
challenges encountered during the research period, with special emphasis on ethical and security 
considerations. Overall, with this chapter the researcher seeks to provide a reliable basis for the 
further analysis.
3.1   Study Area
The capital Juba is one of the few larger cities in South Sudan. Situated along the White  
Nile, Juba served as a garrison town for the government of Sudan during the civil wars (Pantuliano 
et.al., 2008). However, with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, Juba became the 
interim capital of Southern Sudan. Since then, the city has experienced tremendous changes, both 
demographically  and  developmentally.  In  2005,  it  was  estimated  that  Juba  had  approximately 
250,000 inhabitants – 163,000 residents and 87,000 IDPs (Martin & Mosel,  2011). In 2010 the 
population had doubled to an estimated 500,00014, and Juba is today characterized by widespread 
informal settlements, squatting, and land conflicts.
Juba was chosen as the study area for this analysis  due to its long-term and large-scale 
14 No exact population figures exist for Juba, and the estimates vary from 500,000 to 1 million. Some news reports  
claim there are as many as 1 million inhabitants (2007), the USAID's estimate lies around 500,000, while Southern  
Sudanese government sources suggest  between 500,000 and 600,000 (Martin & Mosel,  2011; Pantuliano et.al., 
2008).
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experiences with forced displacement and return migration. During wartime Juba was considered to 
be the safest town in the area, and many people, both from Southern Sudan and from neighboring 
countries, fled there (ibid). These people were allowed to settle temporarily on abandoned land 
within Juba. Since the signing of CPA it has been estimated that more than 2,3 million displaced 
people have returned to South Sudan, many of which have decided to settle down in the capital 
(ibid).  Hence,  Juba  has  experienced  a  large  influx  of  people  in  search  of  security  and  better 
livelihood opportunities;  returnees,  IDPs,  work migrants  from neighboring countries,  and other 
foreigners. Additionally, many returnees arrive in Juba as a transit point on their way home, which 
often takes a much longer time than expected. The International Rescue Committee (2009, in ibid) 
estimates that only approximately 10 percent of the returnees originate from Juba, yet many view 
Juba as a better opportunity than continuing on to the rural areas.
This dynamic has posed large challenges for the capital. Despite Juba's current position as 
the country's political and economic center, the government has not been able to keep pace with the  
contemporary developments. As argued by Pantuliano and colleagues (2008: 7), “progress has been 
remarkable in some areas, but the challenges of rebuilding Juba to address the multiple and often 
conflicting needs of different  interest groups remain considerable”.  Issues of land and property 
conflicts, unemployment, high living costs, and poor access to social services – especially water and  
electricity – are some of the contemporary challenges for Juba's population. Also, Juba's position as 
an  increasingly  multiethnic  city  with  large-scale  international  presence  may  pose  additional 
challenges.
Thus, Juba is an extremely interesting – and contemporary – study area for the issue of  
returnee (re)integration. Its position in one of the world's most unstable regions further highlights 
this. Of course, any large city tells a different story than the country as a whole, and generalizations 
to the rest of South Sudan will be unavailable. However, several respondents in this research shared 
their experiences from other and more rural areas of the country. Therefore, return migration to the 
region in general will be reflected upon, and some comparisons will be suggested.
3.2   Research Methodology
For collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data, this research project could have been built 
on either quantitative or qualitative methodological approaches – or a combination of the two. The 
different  approaches  can  be  useful  in  their  own  ways,  through  determining  and  directing  the 
research  in  various  directions.  As  argued  by  Holliday  (2002:  5),  “quantitative  and  qualitative 
research do represent very different ways of thinking about the world”. It is hence crucial to be 
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aware of this when deciding which approach to make use of.
After careful consideration a qualitative approach has been chosen for this project, due to its 
specific understanding of social life. While quantitative research seeks concrete answers through a 
hypothetical-deductive approach, qualitative methodology aims to uncover deeper aspects of social 
life through an inductive reasoning (Bryman, 2001; Holliday, 2002). The qualitative approach has 
further  been  argued  to  “celebrate  richness,  depth,  nuance,  context,  multi-dimensionality  and 
complexity”  (Mason,  2002:  1). As  this  project  seeks  to  thoroughly  investigate  the  individual 
experiences of returnees in South Sudan, it is exactly this kind of richness and complexity we are 
looking for. Applying a quantitative methodology to this project could have limited the worldviews 
of the people studied, and was therefore deemed unsuitable. Additionally, due to the broad nature of 
the  research  topic,  this  project  also  required  an  open  methodological  approach  to  allow  for 
adaptability  and  sensitivity  to  the  local  context.  This  became  evident  during  the  fieldwork,  as 
geographical and security dimensions put restrictions on the mobility of the researcher15.
Thus,  a  qualitative  methodology  has  been  used  to  study  the  particular  case  of  return 
migration to South Sudan. The case study design was chosen due to its unique function as a bridge 
between the theoretical  approach and the specific 'real-life'  context of the study area (Miller & 
Brewer, 2003). The social variables derived from the research are particular to that social setting of 
Juba, and should be investigated in accordance with this reality16.
Unfortunately, all methodological choices have their disadvantages. As a result of an often 
small sample and a subjective researcher, it is argued that qualitative findings can be very difficult 
to generalize to other settings (ibid). However, generalizability is not the main objective of this 
project. As researchers, we must acknowledge that the specific cases we study usually are parts of  
on-going social processes. This is also the situation for this analysis, in which the (re)integration 
process will continue long after the closure of this project. Thus, the research setting and the people 
the researcher encounter can only give contemporary, interpretive results. As stated by Holliday 
(2002: 1),  “qualitative research presents a statement about  reality and social life that has to be 
continually argued and reaffirmed”.
This challenge can be a drawback in some regards, yet it does not mean that the research 
findings are of no value. Although this analysis may not be suitable for broad generalization, it will 
contribute to a greater understanding of the possible effects of return migration. Currently, we know 
surprisingly little about the dynamics of repatriation and its effects on both the returnees and their 
15 While poor infrastructure made the main fieldwork restricted to the center of Juba, security demands (made by both 
the research institution and local sources) restricted the movement of the solo researcher. Adding the limited time  
frame of a Master's project, a larger collection of quantitative data would thus not have been feasible.
16 Based on the theoretical approach presented in chapter 4, the specific context of the study area has a vital impact on 
the data obtained and the results deriving from the research.
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communities, and it is therefore vital to acquire empirical evidence on the issue. In this regard, an 
in-depth qualitative study of the lived experiences of returnees in South Sudan has the potential to 
contribute to the wider discourse of forced migration studies.
3.3   Triangulation of Methods
As a  means  to  overcome  the  challenges  of  qualitative  methodology,  a  triangulation  of 
methods have been developed for this study. According to several scholars,  the use of multiple 
methods can contribute to answer the research questions from different angles, to cross-check and 
confirm findings, and to analyze the topic in a more comprehensive manner (see e.g. Bryman, 2001; 
Lewis & Ritchie, 2003; Mason, 2002). This may subsequently increase the robustness and validity 
of the conclusions drawn from the research.
In  this  regard,  three  methods  have  been  utilized  in  this  study;  qualitative  interviews, 
observation and document analysis. Although these methods have been used to differing degrees, it 
is in the researcher's opinion that the methods support, complement and reflect upon each other. 
This is also an attempt to provide a holistic understanding of the issue through 'thick descriptions'17 
of the variables, and thus making transferability more feasible.
3.3.1   Qualitative Interviews
In order to gain relevant and rich knowledge, this study has utilized qualitative interviews as 
its main method for accessing data. Based on the project's aim, it may be argued that an in-depth 
understanding  of  the  issue  would  not  be  feasibly  available  through  other  methods  alone18. 
Interviews allow us  to  acquire  in-depth  knowledge about  the social  world based on individual 
perspectives; the informants can express their thoughts about and experiences from the specific 
phenomenon – returnee (re)integration – in their own words (Bryman, 2001; Legard et.al., 2003).
A semi-structured  interview format  was  chosen  in  order  to  celebrate  the  flexibility  and 
spontaneity of qualitative interviewing, combined with a certain level of structure. In this regard, a 
thematic interview guide was developed (see Appendix 2).  While this guide was by no means a 
complete set of topics, it is reflective of the issues this project seeks to highlight. Furthermore, the 
interview process was customized to be flexible based on the responses and experiences obtained in 
the field. Such an approach contributed to avoiding inappropriate research frames,  which could 
17 'Thick descriptions', a concept introduced by Clifford Geertz, provide additional information about the context in 
which the data derives from, allowing the reader to assess the findings in a comprehensive perspective (Lewis & 
Ritchie, 2003: 268).
18 There are very few studies conducted on the micro level, making it challenging to find similar data from other  
sources – especially from the returnees' own perspectives.
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have imposed certain conversational directions on the interviews or prevented the development of 
trust relationships between researcher and informants.
During the fieldwork 23 interviews were conducted with 28 informants19. The interviews 
took place at locations of the informants' convenience and lasted between 30 minutes and 2 hours, 
depending on the time schedules of the informants and their willingness to share. Informed consent 
was given, either in written or oral form, according to the Norwegian Social Science Data Services 
(NSD). The initial plan was to audio-record all interviews, in order to allow a thorough analysis of 
the  real-world  narratives.  However,  most  interviews  with  returnees  were  conducted  with  an 
interpreter, in which there was no inherent value in capturing the exact audio. Thus, 8 out of the 23 
interviews were audio-recorded and later transcribed by the researcher. Handwritten notes were 
taken during all interviews, also in complement to the recorded data. This later proved particularly 
useful, since many of the recordings included disturbing elements such as traffic or heavy rain.
3.3.2   Observation
As a complementary method, personal/informal observation was also utilized during this 
project. Due to the importance of contextual factors, observation has been a crucial tool in order to 
understand the  situation  in  Juba and the  environment  faced by the  returnees.  Additionally,  the 
method has proved useful in discovering patterns of behavior, rhetoric and relationships in the field 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2011). Observation was also utilized during the interviews, from which the 
informants'  body  language,  emotions,  and  tone  of  voice  added  additional  dimensions  to  the 
interview data.
Through four weeks of observation in Juba, the researcher has thus “engag[ed] with the field 
(...) both intellectual[ly] and physical[ly]” (Coffey, 1999, in Mason, 2002: 87). By attending and 
observing various events and organizational cluster meetings, by observing informants' behavior, 
and by simply spending time in Juba, it can be argued that the researcher has gained a richer and 
more in-depth understanding of the field. A vast amount of field notes were taken during this period, 
and  later  processed  as  research  data  in  triangulation  with  qualitative  interviews  and document 
analysis.
3.3.3   Document Analysis
The final data collection method chosen for this project is document analysis. In accordance 
with the research questions, this exploratory method has been used to search for underlying and 
19 Due to practical considerations and the wishes of the informants, one interview was conducted as a focus group  
discussion  with  four  returnees.  Additionally,  one  INGO  interview  was  carried  out  with  three  informants  
simultaneously.
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recurring themes in various documents (Bryman, 2012). Through document analysis the researcher 
has sought to acquire background information prior to the fieldwork, but also to obtain empirical 
and evaluative knowledge throughout the research project. This process has been carried out until 
theoretical  saturation  was achieved,  and  appropriate  categories  for  the  analysis  were  well 
developed.
A variety of texts and documents have been included in the analysis, including both public 
and  non-public  documents.  Official  documents  such  as  annual  reports,  evaluations,  statistical 
documents, and policy documents have been collected from authorities, international organizations, 
and local-level organizations both online and in the field. In addition, non-public documents, such 
as meeting minutes, strategic plans, and internal communication acquired in the field have also been 
included  in  the  data.  Altogether,  the  researcher  believes  that  these  sources  have  provided  an 
important platform for an in-depth analysis.
3.4   Informant Selection
This  study  has  utilized  non-probability  sampling  to  both  gain  access  to  and  select 
informants. As a first-time, lone researcher in South Sudan, it was important to find productive 
ways of identifying informants believed to have the richest and most relevant information for this 
research project. Therefore, purposive sampling methods have been used to select informants20.
Prior to the fieldwork, snowball sampling was selected as the main technique for finding 
relevant  informants  for  the  qualitative  interviews.  Due  to  practical  matters  and  difficulties  of 
accessing  the  field,  this  sampling  method  proved  to  be  essential.  Based  on relevance,  various 
organizational actors, academics and researchers in South Sudan were sought out and contacted 
through email or telephone. This allowed for initial contact with several of the to-be-informants, as 
well as contacts and assistance when it comes to the practical planning of the fieldwork. Through 
snowball sampling, these contacts also introduced the researcher to their networks and to possible 
informants, and gave recommendations on the path forward.
However, relying solely on the networks of these organizations for informant recruitment 
could have been problematic. In regards to the sampling of returnees, this might exclude more 
isolated or marginalized individuals or households not connected to any organizational network 
(Ritchie et.al.,  2003).  In addition,  most  of the NGOs working with returnees only had projects 
outside  of  the  capital,  meaning  they  had  no  returnee  networks  to  introduce  to  the  researcher. 
20 Lack of usable official registers and communication infrastructure in parts of the study area, would have made it 
unfeasible to utilize a probability sampling method.
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Therefore, an additional sampling method was utilized, namely opportunistic sampling. It became 
evident that the researcher needed to be extremely adaptable and take advantage of any unforeseen 
opportunity within the field21.  Therefore,  it  proved necessary to make minor adjustments in the 
sampling  approach  in  order  to  ensure  the  inclusion  of  informants  with  the  most  relevant 
experiences.
Overall, snowballing combined with opportunistic sampling were seen as the most feasible 
recruitment alternatives. This further compensated for the potential power the gatekeepers could 
have  exercised  through  utilizing  snowballing  alone  (Bryman,  2012).  Although  the  use  of 
snowballing showed possible  roles  of  returnee  networks  and social  organization,  it  could have 
hindered the analysis' identification of other important factors. Thus, by making use of more than 
one sampling method, the researcher also sought to ensure the diversity of the sample.
3.5   Informants
In  addition  to  the  multiple-methods  approach,  this  project  has  sought  to  access  a 
triangulation of perspectives as well. In order to gain a broader and more holistic understanding of 
the topic, the sample included the following groups of informants:
Table 1: List of informants for interviews, fieldwork June 2013




Displaced due to conflict. 
Displaced to today's Sudan.






Living in return areas.
1




Projects involving returnees 
(directly/indirectly).
13
South Sudanese authorities Formerly or currently employed by 
the authorities.
3
21 For example, the researcher's guesthouse accommodation was coincidentally housing a number of female returnees 
who were attending a women's conference. Even though the primary objective was to recruit informants living in 
Juba, this provided an opportunity impossible to dismiss. Some of these informants further introduced the researcher 
to other returnees in Juba.
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As table 1 suggests, the researcher attempted to collect information from four groups of informants.  
The aim of this triangulation was to obtain a macro level view from the perspective of the state and 
external actors, while at the same time supplement the data analysis with the empirical experiences 
and narratives of the returnees and residents on a micro level. Together, these perspectives were 
expected  to  provide  a  comprehensive  and  realistic  impression  of  the  returnees'  (re)integration 
process. By comparing findings from the different groups, we could also seek for irregularities or 
incompatibilities in the data.
Since the aim of this project is to investigate the returnees'  ability to contribute to post-
conflict  reconstruction,  it  has been natural to emphasize the returnees themselves as sources of 
information. In order to narrow down the research scope, as well as strengthening the validity of the 
findings, the researcher has chosen to focus solely on people who have been displaced to the north –  
today's  Sudan22.  These  individuals  have  unique  experiences,  having  been displaced  within  'the 
enemy's territory'. This may imply that they face different challenges upon return than returnees 
from other areas.
The majority of the returnee informants were happy to participate in the research project. 
They were generally eager to share their experiences – especially their difficulties. The returnees 
interviewed were between 18 and 55 years old, and were both students, part-time and full-time 
employees.23 Unfortunately, the majority of the informants were female. This was probably partly a 
result of the sampling methods used, and partly due to the researcher's own gender as well. As a 
female in a male-dominated society, it was easier – and more accepted – to make contact with other 
women.  Women  were  easily  accessible,  as  they  worked  in  the  venues  the  researcher  stayed 
(housekeeping, tea selling, etc.), and it was hence more natural to approach them with conversation. 
It also seemed easier to gain trust and sincerity in conversations with women. Subsequently, when 
these women assisted in meeting more informants through snowballing, it was natural for them to 
introduce the researcher to other women; women in their neighborhoods, in their workplace, etc. 
Additionally,  the  opportunistic  sampling  also  included  female  participants  at  the  women's 
conference at the guesthouse (see footnote 23). This gender imbalance can be a weakness for the 
project, yet most of the respondents spoke on behalf of their households and shared narratives from 
other family members as well – also male.
Unfortunately, the researcher only interviewed one resident formally. This was due to the 
fact  that  almost  every  person the  researcher  encountered  was a  returnee/migrant  of  some sort. 
22 If  time  and  resources  had  allowed  it,  a  comparison  between  the  experiences  of  returnees  from  different 
countries/regions (e.g. East Africa, Israel, US) would have been of interest.
23 See Appendix 1 for further information about the informants. All informants have been given a pseudonym in order  
to protect their identity.
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Consequently,  accessing  returnees  and  macro  level  actors  for  the  interviews  became  the  main 
priority.  However,  informal  conversations  with  various  residents  of  Juba took place  during  the 
observation period, shedding light on the issue.
3.6   Further Reflections: The Role of the Researcher
Throughout  this  project  the  researcher  has  been  especially  concerned  with  the  various 
factors that may impact the conduction of research in an unfamiliar, post-conflict setting. It has been  
obvious  that  the researcher herself  has been a major influencing factor  when it  comes to  both 
determining the directions of the research and limiting the available choices. As argued by Eaves 
and Kahn (2000:  42),  “the researcher both influences and is  influenced by the phenomena and 
people she or he studies”. Therefore, this section highlights the researcher's role in the fieldwork, 
both when it comes to ethical, practical, and security considerations.
3.6.1   Safety in the Field
When conducting research in politically volatile contexts, it is crucial to consider the various 
sources  of  insecurity  which  may  affect  the  researcher  or  the  informants  involved.  The  risk 
assessment started as soon as this project began; with an initial acquisition of knowledge about the 
study area and its potential threats. In this regard, the researcher drew on experiences and advice 
from academic colleagues who had been in similar situations. As an additional security measure, 
Norwegian NGO employees and independent researchers within the study area were contacted for 
further  enquiries  regarding  the  security  situation.  Thus,  through  thorough  preparations  the 
researcher sought to acquire a holistic understanding of the field context, develop notions of best 
practices,  and  subsequently  become  better  able  to  protect  both  self  and  the  informants  from 
dangerous situations.
However, not all dangers can be anticipated and prepared for (Gokah, 2006). Therefore, it 
was crucial for the researcher to start out with a broad and flexible research design. As Polsky 
argued in 1967 (in Meyer, 2007: 77), the “final rule [of research] is to have few unbreakable rules”. 
Prior to the fieldwork, the researcher was therefore prepared to make adjustments if necessary. This 
proved essential, since the researcher upon arrival in South Sudan was advised not to travel solo to 
the planned neighborhood of study – a suburban area of Juba made up of solely returnees from the 
north. Consequently, the research plan was adjusted and an area of Juba perceived more secure and 
easily  accessible  was  chosen.  This  may  have  influenced  the  type  of  data  collected,  yet  the 
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researcher chose to listen to more experienced colleagues24.
The field experiences show the significance of having a well-prepared, yet flexible research 
plan. The fragile post-conflict context posed some challenges, which could have been potentially 
difficult for a lone researcher. However, the prior knowledge acquisition and the adjustable research 
design made the data collection both safer and more feasible to conduct.
3.6.2   A Complete Outsider?
In addition to safety measures, the role of the researcher as an outsider can also have an 
impact  on the  research  and the  people involved in  it.  This dynamic  can affect  the  informants' 
behavior, well-being and willingness to accommodate the researcher. Thus, if this is not adequately 
acknowledged, it may lead to misinterpretations and misperceptions of data.
For  this  study,  the  researcher  therefore  recognized  her  perceived  role  as  a  practically 
complete outsider. According to scholars, a researcher can be identified as an outsider based on 
various  social  identifiers,  such  as  culture,  ethnicity,  or  gender  (Eaves  &  Kahn,  2000).  As  a 
Caucasian from a developed country, there were few similarities between the researcher and the 
researched. In a few cases, age and gender were the only identifiers which could have made the 
researcher a partly insider. These factors were of no crucial significance for the research topic, and 
could therefore only have a limited impact on the findings. However, as has been discussed already, 
gender arguably influenced both the access to informants and the building of trust relationships. 
Age  can  also  have  had  a  similar  effect,  especially  regarding  trust  building  and  the  level  of 
understanding across generations. This was particularly felt during meetings with the government 
representatives – meetings which would most likely never have taken place without gatekeepers' 
organization. The age and power gaps experienced were challenging, yet careful and respectful 
conversation and the search for some kind of common ground proved relatively successful.
All in all, the researcher was perceived as a relative outsider, often understood as a wealthy 
foreigner  –  with  its  advantages  and  disadvantages.  Rumors  spoke  about  the  negative  attitudes 
towards foreigners in Juba. International organizations and NGOs have for years done large-scale 
development work in South Sudan, and it is clear that expatriates are perceived to 'take up much 
24 In another instance, the researcher found the opportunity to travel to a returnee camp in the periphery of Juba. A  
local NGO provided transportation and an interpreter familiar with the returnees. The camp was characterized as a 
'special and difficult case', and seemed to be a unique case for this project. A NGO employee had informed the 
community chiefs of the researcher's arrival the previous day. However, upon arrival the researcher met a group of 
suspicious community chiefs – especially one woman was very loud, shouting and aggressive. Despite continuous 
explanations and persuasions by the local interpreter, the female chief refused to allow even the presence of the  
researcher, let alone conversations with returnees. It is the researcher's belief that there was no physical danger  
involved, yet the aggressive behavior created a psychologically hostile and threatening atmosphere. Unfortunately, it 
was necessary to leave the returnee camp, despite its potential as an adequate case study.
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space' in the capital. On the other hand, Norwegians are often perceived remarkably positively, due 
to  the  historically  long  and  persistent  relationship  between  Norway  and  the  South  Sudanese 
people25.  This clearly  became an advantage  for  the researcher,  who in most  cases  was met by 
friendly and welcoming people. The close working relationship with well-established Norwegian 
NGOs in the area also served as a door opener to friendly relations.
Another  important  aspect  of  being  an  outsider  is  the  researcher's  level  of  cultural 
understanding in the field (Harrison, 2006; Kenyon & Hawker, 1999). Therefore, as an attempt to 
reduce the significance of the outsider status, it was also important to acquire knowledge of the 
social  situation in  Juba,  as  well  as  to  become familiar  with  local  cultural  norms and behavior 
patterns. The researcher was thus constantly observing the local context and subsequently seeking 
appropriate advice from local contacts. This was particularly significant when it came to cultural 
dress codes, patterns of greetings etc. However, it is important to note that the cultural and ethnic 
diversity of South Sudan – and especially Juba – made it challenging to anticipate when or when 
not  to  follow  cultural  norms26.  Thus,  the  researcher's  main  rules  were  to  avoid  unnecessary 
attention, to act politely, and to pay attention to people's contexts and body language.
3.6.3   Power Dynamics between Researcher and Researched
Social research is often associated with power dynamics; researchers can shape the research 
agenda and presentation in ways most beneficial for themselves, yet the researched also have their  
own expectations and the power over their own knowledge (Gallaher, 2009; Mitchell, 2013). These 
power relations are often unequal, and must therefore be taken into serious consideration throughout 
the process. Within this project there are several  such power dynamics which potentially could 
influence the research results. These will now be assessed in turn.
Firstly, the gatekeepers and the respondents from the macro level all hold certain power 
positions  within  the  South  Sudanese  society.  These  dynamics  may have  created  incentives  for 
leading the research in certain directions, or to amplify certain aspects of the (re)integration process 
and downplay others. However, this only became a significant challenge during the interviews with 
the representatives from the authorities. These respondents clearly had their own political agendas 
25 For decades,  Norway has shown a strong interest and involvement in South Sudan. Norwegian NGOs, such as  
Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), have been engaged in South Sudan since the 
1970s and 1980s (parts of the state Eastern Equatoria have even gone by the nickname 'Little Norway'). Since the  
1990s, Norway has played an important role in the peace negotiations between the government in Khartoum and 
SPLM, and today South Sudan is among the countries that receive the most aid from Norway. See e.g. Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs (2013), Mumbata (2013) and Sæbø (2010).
26 South Sudan is a very diverse country with more than 200 ethnic groups, which implies a highly diverse mixture of 
social values and norms (World Bank, n.d.). Additionally, returning exiles from the West have also brought with 
them Western behavioral patterns and norms, adding complexity and, for the researcher, confusion.
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to consider, and at times appeared defensive regarding South Sudanese (re)integration policies. The 
researcher became particularly aware of this, when some answers contradicted with similar answers 
from the other respondent groups. Thus, in stead of being a weakness, this power exercise rather 
became  evidence  for  certain  research  findings  regarding  the  power  dynamics  involved  in  the 
(re)integration process.
Additionally,  by  accessing  respondents  among  returnees  the  researcher  put  herself  in  a 
powerful  outsider  position.  Mitchell  (2013:  1256)  argues  that  research  concerning “the 
‘experiences’ (...) of some of the world’s most vulnerable people” should preferably not be included 
in educational fieldworks, due to its exploitative nature. However, this project highly desired to 
emphasize the perspectives of the returnees themselves, rather than viewing it solely from a macro 
perspective. Therefore, it has been extremely important to carefully consider the possible impacts of 
this research on the returnees involved, and the returnees' own sentiments towards the project. Thus, 
as far as possible,  the returnees involved have been allowed to establish the framework for the 
interviews – both when it comes to content and practical matters.
All interviews with returnees were carried out in a open and more unstructured fashion than 
with  the  other  respondent  groups.  The  returnees  themselves  decided  the  main  focuses  of 
conversation,  by  freely  reflecting  upon their  own experiences  and  the  issues  they  found more 
important.  The  researcher  was  very  cautious  about  putting  any  pressure  or  directions  on  the 
conversations, and rather allowed the returnees to choose the way forward. When certain topics 
were avoided by the respondents, the researcher usually decided not to pursue such paths.
Furthermore,  some of the returnees requested something in return for their  participation. 
This is often the case in social research; respondents sometimes expect some kind of benefit from 
sharing  their  knowledge  with  the  researcher  (Gallaher,  2009).  Within  this  project,  requests  for 
money grants happened frequently, perhaps due to the researcher's outsider status. One returnee 
further wanted assistance in finding her lost luggage from Khartoum, while another sought financial 
help for her daughter's education. These demands were politely turned down for several reasons. 
Firstly, the researcher did not wish 'to buy data' from the respondents. It contradicts with personal  
values, as well as creating a risk of compromising a neutral relationship between the researcher and 
the respondent. Secondly, the researcher did not have the financial means to fulfill such requests for 
all respondents. The study area, Juba, is one of the most expensive places in the world, and the high 
prices  put  additional  constraints  on  an  already limited  budget27.  In  this  context,  the  researcher 
27 Since the signing of CPA in 2005, Juba has experienced a massive influx of expatriates. The lack of accommodation  
led to extremely high prices, in which people had to pay hundreds of US dollars for renting a tent. Despite the rapid 
construction of housing during recent years, the prices remain very high. Additionally,  Juba is ranked by ECA 
International (2013) as the 4th most expensive city in the world for expatriates when it comes to the costs of living  
(not including accommodation). Virtually every commodity is imported, including food, which gives high import  
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sought other possible ways of showing appreciation to the respondents, and hence  drinks and/or 
meals were provided during the interviews.
3.7   Summary
This chapter has outlined the methodological choices made throughout this project. It has 
presented  the  adopted  qualitative  approach  and  the  triangulation  of  methods  used  for  data 
collection,  namely  qualitative  interviews,  observation  and  document  analysis.  It  has  further 
presented  the  methods  used  for  gaining  access  to  the  study  area,  Juba,  and  the  subsequent 
techniques  utilized  for  recruitment  of  informants  from  both  micro  and  macro  levels.  These 
triangulations of both methods and perspectives arguably give a higher degree of reliability and 
robustness  of  the  findings  and seeks  to  make up for  the  general  weaknesses  of  the qualitative 
approach and the more specific flaws of using a non-probability sampling method. Furthermore, 
this chapter also reflected upon some of the challenges encountered and their potential impact on 
both the informants, the researcher, and the quality of this research. The next chapter will outline 
the theoretical framework utilized in the following analysis.
and transportation costs. Unfortunately, the high prices and the researcher's limited budget had a definite impact on  





“There are few issues that are of such significance to civilisation, or so consistently present on 
international, state and local political agendas, as migration.” 
Spencer (2003: 1)
Forced migration scholars have for several decades seen return migration as the preferred 
solution for conflict-induced migrants. Various reasons are given for this, yet the main argument 
claims that people should return home as conflicts come to an end. In this regard, several scholars  
argue that returnees are potential sources of development and reconstruction in their countries of 
origin (see e.g. Ajak et.al., 2012; Helling, 2007; Petrin, 2002). By bringing with them various kinds 
of  resources,  returnees  may contribute  to  transforming society into an increasingly more stable 
entity both developmentally and socio-economically. Helling (2007: 9) goes as far as to argue that 
the  sustainable  (re)integration  of  returnees  is  “crucial  to  increase  regional  stability  and  global 
security”. With this in mind, this chapter seeks to explore the contemporary discourse regarding 
returnee  (re)integration  and  the  use  of  'returnee  capital'  for  development  and reconstruction  of 
conflict-affected societies.  How can returnees  participate in  post-conflict  reconstruction of  their 
local communities?
The chapter starts out by giving an overview of the relevant conceptual framework, with 
emphasis on the concepts 'returnee'  and '(re)integration'.  Secondly,  repatriation's place in forced 
migration literature is examined, with emphasis on the lack of research on the post-return period. 
Then, this study's main theoretical framework is presented, resting on the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu, 
Karen Jacobsen, and Dominik Helling. These scholars take us from the more general concept of 
social capital (Bourdieu), to the ideas of refugee resources (Jacobsen) and returnee capital (Helling).  
Together, the concepts represent the basis of the theoretical framework used in this study. Lastly, 
criticism  to  such  a  framework  is  presented  and  a  more  comprehensive  and  context-specific 
framework is suggested for the final analysis.
4.1   A Conceptual Framework of Return Migration
4.1.1   The Historical Development of Repatriation
Since  repatriation  came to the  top of  the  agenda in  the 1990s,  millions of  people have 
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returned to their places of origin (Bascom, 1998). Yet, return has not always been on the agenda of 
either  politicians  or  researchers.  This  section  will  present  the  emergence  of  repatriation  as  a 
preferred solution, and briefly reflect upon its implications.
Despite  the  long-term  existence  of  migration,  the  20th century  experienced  a  broader 
international recognition of people fleeing conflict-torn societies. As a result of the two World Wars 
and the later shifting trend from inter-state to intra-state conflicts, a correspondingly growing body 
of international institutions and agreements concerning forced migration has emerged. The main 
purpose of this body is to facilitate and justify the protection and assistance of people fleeing from 
war and conflict – or in other words, to find solutions to what is often called 'the global refugee 
problem'. 
In this regard,  UNHCR formally adopted what is referred to as the three durable solutions 
for  displaced  people;  1)  granting  asylum,  2)  third-country  resettlement,  and  3)  voluntary 
repatriation. The latter – voluntary repatriation – has been considered to be the most suitable and 
sustainable solution since the 1980s, and implies the voluntary return of displaced people to their 
places of origin (Chimni,  2003; UNHCR, 2004). This derives from the general assumption that 
refugees wish to return home, as well as the belief that repatriation can provide relief for host states  
and “opportunities for returnees to rebuild their home states” (Abuya, 2010: 155). Based on this, 
voluntary repatriation soon became the preferred solution to displacement, and has continued to be 
so today.
This development has, however, led to the rise of several critical voices within the discourse, 
questioning the almost exclusive focus on ensuring early return and the subsequent lack of attention 
to the period after return (see e.g. Arowolo, 2000; Chimni, 2002; 2003; Helling, 2007). What do 
actually  happen  to  the  returnees  in  the  post-return  period?  What  kind  of  conditions  are  they 
returning  to?  How  do  they  overcome  potential  (re)integration  challenges  and  prevent  new 
displacement cycles? Or do they?
4.1.2   Understanding the Term 'Returnee'
Before moving further, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the group of people 
referred to, namely returnees. A 'returnee' is by the international community often understood as “a 
person who was a refugee, but who has recently returned to his/her country of origin” (OHCHR, 
2001: 205). This definition requires a person to have crossed an international border in order to be a 
returnee, and thus excludes millions of people displaced within their own state.
In order to maintain a more inclusive approach, this project therefore bases its reflections on 
Helling's definition of a 'returnee':
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“a formerly internally or externally displaced person that relocates its centre of livelihood 
among a society within the borders of his/her country of nationality or habitual residence, 
aiming at establishing a viable environment in order to pursue a sustainable livelihood”.
(Helling, 2007: 17)
This  definition  includes  both  former  refugees  and  IDPs,  as  well  as  demonstrates  the 
importance of understanding repatriation as involving more than solely the process of return. It 
involves (re)integrating the returnee into society and establishing a sustainable livelihood in the 
returnee's new environment.
4.1.3   Understanding the Term '(Re)integration'
When returnees reach their final destinations, they enter into the so-called (re)integration 
phase.  As  with  the  concept  of  returnee,  complexity  is  also  evident  in  the  various  available 
definitions of this process. In 2004 UNHCR defined (re)integration as “supporting those who have 
returned/resettled or integrated to secure the political, economic, legal and social conditions needed 
to  maintain  life,  livelihood  and  dignity”  (in  Pantuliano  et.al.,  2008:  2).  According  to  this 
understanding,  (re)integration  is  a  process  of  (re)establishing  people's  lives  in  the social  return 
environments,  in  which  the  returnees  should  have  the  same  access  to  political  participation, 
productive resources,  legal  processes,  and social services as the wider population.  In 2008, the 
wording was slightly changed to the following:
“the progressive establishment of conditions which enable returnees and their communities 
to exercise their social, economic, civil, political and cultural rights, and on that basis to 
enjoy peaceful, productive and dignified lives”.
(UNHCR, 2008, in Shanmugaratnam, 2010: 4)
This definition can be seen as more dynamic than the former, by diminishing the divide between 
returnees and the resident population in the return areas. Migration impacts both the returnee and 
the rest of his/her community, and it is therefore crucial to consider both groups in relation to the 
(re)integration process. In this regard, the latter definition of (re)integration does not separate the 
returnees from their membership in the community. Furthermore, the definition also emphasizes the 
need for peaceful relations between the two groups for (re)integration to be successful.
As this section explains, repatriation has come to stay on the political agenda, with all its 
implications.  The  focus  of  this  analysis,  the  process of  (re)integration,  is  a  major  factor  when 
determining the successfulness of return; are the returnees able to cope and to what extent are they 
able to contribute to society? Despite this crucial position, the next section will suggest the lack of 
attention to (re)integration within both academia and political environments.
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4.2   Return Migration in the Literature
“[L]argely  because  return  migration  is  a  neglected  area  in  migration  research,  the  
development of a viable framework for addressing the complex issue of reintegration is still  
at infancy.”
(Arowolo, 2000: 60)
As has already been hinted towards, there is a general lack of research on repatriation and its 
effects. Chimni (2002: 164) claims that “...little information is available about what has happened to 
those refugees [and IDPs] who have returned home...few authors have attempted to investigate the 
experiences of the returnees themselves”. According to King (2000: 27), “studies of migration made 
little or no reference to return” until the 1960s. Since then, the literature has followed the return 
currents themselves,  with particular emphasis on the returns from Western countries  during the 
1980s and 1990s. However, the majority of studies have been purely empirical or descriptive in 
nature, with only one book published with a global overview of return migration by 2000 (Ghosh, 
2000; King, 2000). According to King (ibid: 40), “[t]he tendency has been to examine each return 
migration group as  a  distinct  entity  and to  make little  attempt at  cross-national  comparison or 
theoretical synthesis.” Instead, pressure from host states have led scholars to focus on ensuring early 
returns and on the actual return process. Whatever happens to the returnees after they have reached 
their  destinations  is  rarely  the  center  of  attention,  and  adequate  theoretical  or  policy-oriented 
frameworks have subsequently not been developed (Arowolo, 2000; Ghosh, 2000). In other words, 
there is no internationally recognized framework for the assistance and (re)integration of returnees, 
and returnee projects are often implemented in an ad hoc manner.
Thus, we may suggest that the discourse is largely lacking research on the effects of return 
and that more attention should be given to the durable solutions, and more specifically to the effects 
of repatriation. As a response, in 2003 UNHCR introduced the 'Framework for Durable Solutions  
for Refugees and Persons of Concern'. This was an attempt to expand the 1951 Refugee Convention 
in order “to make the international response more reliable and effective” (UNHCR, 2003: 3). With 
this  framework  UNHCR  acknowledges  that  the  agency  of  refugees  and  returnees  is  often 
overlooked,  and highlights  the  need for  comprehensive  integration  and (re)integration  plans  to 
ensure stability and sustainability.
One part of the Framework focuses particularly on the process of returns to post-conflict 
settings, namely the '4Rs Framework'. The 4Rs stand for Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation 
and Reconstruction (see Table 2), and is an attempt to link the two phases of 'during return' and  
'post-return' together. Thus, UNHCR (ibid) argues that repatriation should include more than just 
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transporting returnees back to their countries of origin. It should be expanded to also include post-
conflict rebuilding of the home communities.  Through linking the relief and development phases 
together, the 4Rs aim to “contribut[e] to national recovery, and the consolidation of peace, stability 
and the foundation for longer-term development” (ibid: 19).
Table 2: The 4Rs Framework
THE 4Rs
Repatriation: the return of refugees to their countries of origin. Voluntary repatriation requires free and 
voluntary return in safety and dignity.
Reintegration: the  ability  to  secure  the necessary  political,  economical,  legal  and  social  conditions  to 
maintain the lives, livelihoods and safety of refugees.
Rehabilitation: the restoration of social and economic infrastructure destroyed during conflict in order to 
enable sustainable livelihoods.
Reconstruction: the (re)establishment of political order, institutions and productive capacity to create a base 
for sustainable development.
Accessed and adapted from UNHCR's Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities (2004)
These issues have been further emphasized by the UN Secretary-General's report on 'Peace-
Building in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict' and the following decision No.2011/20, calling for 
an increased focus on “reintegration of returnees” (UNSG, 2011). These documents state that the 
durable  solutions  –  including  repatriation  –  should  address  both  human  rights,  humanitarian, 
development,  reconstruction,  and  peace-building  challenges.  The  lack  of  finding  sustainable 
solutions to displacement can, according to the Secretary-General (ibid), be “critical to the recovery 
and to sustainable development of post-conflict countries”.
These arguments demonstrate how the concepts of repatriation and post-conflict recovery 
should go hand-in-hand. The UNHCR assumes that returnees, if within the right environment or 
framework promoting self-reliance and empowerment, can act as productive members of society 
and potentially contribute to peace-building and reconstruction. This idea is the very core argument 
of this study, and will now be further investigated.
4.3   Post-Conflict Reconstruction and the Contributions of Returnees
Up till now we have seen the growing belief in returnees' contributions to development and 
post-conflict reconstruction. However, the question of 'how' still remains to be answered. How can 
returnees contribute to developmental changes in their return communities? Which factors enable 
these  contributions  and  which  create  obstacles  for  the  returnees?  We  will  now  turn  to  these 
questions.
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4.3.1   (Re)integration on Micro and Macro Levels
It is evident, from what we have seen above, that the process of (re)integration is a complex 
one and that it involves many different aspects on several levels. With this in mind, how can we 
then understand the process and attempt to measure its results? 
Ghosh (2000) argues that (re)integration of returnees can be understood on either the micro 
or macro levels. The former refers to the personal success of (re)integration, “entailing social and 
economic security and welfare of the [returnee] as an individual (...) in the local community of the 
country  of  origin”  (ibid:  184).  Thus,  this  relates  to  how  the  returnee  personally  manage  to 
(re)integrate into his or her new community, for instance through employment. This also includes 
the  translation of  the  returnee's  success into the  rest  of  the  household's  integration.  The latter, 
successful (re)integration on the macro level, refers to the returnee's contribution to the economic 
and social development of his or her local community and the country of origin as a whole (ibid). 
Clearly, these levels of success are closely intertwined. Success on the micro level is usually 
a prerequisite for success on the macro level, particularly concerning employment and economic 
development. When we are looking at the post-conflict  reconstruction, it mainly focuses on the 
macro  (re)integration.  However,  throughout  this  project  it  became evident  that  the  majority  of 
returnees in South Sudan are struggling to meet their own and their families' needs on the micro 
level of the (re)integration process. Therefore, this study understands returnees' achievements on the 
micro level as indicators for their further contributions on the macro level.
4.3.2   Displaced People: Passive Victims or Acting Agents?
In order to overcome the research gap on (re)integration, some scholars have attempted to 
investigate the post-return period. As a result, a main argument has emerged saying that migrants 
are solely separated from their current livelihoods,  not from their human capacities for thought, 
action and innovation (Marfleet, 2006).  Thus, the main focus in this study is the various capital 
returnees  possess  and how these  resources  can be  utilized  to  create  development.  This  section 
highlights the work of Dominik Helling, his suggested concept  returnee capital, and how it was 
developed. Other scholars before him have expressed similar opinions, yet this analysis has not 
succeeded in finding other so clearly defined theoretical ideas.
Helling (2007) argues that displaced populations contain large – and often unused – sources 
of capital. These resources have the potential to be a vital contribution to national development and 
post-conflict reconstruction. However, he argues, displaced people are often presented negatively in 
the literature, carrying “a negative stigma” (ibid: 10). They are often presented as passive victims 
who place demands on the host community, rather than contributions. The returnees' potential is 
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therefore often overlooked, and instead they are seen as a resource-poor group – a burden. This 
perception is exactly what Helling aims to challenge.
Helling  builds on discourse  drawn from general  sociology and refugee  research.  In  this 
regard, his argument is closely related to the work of the French philosopher and sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu  and  his  model  of  social  capital.  Placed  within  the  classical  sociological  debate  of 
structure/agency, Bourdieu suggests the existence of non-physical types of capital, namely social 
capital (ibid). In addition to materialistic capital, he argues, capital also derives from the resources 
people draw from the social, cultural and symbolic spheres of life. He defines social capital as:
“the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue 
of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition.”
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 119)
This kind of social,  cultural  and symbolic  capital  is  different from material  forms of  capital  – 
money and property – yet the two fields are interrelated and transfers across fields can take place. 
Bourdieu claims that each individual in a society enters certain fields or social spaces (structures),  
for  instance  ones  workplace  or  neighborhood,  by  bringing  with  his  or  hers  individual  capital 
(agency). This pool of resources is defined by the amount and types of capital held, and includes 
both the material capital you have, in form of money and assets, and the non-material capital; your 
networks, educational experience, knowledge of cultural codes, etc.
Bourdieu's approach acknowledges people's agency – agency that exists independently of 
the social setting. In other words, he recognizes that all individuals have certain resources, varying 
in form and amount, which they can utilize within their social environments. Yet, the use of the 
capital will be readjusted to every new field a person enters into. As Bourdieu (1989, in Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992: 23) states; “[o]ne does not have to choose between structure and agents, between 
the field, which makes the meaning and value of the properties objectified in things or embodied in 
persons, and the agents who play with their properties in the space of play thus defined”.  This 
implies that the structure and people's agency – or resources – are interrelated, but the agency is not 
dependent  on  any  particular  structure  to  exist  per  se.  Thus,  a  person's  agency  will  exist 
independently of the social setting he finds himself in, yet he might be able to utilize only a limited 
part of the resources within that specific context.
Karen Jacobsen, a forced migration scholar, has attempted to apply a similar approach to the 
field  of  displacement.  By  coining  the  term  refugee  resources,  Jacobsen  (2002)  argues  that 
displacement does not rob a person of all of his or her capital. Instead, refugees bring with them 
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their resources into the host communities and adapt it to their current social field. Based on this 
model,  Jacobsen  (ibid:  578)  argues  that  an  individual's  resources  can  be  used  to  create 
developmental changes on both the micro and macro levels:
“These  material,  social  and  political  resources,  potentially  represent  an  important 
statebuilding contribution to the host state. Refugee resources may help develop areas of the 
country, increase the welfare of citizens, and extend the bureaucratic reach of the state.”
Refugees bring with them social capital, through education, work skills and social skills as well as  
connections,  that  can be utilized in  the  refugees'  new environments;  firstly  in  order  to  survive 
themselves (micro level)  and eventually to benefit  the wider community in one way or another 
(macro  level).  Thus,  “[b]y  embracing  refugees  and  treating  them  as  a  potential  asset,  host 
governments could find that they are less of a burden than widely perceived” (ibid: 593).
Jacobsen's approach takes a large step away from the widespread perception of displaced 
people  as  passive  victims.  She rather  argues  for  their  ability  to  be  “active  agents  of  change”, 
stimulating  both  economic  and  social  development  within  their  present  environments  (Helling, 
2007: 23).
4.3.3   The Concept of 'Returnee Capital'
To take this further, Helling (ibid) argues that Jacobsen's approach can be extended to the 
field of return migration and returnee (re)integration. Building on the concepts of 'social capital' and 
'refugee resources', Helling argues that the resources returnees bring with them can be utilized to 
create  developmental  change in  the  same sense as  in  the refugee  context.  Following from this 
reasoning, he suggests the term returnee capital:
“the sum of characteristics, resources and stimuli unified in a formerly displaced person that  
derives from his/her life experience prior to flight as well as during exile, and are of value 
for the larger community's livelihood (re)construction.”
(ibid: 24)
This is an expansive definition in need of further elaboration. 
Helling argues that returnees, in the nature of being human beings, possess capital in various 
forms  and  amounts.  This  includes  both  material  capital  (money,  property),  human  capital 
(education, work skills) and social/cultural capital (values, attitudes, ideas). This capital is in itself 
not linked to a geographical area, but will follow the returnees back to their places of origin and can 
be readapted to the new social settings. Furthermore, the returnee capital can, if utilized efficiently, 
benefit the return communities and contribute to the post-conflict reconstruction. Let us now turn to 
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some of the examples Helling suggests to verify this argument.
Firstly, Helling claims that returnee capital can contribute to the economic development of 
return  areas  (ibid).  First  of  all,  returnees  participate  in  the  national  economy simply  by  being 
consumers.  By injecting their  physical capital  into the economy, the returnees contribute to the 
overall economic system. Although their economic contributions may vary widely in both size and 
frequency, this can be of crucial importance to weak economic systems.
Furthermore, Helling also suggests that returnees' human capital can contribute to economic 
development. The inflow of educational experience, work skills and other forms of non-material 
capital that returnees hold, can contribute to boosting the local economies of the return areas (ibid; 
UNHCR, 1995). This is closely related to the idea of brain drain and loss of human capital from 
migration. Collier (2013) claims that:
“When educated people emigrate and settle in a richer country, the poorer country suffers a 
direct loss. (...)  If, in addition, their economies are in trouble, they suffer an educational  
hemorrhage. The top rankings for skilled emigration are a roll call of the bottom billion. 
Haiti loses around 85 percent of its educated youth, a rate that is debilitating. Emigrants send 
money back, but it is palliative rather than transformative.“
If we follow Helling's argument, this trend can be reversed with return migration, and we may talk 
about a phenomenon of brain gain instead of brain drain. Educated returnees bring with them their 
human capital, and raise the overall skill level in their home communities. Non-educated returnees 
also bring with them their experiences from work and social life in exile, which adds to the total 
level of human resources.
To demonstrate this, Helling (2007) uses the example of agricultural development. With the 
support of other scholars28, he argues that some returnees who have been displaced in rural areas 
have acquired agricultural skills that are different from those used in the return areas. By utilizing 
these skills upon return, the returnees may contribute to agricultural improvements and increased 
production in their local communities. This is supported by findings of Akol (1994, in ibid: 28) in  
the case of Southern Sudan:
“In the Equatoria Provinces, the most southern sections of the Southern Sudan, parts of the 
population had been exposed [during exile] to the cash crop economies of Zaire and Uganda, 
and  to  a  wide  variety  of  farming  techniques.  On  their  return  some  families  eagerly 
experimented with imported methods, and tried out a range of new crop varieties (...). Where 
this occurred it seems to have contributed to increased agricultural productivity and to a 
general improvement in living conditions”.
28 Several  scholars (e.g.  Jacobsen, 2002; Kibreab, 1985) have argued that  refugees often bring with them new or  
different agricultural methods to their new environments (Helling, 2007: 28).
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This example shows how returnees' skills can be very useful. On the micro level, the new farming 
techniques improved the returnees' own living conditions in Southern Sudan. On the macro level,  
however, such skills may lead to the “creation of economic conditions superior to those existing 
prior to their flight into exile or to those prevailing among local residents who did not go into exile” 
(Rogge, 1989, in ibid: 29). This can arguably also be the case with other types of skills as well.
Furthermore,  Helling's  second  argument  is  that  returnees  can  act  as  stimuli  for  state 
capacity-building and aid distribution. He, with others, argue that returnees increase the attention to 
the areas where they settle down, from both national governments, international actors and other 
humanitarian actors (Helling, 2007; Petrin, 2002; UNHCR, 1995). This builds on empirical findings 
from refugee populations; “[a]lthough host governments in Africa have born the heavy burden of 
refugees  for  many  years,  they  have  nevertheless  benefited  from  numerous  rural  development 
projects  established by the various international agencies for refugees” (Akol,  1987: 150).  This 
statement concerns the context of refugees, yet Helling (2007) argues that this can be applied to 
returnee settings as well.
Such an argument can essentially be explained in two ways. Firstly, some returnees settle in 
decentralized  areas  that  have  historically  enjoyed  limited  access  to  economic  and  social 
opportunities. A sudden presence of a number of returnees, however, may attract attention to these 
areas, including benefits for both the returnees and the resident population in the areas. Secondly, 
macro actors sometimes tend to perceive displaced people – in this case returnees – as a threat to  
local stability due to competition for scarce resources (Jacobsen, 2002). This negative attention 
may, however, lead to an increased state-presence in the area. Benefits, like improved infrastructure 
or increased access to social services, can be provided to the return areas in order to avoid tensions 
between returnees and the rest of society.
Finally, Helling (2007: 30) claims that returnees “'return home' not only with newly acquired 
skills and qualifications (...), but also import a variety of new attitudes, values and idea(l)s”. During 
displacement, people face a wide range of new social values and practices, and they may gradually 
adopt  these  new  lifestyles,  partly  or  completely.  Away  from  traditional  views  and  cultural 
obligations,  people  can  gain  skills  and  knowledge  through  both  education,  new  livelihood 
strategies,  political  awareness,  awareness  of  new  forms  of  community  organization  as  well  as 
patterns  of  social  interaction.  According  to  Rogge  (1994),  this  is  dependent  on  the  length  of 
displacement and is hence particularly evident for second-generation displacees, who are born and 
integrated into an alien society, and are therefore more likely to adopt the local culture.
Upon return, some returnees are unable or unwilling to return to their old practices. Instead, 
they bring their learnt attitudes and social practices into the return communities, with the potential  
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of creating changes. As Collier (2013) puts it, “[b]right, young, enterprising people are catalysts of 
economic  and  political  progress. They  are  like  fairy  godmothers,  providing  benefits,  whether 
intended or inadvertent, to the rest of a society.” By bringing new impulses, whether economic, 
social, cultural or political, returnees can contribute to changes in social values and practices, and 
create a more multi-cultural environment.
4.3.4   Returnee Capital and the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework
To summarize,  Helling argues that returnees have resources,  acquired either  prior to the 
displacement or during exile, which can lead to changes in the return communities. By utilizing 
their material resources (money, property) and non-material resources (education, work experience, 
social networks, cultural features, stimuli),  returnees can provide economic, political,  social and 
cultural contributions to both the micro and macro levels of society. In other words, returnees can 
act as active agents of change.
Helling's  approach  is  indirectly  supported  by  the  'Sustainable  Livelihoods  Framework'29 
(SLF).  This  is  a  people-centered  framework  that  “seeks  to  gain  an  accurate  and  realistic 
understanding of people's  strengths (...)  and how they endeavour to  convert  these  into positive 
livelihood  outcomes”  (DFID,  1999).  People  have  a  range  of  assets  –  human,  social,  natural,  
physical, and financial – which they can use to create positive livelihood outcomes. This directly 
correlates with Helling's claim that returnees have capital that can be used to society's benefit. In 
line with Helling's argument, the SLF states that people have various skills and knowledge (human 
capital), connections (social capital), and material capital (natural, physical and financial capital) 
that they can utilize to improve their environments.
Based on this correlation, it is reasonable to argue for its support of the idea of 'returnee 
capital'. Although the SLF focuses on the household's personal success, the framework can arguably 
support the idea of improved conditions on a macro level;  people have the ability  to use their 
resources/capital/assets  to  work  as  active  agents  for  themselves  and  others.  This  further 
demonstrates that discourse on general development also can be feasibly applied to return migration 
and returnee issues.
29 The 'Sustainable Livelihoods Framework'  is a tool to understand livelihoods in a comprehensive and integrated  
manner. It presents the various factors which can affect people's livelihoods, as well as the households' livelihood 
assets and strategies to achieve improved livelihood outcomes (see DFID, 1999). The entire depth of this framework 
will not be explored here, due to its main focus on success on the micro level. However, certain elements of the  
framework can be useful to gain a holistic understanding of the idea of 'returnee capital' and its functions.
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4.4   Obstacles to the Utilization of Returnee Capital
Several scholars have argued along similar lines as Helling, however, within the field of 
forced  migration  there  are  plenty  of  opposing  voices  as  well.  The  idea  that  displaced  people 
generally are a cause of burden is a widely established perception. The argument is essentially that 
both  refugees,  IDPs,  and  returnees  are  burdens  to  already  scarce  resources  and  services,  sub-
sequently threatening local and regional stability (see e.g. Chimni, 2002; Jacobsen, 2002). We will 
therefore now look into some of the counterarguments to the returnee capital framework.
4.4.1   Weak State Management
Many argue that one of the key challenges to successful returnee (re)integration in post-
conflict environments is weak states:
“In the post-conflict period, (...) [t]he state may be barely capable of functioning and can 
accurately be described as  a weak state.  Weak states  have poor  capabilities to penetrate 
society, regulate social relationships, extract resources and appropriate or use resources in 
determined ways.”
(Migdal, 1998, in Petrin, 2002: 230)
Weak states often lack both the necessary resources to maintain a certain level of service provision, 
the  capacity  to  secure  stability  in  decentralized  areas,  and  the  ability  to  provide  assistance  to 
vulnerable people. In such a context, the state can be unable to absorb and manage a large number 
of newcomers. The arrival of returnees will pose an increased demand on the state, both regarding 
resource management, service delivery and security. If the state is unable to respond accordingly, it 
can have unfortunate consequences for both the returnees and their communities. Petrin (ibid:7) 
explains this well  when stating that “[i]t may be impossible to fully reintegrate returnees in an 
environment where the infrastructure has been destroyed and instability continues due to persisting 
conflict”. The additional economic stress of facilitating (re)integration of returnees can thus create a 
basis for political tension and conflict (Bascom, 1998).
One can argue that this is exactly the case in South Sudan. Scholars claim that the South  
Sudanese government (GoSS) lacks the capacity to absorb a large number of returnees (Macdonald, 
2010; Shanmugaratnam, 2010). As chapter 2 has shown, South Sudan is characterized by extremely 
low levels of development and correspondingly high levels of human insecurity. Extreme poverty, 
continuing internal conflicts, lack of service provision, and poor infrastructure make the population 
extremely vulnerable to minor changes. As argued by Macdonald (2010: 3), within such a context, 
30 See also Bascom (1998) and Chimni (1999) for similar arguments.
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“...mass displacement can (and do) easily tip communities from survival to crisis”.
4.4.2   Unwanted Urbanization
Furthermore, Macdonald (ibid) argues that the lack of state capacity in return areas can lead 
to an unwanted process of urbanization. When returnees are unable to economically and socially 
integrate into their rural communities, migration to urban areas can be anticipated. This especially 
applies to capital cities, where power and resources are concentrated and where state reconstruction 
is expected to begin. In other words, when the state's presence in rural areas is poor, people are  
often attracted to areas where they expect a higher level of state capacity and activity. Additionally,  
people might have been displaced in more urban settings and therefore wish to continue their lives 
in an urban area. A study from Sudan in 1990 showed that the amount of Eritrean refugees engaged 
in agricultural activities had dropped from 85 to 65 percent (Bascom, 1998). Upon return, it would 
be natural to anticipate a similar trend and subsequent movements to urban spaces.
If such a process of urbanization takes place without coinciding regulating policies, this can 
lead to unwanted consequences, like overcrowding of urban areas and lack of housing, and have a 
general destructive impact on the economy. Empirical cases demonstrate this;  when Cambodian 
returnees were unable to purchase land in their rural return areas, a large number migrated to the 
capital Phnom Penh, which quickly became overcrowded by returnees lacking both housing and 
resources (Helton, 2002, in ibid). This example demonstrates the complexity regarding the return 
environment in many cases. As the analysis in the next chapter will show, a process of unwanted 
and rapid urbanization is also taking place in contemporary South Sudan.
4.4.3   Lack of Property and Housing
Furthermore, Chimni (2002) claims that access to housing and property is a key problem in 
many post-conflict situations, leaving many returnees with no place to stay. In 1998 the UN Sub-
Commission  on  Prevention  of  Discrimination  and  Protection  of  Minorities  adopted  Resolution 
1998/26, which states that “the right of refugees and internally displaced persons to return freely to 
their homes and places of habitual residence in safety and security forms an indispensable element 
of national reconciliation and reconstruction” (OHCHR, 1998). This places the responsibility upon 
the state of origin to protect the property rights of returnees.
However,  many returnees  have  troubles  recovering  their  land and properties  when they 
return. This is often due to occupation by other residents as well as other displaced people, who 
may  not  be  willing  to  give  up  the  houses. Lack  of  documentation,  laws  and  enforcement 
mechanisms make it very difficult to regain occupied properties, and in some cases it  can create 
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conflicts between the opposing parties. Compensation is also rare. Studies from Eritrea show that 
access  to  cultivable  land  has  been  a  continuous  source  of  tension  between  returnees  and  the 
communities (Kibreab, 2002: 58):
“The two major causes of disputes were housing and land, especially horticultural land. The 
conflicts were more evident in situations such as restitution of housing in urban and peri-
urban centres and irrigated horticultural farms, especially those with perennial fruit trees.  
These issues were further complicated by the fact that during the absence of the rightful 
owners, the occupants had made substantial investments to expand or improve the property. 
Others had caused substantial damage to the property taken over after the owners fled the 
country. In many cases, returnees found their residential premises being turned into hotels, 
drinking houses or even brothels serving the Ethiopian army.”
If  unsolved,  such  situations  can  leave  many  returnees  homeless.  Some  stay  temporarily  with 
relatives or friends, while others are forced to live on the street or pushed into new displacement 
cycles. This can be a major obstacle to the utilization of returnee capital. In rural areas the lack of  
land will hinder both subsistence and commercial agriculture, while in urban areas it stands in the 
way of  settling  down permanently and earning a  livelihood.  In other  words,  returnees  without 
housing or property are usually not able to utilize their resources, and a large proportion of the 
returnee capital remain unused.
4.4.4   Lack of Employment
Another constraint for returnees in post-conflict societies can be the lack of employment. 
Arowolo (2000) claims that the ability to secure wage employment is the single most important step 
towards full (re)integration. At the same time, many post-conflict societies have poor job markets, 
in which the returnees face tough competition from the resident population. This can hinder the use 
of their returnee capital.
Various  factors  may  influence  the  returnees'  abilities  to  find  employment  in  their  local 
communities. Some, who were previously farmers, have acquired education and new skills abroad 
and are unwilling to return to manual labour. Other returnees might have acquired skills during 
displacement which are incompatible with the existing job opportunities in their home community 
(ibid).  Some also experience  language difficulties,  especially  if  they have been displaced for  a 
considerable  period of  time or  if  even born in  exile  –  as  chapter  5  will  show. In  the  case  of 
Namibian returnees, Preston (1994, in Kibreab, 2002: 54) argues that  “many of those returning 
found it difficult to resume or assume (in the case of the young) productive and social roles in their 
communities of origin. They did not identify with community culture, particularly in subsistence-
producing areas”. This is closely related to the rural-urban dichotomy, and the changes in livelihood 
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during exile. When returning, it can therefore be a huge challenge for returnees to find livelihood 
opportunities. This will be further elaborated in the next chapter.
4.4.5   Social (Re)integration
Lastly, the social (re)integration can also pose challenges for the returnees. As argued by 
Helling above, returnees often acquire new values, attitudes and lifestyles in exile. However, some 
scholars  argue that  this  can rather have negative  consequences  (see  e.g.  Arowolo,  2000;  King, 
2000). Upon return, these new acquisitions can either be kept or dropped. Yet, reality is not that 
black and white. Returnees who have changed their behavior often meet resentment and skepticism 
from society,  from both  relatives,  friends,  and potential  employers  (Arowolo,  2000).  However, 
when returnees seek to return to their old lifestyles,  they may have to relearn this upon return. 
Whatever approach, returnees often  face a difficult process of adapting into society.
Again, studies from Namibia can be used to demonstrate this. Preston (1994, in Kibreab, 
2002) argues that Namibian women in exile had developed new leadership positions. This was, 
however, very different from their original community structure. Therefore, when they returned to 
their communities of origin, these women had to suppress their  leadership skills in order to be 
accepted by the community. In Helling's terminology, this would arguably be a loss of returnee 
capital.  Similarly,  Tapscott  (1994, in ibid: 54) states challenges for the social (re)integration of 
Namibian returnees:
“[T]he  behaviour  of  many young returnees  has  been a  source  of  consternation to  older 
members of the community. To some community elders, the manners and liberal attitudes of 
young returnees are symptomatic of the loss of respect for local culture. More seriously, in a 
community in which religious influences  are  strong,  the disinterest  of  some returnees in 
attending  church  services,  or,  in  certain  instances,  their  professed  atheism  is  severely 
frowned  upon.  The  independent  attitude  of  repatriated  women,  too,  has  annoyed  more 
traditionally minded members of the community, who view their behaviour as a challenge to 
local culture.”
This demonstrates the complexity of social (re)integration, and the findings challenge the returnee 
capital approach. Moreover, it is also questionable whether returnees can ever be completely rid of 
the  returnee  identity.  King  (2000:  20)  argues  that  returnees  often  are  continuously  viewed  as 
different  –  “as  people  who have 'been  away'”  –  which  can create  difficulties  of  adapting  into 
society. 
Such resentment from the communities can be reinforced by the general competition for 
land, property, resources and employment described above. Harsh competition for scarce resources 
is believed to create fertile grounds for negative perceptions of returnees. In post-conflict societies 
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like South Sudan, skilled returnees might also meet jealousy from a population who had limited or 
no access to education or work experience during the time of war (Macdonald, 2010).
4.4.6   Obstacles Reflected in the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework
The  main  point  of  these  arguments  is  that  returnees  can  experience  various  contextual 
obstacles to their (re)integration process. This is also strongly acknowledged in the SLF, which 
argues that people's livelihood strategies are influenced by both the context in which they live in, 
and the prevailing structures and processes within that context. The SLF defines the context as the 
trends, shocks and seasonality within the household's environment, over which the individuals have 
little control31 (DFID, 1999). These factors have a direct impact on the household's ability to make 
use of their available capital; a household's ability to earn financial capital from their agricultural 
production will depend on the seasonality of prices, while an individual's ability to secure wage 
employment depends on the employment opportunities the environment offers.
Whether  or  not  the context  works in  favor  of the household,  the SLF suggests  that  the 
current  structures  and processes  also will  impact  people's  access  to  livelihood strategies  (ibid). 
Structures are here understood as private and public organizations, who make processes – policies, 
legislation, institutions, culture and power relations – function. The structures and processes affect 
individuals  and  households  in  various  ways;  they  determine  the  access  to  land,  capital,  and 
decision-making, they set the terms of exchange for different types of capital, and they influence 
people's abilities to be socially included in society (ibid). Thus, the absence of a structure can hinder 
the use of certain processes, and subsequently limit people's livelihood choices.
4.5   Acknowledging Reality and Attempting to Theorize
Overall,  this thesis aims to acknowledge the criticism of the returnee capital  framework 
presented above, and hence seeks to find a more comprehensive framework for its analysis. Thus, it  
is the belief of the researcher that we can gain a better understanding of the returnees' abilities to 
utilize their capital, by recognizing the context, structures, and processes surrounding the returnees. 
In this regard, the scholars Ajak, Biar and Larson (2012: 14) have suggested the following equation:
returnee integration = returnee capital + prevailing conditions
By  building  on  Helling's  concept  of  returnee  capital  and  adding  the  diversity  of  each  case's 
31 Trends:  population,  resource,  economic,  political,  technological.  Shocks:  health,  natural,  economic,  conflict, 
livestock health. Seasonality: prices, production, health, employment opportunities. (See DFID, 1999)
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prevailing conditions, they highlight the complexity of the process of (re)integration. Ajak, Biar and 
Larson (ibid) claim that the prevailing conditions in any given community – may it be security  
issues,  economic  opportunities,  government  regulations,  or  service  delivery  –  influence  the 
returnees' abilities to make use of the capital they bring with them. In other words:
“...the ability of a returnee to obtain a job, to put up permanent settlement, and to receive 
social services is determined by their returnee capital and the prevailing conditions in their 
particular host community.”
(ibid: 15)
This clearly relates to the holistic perspective of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework and takes 
much  of  the  criticism  presented  above  into  consideration.  We  may  therefore  argue  that  the 
possession of returnee capital alone is insufficient for successful (re)integration – both on micro and 
macro levels.
According to these views, the returnee capital framework may face unexpected challenges. 
It is thus clear that the case of South Sudan must be thoroughly investigated according to both 
historical and contemporary developments in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the 
specific  context.  Local  conditions  are  arguably  crucial  for  the  (re)integration  process,  and  can 
therefore not be emphasized enough. This is put well by Ghosh (2000: 206), who claims that:
“...if return (...) is to be durable, conditions must be created so that the individual (and the 
family) can play a useful and productive role as a member of the community in the country 
of  return,  and  may  not  be  induced  or  forced  to  leave  again.  In  the  absence  of  such 
conditions,  even  if  the  migrant  does  return,  sustained  reintegration  will  be  difficult  to 
achieve and he/she is likely to leave again.”
Thus, this study has decided to utilize Ajak, Biar and Larson's equation as the main tool for the 
following analysis.
4.6   Summary
Based on the assumption that human beings have agency, it  is clear that there is a solid 
argument to be made that returnees hold resources that can be used for developmental purposes in 
post-conflict societies. The international focus on voluntary repatriation as the preferred durable 
solution to forced migration can be argued to ignore the post-return (re)integration process and the 
needs of both returnees and return communities. This has the potential of neglecting returnees as 
productive actors and contributors to their surroundings. Moreover, this ignorance also limits the 
understanding of the challenges of post-return (re)integration and the potential of new displacement 
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cycles.  Without  more  emphasis  and  research  on  this  crucial  aspect  of  forced  migration,  it  is 
reasonable  to  believe  that  the  potential  of  returnees  and  their  resources  will  go  unrecognized, 
leaving them with the negative stigma of being a burdensome group.
As an attempt to reduce this gap, this study will apply the theoretical framework of returnee 
capital to the return area of Juba, South Sudan. This chapter has demonstrated how a combination of 
discourse from both sociology, development studies and forced migration studies can be a theorized 
alternative to the contemporary single-case empirical  evaluations.  By evaluating the concept  of 
returnee  capital  through  the  (re)integration  of  South  Sudanese  returnees  from Khartoum,   the 
analysis will explore the idea of returnees as active agents within post-conflict reconstruction and 
development. Furthermore, this study also wishes to contribute to the wider process of theorizing 
forced migration  studies.  By combining the  use  of  the  theoretical  framework presented  in  this 
chapter and the contextual understanding presented in chapter 2, the next chapter will provide the 
analysis and discussions on (re)integration of returnees in South Sudan.
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5 Data Presentation and Analysis
This thesis attempts to explain the process of post-conflict returnee (re)integration through 
the  examination  of  possession  and  use  of  returnee  capital  in  South  Sudan.  With  the  use  of 
methodological and theoretical concepts and methods, this study has developed its aim and scope, 
and resulted in the collection of qualitative data in Juba, South Sudan. This chapter seeks to bring 
together the theoretical framework and the empirical data collected during the fieldwork, in order to 
address  the  idea  of  returnee  capital  as  a  potential  resource  for  post-conflict  development  and 
reconstruction. The discoveries will be presented and analyzed in four main parts.
The first section presents a brief, but important contextual overview of the displacement. 
The returnees' experiences from Khartoum are described, mainly focusing on economic and social 
issues, as well as the returnees' reasons for returning to South Sudan. Furthermore, the possible 
impact of these experiences on the post-return period in South Sudan will be reflected upon.
Next, the data will be addressed according to the equation presented in chapter 4:
returnee integration = returnee capital + prevailing conditions
Hence, the second section of this chapter will take the concept of  returnee capital into account. 
More specifically, it will examine whether or not the South Sudanese returnees are perceived to 
hold returnee capital. The findings include material capital, education and work skills, social and 
cultural capital, and assistance stimuli.
The  third  section  deals  with  the  prevailing  conditions;  conditions  that  influence  the 
returnees' abilities to make use of the capital they bring with them. Through highlighting the various 
contextual factors that may enable or disable the utilization of returnee capital, this section attempts 
to obtain a realistic understanding of the use of returnee capital.
Finally, the last section addresses the overall returnee (re)integration process. By linking the 
returnee capital and the prevailing conditions, the aim is to reflect upon the situation on the ground 
in South Sudan and the returnees'  role  within it.  Are the returnees perceived positively by the 
society? Are they able to contribute with their returnee capital? Or are they, as some scholars phrase 
it, solely straining scarce resources?
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Section 5.1: Understanding the Displacement in Khartoum
Although  the  actual  displacement  is  not  the  main  focus  here,  it  is  vital  to  have  an 
understanding of where the group in focus is coming from. According to the definition, returnee 
capital can be acquired both prior to displacement and during exile. Knowledge of the context in 
Khartoum is therefore vital for a comprehensive understanding of the opportunities people had to 
gain  returnee  capital  during  their  displacement.  Also,  due  to  protracted  displacement,  it  is 
reasonable to argue that the returnees' experiences in Khartoum have an impact on their choice of 
returning and their perceptions of their new environment in South Sudan.
As we know, the individuals in focus of this study are returnees who have been displaced in 
Khartoum, and who have now come to live in South Sudan. Many also fled to other countries, like 
the East African neighboring states, Egypt, Israel and Western countries, yet the group of people 
displaced in Sudan represents by far the majority of displacees. The time in exile varies widely. 
Some spent years or even decades in Khartoum, some were born there,  and some have moved 
around to different places. Eight of the returnee respondents of this study spent from 9 to 22 years 
in Khartoum, while three were born in Khartoum after their parents' flight from the south. These 
long  durations  in  exile  are  not  surprising  when  considering  the  length  of  the  two  civil  wars; 
respectively 17 and 23 years.
5.1.1   Life in Khartoum
Life in Khartoum was in many ways very different from the life left behind in South Sudan. 
Many people came from rural areas and were experiencing an urban lifestyle for the first time. For 
all the southern IDPs Khartoum represented a very different life, both economically, politically and 
socially. For many, Khartoum represented opportunities. The respondents spoke of easier access to 
better services and more job opportunities. Mary, who spent 22 years in Khartoum, said: “People  
were very  comfortable in  Khartoum, they had electricity  24 hours,  clean tap  water,  and many  
jobs...”32. Electricity and access to clean water were repeatedly mentioned during the interviews, as 
well  as access to free education and health care. Especially the young returnees mentioned the 
access to free education in Sudan as a major issue. Alicia eagerly expressed her contentment of life 
in Khartoum: “We had a stable life in Khartoum, my family had a piece of land and we even had a  
concrete house there!”33.
32 Mary (informant #1), interview by Linn Ersland, June 2013.
33 Alicia (informant #10), interview by Linn Ersland, June 2013.
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The  respondents  spoke  of  the  variety  of  livelihood  opportunities  in  Khartoum as  well. 
Small-scale business opportunities and domestic work were common among IDPs from the south. 
Returnee Mary talked about a wide range of industries with employment opportunities that you 
could not find in the south, and she also added: “...and the wage would cover much more than it  
does here in South Sudan!”34. This implies that the IDPs in Khartoum had access to both a wider 
range of job opportunities and a larger amount of material capital than they had been used to in the 
south.
However, the conversations also showed signs of a different life in Khartoum. Tony, a South 
Sudanese who spent 20 years in Khartoum without his family, said that in Khartoum “...you can 
have access to electricity, clean water, even a cooler in your house...but if you don't have the money  
to do this, life in Khartoum is very difficult...”35. According to a report by the Norwegian Refugee 
Council (Macdonald, 2010), the majority of the southern IDPs resided in the poorer shanty town 
areas or in IDP camps outside of the city. People in these areas were often living in very poor  
conditions,  with  no  access  to  the  electricity,  clean  water  and  free  services  mentioned  by  the 
informants. Sebit, a South Sudanese employed by an INGO in Juba, supported this; “the life in the  
north was really...they were working hard...like slaves...”36.
Another issue also became clear during the interviews, namely the social discrimination of 
Southerners. The respondents talked about mistreatment, pressure to convert to Islam, and even 
killings of people from South Sudan:
“The rule of law [in Khartoum] is good...I mean, in my understanding it is good, in your 
understanding it may not be good...I mean, rule of law for their own people, not for the 
foreigners...especially for the South Sudanese and the South Kordofan people...and the Blue 
Nile people...they are very harsh on them...”37
“...when  South  Sudan  became  independent,  the  north  did  not  want  to  see  the  Blacks 
anymore...they  were  banned...even  killed...the  security  in  Khartoum  disturbed  us  so 
much...after Garang died [in 2005], the Arabs started coming into people's houses and killing 
them...”38
Such discrimination of Southerners is  not  very surprising if  one is  familiar  with the history of 
Sudan. As explored in chapter 2, historically there has been a sharp division between people from 
the southern region and people from the central north of Sudan. What is interesting here is the fact 
that several of the returnees talked about mistreatment only after either the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in 2005 or the independence in 2011. When recalling his time in Khartoum, Tony 
34 Mary, interview.
35 Tony (informant #9), interview by Linn Ersland, June 2013.
36 Sebit (informant #16), interview by Linn Ersland, June 2013.
37 Richard (informant #15), interview by Linn Ersland, June 2013.
38 Anna (informant #2), interview by Linn Ersland, June 2013.
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claimed;  “it  was  very  nice  at  the  time,  but  at  the  CPA time  things  became  different”39.  The 
acceptance of war-displaced Southerners disappeared, and people became challenged in new ways. 
As INGO-worker Jack expressed it; “there was not a good divorce, no, it was a bad divorce...so of  
course they mistreat them there, and I mean nothing physical or whatever, but they are seen as  
'okay, now get to your country, you didn't want us, so get out'...”40. This leads us the choice of 
returning back to South Sudan.
5.1.2   The Motivation for Returning to South Sudan
Although this study does not focus on the factors behind repatriation, a few relevant issues 
should be mentioned. The reasons behind people's return migration can explain their motivation to 
or lack of motivation to contribute to the rebuilding and development of their country. As Rogge 
(1994: 35) argues, “[r]eluctant migrants seldom make successful settlers, even if it means 'going 
home'”.
In  this  study,  the  most  commonly  heard  motivation  for  returning  to  South  Sudan  was 
patriotism. Hope, a returnee in her late 20s, said the reason for her return was “...because this is my 
country!”41. Mary expressed herself similarly;  “we are feeling at home in South Sudan, it is our  
land. It is not like Khartoum, that is not our land...”42.  This feeling of nationalism and affiliation 
with South Sudan can arguably have an effect on the returnees' desire to contribute to their country.  
A study done by Pantuliano and colleagues (2008: 1), claims that “[i]n Southern Sudan there is a 
strong sense of people 'returning home',  often driven by a desire not only to rebuild their  own 
livelihoods and futures, but also to contribute to the building of a viable and peaceful Southern 
Sudan”. This is clearly expressed by university student Vincent, who said that;“South Sudan needs 
its people to improve its country, so I returned to help my family and to help my country”43.
However, the respondents also mentioned the referendum and the following independence in 
2011  as  reasons  for  returning.  Both  returnees  and  INGO  respondents  claimed  that  the  South 
Sudanese government encouraged people to return in time to cast their votes in the referendum. 
Simultaneously, the mistreatment of Southerners in the north and the alienation after the referendum 
result  was disclosed,  many felt  they had no choice but to move to the south. Charles, a South 
Sudanese academic, claimed that; “...overnight they became foreigners, they lost their rights, they  
39 Tony, interview.
40 Jack (informant #13), interview by Linn Ersland, June 2013.
41 Hope (informant #4), interview by Linn Ersland, June 2013.
42 Mary, interview.
43 Vincent (informant #8), interview by Linn Ersland, June 2013.
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could  not  work  –  the  only  option  was  to  go  back  home...”44.  This  raises  questions  of  the 
voluntariness of the return. It may seem like some returnees were directly or indirectly pressured to 
leave Khartoum, and might therefore have no real desire to either return or contribute to South 
Sudan.
* * *
Section 5.2: Returnee Capital: What are the Returnees Bringing?
In order to  analyze  the returnees'  potential  to contribute,  it  is  necessary to  have a clear 
understanding of what they can actually contribute with. In this regard, we will now turn to the first 
section of the equation:
returnee integration = returnee capital + prevailing conditions
As we saw in chapter 4, returnee capital is the material and non-material resources returnees have 
acquired either before the flight or during exile, which they bring with them upon return. In this 
case this implies the capital people obtained in South Sudan before the flight and in Khartoum 
during the displacement. This section will therefore present the returnee capital discovered in this 
study. Through data collection, information regarding people's levels of capital (material, education, 
work experience, social capital, etc.) have been obtained and discussed. This was essential not only 
to acquire an overview of the relevant returnee capital available in Juba, but also to illuminate the 
capital left behind in Khartoum. The utilization of these resources will be discussed in the following 
sections.
5.2.1   Material Capital
According to the findings, the amount of material capital brought by returnees varies greatly. 
The informants told very diverse stories about  access to both money, land and goods. When it  
comes to property, five of the eleven returnee informants claimed that they already had a plot or a 
house upon the return, either in Juba or outside the city. The remaining six returnees said they were 
staying  with  relatives  or  temporarily  renting  a  place.  However,  when  it  comes  to  money  the 
message was clear; returnees from Sudan bring overall very little money back to South Sudan.
According to the informants,  this has several  reasons.  Firstly,  the introduction of a new 
44 Charles (informant #24), interview by Linn Ersland, June 2013.
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currency, the South Sudanese pound (SSP), in July 2011, caused a loss of value for the Sudanese 
pounds the returnees possessed. A small-scale business woman, Anna, understood this and decided 
to spend her money on goods in Khartoum45. She bought fabrics and clothes in Khartoum, and 
brought them to Juba where she sold them. In addition to being a form of social capital in itself, this 
economic insight made her able to indirectly bring her material capital to the south. However, the 
majority of the informants followed a pattern of having at least some money in Khartoum, but not 
being  able  to  benefit  from it  or  transfer  it  to  South  Sudan.  A similar  pattern  was  discovered 
regarding belongings; 
“...it is like sort of in the whole returns pattern, it is completely forgetting how little money 
people have, like how little financial independence...they have a monetary system, a lot of  
people left Khartoum with a reasonable number of assets...and of course you cannot carry a  
bed frame all the way back to South Sudan, and they had to sell it...people knew that they 
had to sell it...and there is a point when people in Khartoum had to sell things at a fifth of its  
value...”46
Another  reason  for  the  lack  of  material  capital,  which  was  expressed  clearly  by  both 
returnees and other informants, is the often arduous journey from Khartoum to the south. Despite 
Sudan being the neighboring country, the return can offer numerous challenges. First of all, the 
returnees are not always able to bring all their belonging with them. An INGO-worker said that 
“many returnees converted their money into goods, because they were less likely to be stolen on the  
way to South Sudan”47. This created a massive challenge for the actors involved in the assisted 
returns, who had to transport not only thousands of people back to the south, but also an enormous 
amount of goods. Another respondent further explained; “they try to bring all their belongings, all  
their furniture...fridge, sofa sets...everything under open sky...burning in the sun...soaking in the  
rain....getting spoiled...but they came with all these things...”48. Furthermore, the respondents also 
spoke of difficulties at the border check points, where both money and belongings were forcibly 
taken from them. In addition, the barges transporting both returnees and goods down the river Nile 
are  regularly  reported  stranded,  due  to  either  taxation  issues  or  the  shifting  rainy/dry  seasons. 
Consequently, people's belongings are delayed. Grace told that all her family's belongings had been 
stranded in Kosti, a border town, for two years now49.
One crucial aspect of the return process which must be mentioned is its long duration. This 
is often overlooked, despite its potential impact on the returnees' material capital.  According to 
Gabriella,  a  NGO-employee,  the  time  from  you  leave  Khartoum  until  you  reach  your  final 
45 Anna, interview.
46 Gabriella (informant #20), interview by Linn Ersland, June 2013.
47 John (informant #12), interview by Linn Ersland, June 2013.
48 Jack, interview.
49 Grace (informant #11), interview by Linn Ersland, June 2013.
60
destination and manage to settle down – may it be in Juba or somewhere else – can take from a few 
months and up to several years50. During this period, the returnees have to survive of the capital 
they have:
“They don't have money...I mean, the only money they have in a lot of cases is the one they 
bring with them in terms of material things...you know, their cargo...so they sell it a little by 
little...and in this way they survive until  they can reintegrate up to a point, but it is not  
easy...”51
A NGO-worker told a similar story of a young returnee mother in Warrap state:
“Some of them were really...hmm...in a terrible situation, because I remember in 2012, early 
2012,  we  visited  some  of  the  returnees,  and  there  was  a  young  woman  that  had  four 
children...and she said her husband had been killed in the war some time ago...and she had  
come from Khartoum with her household belongings, because the IOM assisted them to 
carry  everything...but  by  2012,  and  she  had  come  in  2011,  she  had  sold  most  of  her 
household things to be able to buy food, because the World Food Program provides food for 
six months, but in this case they provided actually for one year...but they said 'we cannot 
provide for longer'...so she had to sell  most of her household items...and she had almost  
nothing, and these four children were with her and she did not know what to do...she was 
actually in a desperate situation...”52
This  story  represents  similar  experiences  heard  from other  respondents.  Overall,  it  thus 
seems reasonable to argue that only a limited amount of material capital is brought from Khartoum 
to South Sudan. When arriving in Juba, and if  their  material capital  have not been lost,  stolen, 
destroyed or used along the way, many returnees find themselves with very little capital left. We 
should of course be aware that there are exceptions to the rule, like stated by John; 
“If looking at Juba, you will be dealing with a different level of diaspora...like some nurses  
and  business  people  who  are  bringing  substantial  wealth  and  connections  from Sudan, 
and...you know...there is to be seen in Juba, yeah...in Juba...it is hard to say what's behind it,  
but  like  obvious  displace  of  wealth,  like  fancy  new cars  and  mansions  and  things  like 
that...”53
However, the largest part of the data shows a clear underrepresentation of material capital among 
the returnees.
5.2.2   Human Capital
On the other hand, all of the 28 informants agreed that returnees come with skills. Through 
direct questions or appearing indirectly throughout the interviews, every respondent claimed that 
50 Gabriella, interview.
51 Jack, interview.
52 Nancy (informant #21), interview by Linn Ersland, June 2013.
53 John, interview.
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returnees bring with them either academic or work experience from Khartoum. For instance, out of 
the eleven returnee respondents, there were four nurses, one small-scale business woman, one man 
with  ten  years  experience  within  policing  and  security,  one  administrator,  and  four  university 
students.  Several  of  the  informants  also  had  family  members  with  higher  education  or  with 
experience from high positions in  Khartoum. Many had attended the Juba National  University, 
which was relocated to Khartoum from 1983 to 2011 for security reasons.
The macro-level informants also argued that returnees bring various forms of human capital. 
NGO-worker Gabriella said that “...certainly people are turning up educated, people are turning up  
with assets, with different experiences...”54. Interestingly, academic actor Charles told that;
“...during the war,  the government targeted highly educated people,  they saw them as a 
security threat, as someone who can mobilize people. At the university, many professors and 
lecturers were targeted. The government targeted everybody, but especially highly educated 
people...”55
This  statement  can imply that  educated people were displaced during  the war and that  human 
capital were removed from the south. If this is correct, it is even more vital to bring skills back to 
South Sudan, and this study shows clear discoveries of such brain gain. The respondents mentioned 
nurses, doctors, pharmacists, administrators, carpenters, builders, plumbers, electricians, teachers, 
police, and business entrepreneurs who have returned from Khartoum to South Sudan – “ ...qualified  
workers who South Sudan desperately needs, and who they don't have...”56. As we have seen, Anna, 
who returned  after  seventeen  years  in  Khartoum,  brought  her  clothing  business  back to  South 
Sudan57. She is also using her business skills to teach other women how to set up small businesses. 
Similarly, Kate reflected upon experiences from a returnee camp set up in the outskirts of one of  
South Sudan's bigger towns;
“There were many returnees with some sort of skills...absolutely...it took only three days  
before there was a market in the camp! Some of the most initiative, and who had some 
money, they bought a few packages of biscuits, some soap and some different things, and 
started their own business...it happened immediately, so there was quite a lot of initiative in 
them...”58
It should, however, be kept in mind that there always are exceptions. The South Sudanese in 
Khartoum were indeed displaced, and many had no access to education or employment. According 
to Jacobsen, Lautze and Osman (2001), the Sudanese government employed strategies designed to 
54 Gabriella, interview.
55 Charles, interview.




make  it  difficult  for  Southerners  to  get  any  kind  of  documentation  or  to  claim  any  rights  of 
residency in Khartoum. As mentioned above, many Southerners lived very vulnerably in IDP camps 
or in the poorest areas of Khartoum. It should be assumed that also some of these individuals and 
households have found their way to Juba in the post-war period. Based on this, former government 
official Eric described the situation as following;
“Those who had jobs are few among the returnees, because we had more than four million 
IDPs  in  the  north...and  if  you  take  the  proportion  of  educated  people,  because  the 
government in the north also did not give them the opportunity, because they discriminated 
them...yeah...so  they  were  fighting  them...so  only  few...they  got  their  scholars  and 
scholarships  for education,  whoever  is  lucky to get  that  chance...so...maybe  among four 
million you can say 500...it is not a big number...”59
This is further reflected in the extremely low literacy rate (27 percent) in South Sudan today, and 
must be considered in the further analysis.
5.2.3   Social and Cultural Capital
In his theory,  Helling argues that  returnees often have experienced different  lifestyles in 
exile, and that they therefore are bringing with them different values, attitudes and ideas when they 
return. Helling sees these acquisitions as an important part of the overall level of returnee capital. In 
this  study,  the  urban  life  of  Khartoum  was  found  to  cause  a  crucial  change  in  the  returnees 
lifestyles. According to research, 83 percent of the South Sudanese population is rurally based and 
78 percent of households rely primarily on agriculture or livestock for their survival (Maxwell et.al.,  
2012).  Tribalism,  customary  law  and  a  traditional  lifestyle  are  strong  factors.  Thus,  when 
Southerners arrived in Khartoum, many experienced an urban setting for the very first time. Several  
aspects of this  lifestyle  were mentioned during the interviews as potentially  positive for  South 
Sudan's future.
Firstly, the respondents argued that the urban environment introduced people to a different 
life  –  a  life  with  higher  standards  of  living,  different  economic  opportunities  and  new social 
networks. This is reflected in the range of skills discussed above. Victor, a South Sudanese NGO-
employee, referred to it as “the acquisition of urbanized survival mechanisms”60. However, Victor 
did not only mention work skills, but also the encounter with a different culture;  “they went and 
acquired different skills...they went and acquired a new culture...which have still prolonged, they  
have a new culture also...which means they have new attitudes...”61. This argument was supported 
59 Eric (informant #26), interview by Linn Ersland, June 2013.
60 Victor (informant #17), interview by Linn Ersland, June 2013.
61 Ibid.
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by  several  other  respondents.  It  was  suggested  that  returnees  in  general,  not  only  those  from 
Khartoum, come back with both different mentalities, attitudes and opinions. One informant said 
that “they come with a different spirit, a different attitude towards work”62, while another suggested 
that “returnees come with another mentality, that is more pro-development...or it is more...I mean,  
it is new, it is more modern!”63.
Furthermore, discoveries were made during the observation phase that many returnees had 
developed different  perceptions  of  what  is  considered respectable work.  According to tradition, 
there are certain professions that are considered very low level jobs that respectable people should 
not do. Examples of this in Juba is working in bars or hotels, or driving water trucks64. Most South 
Sudanese  people  will,  according  to  informal  sources,  not  take  such  jobs.  However,  the  urban 
experiences of many returnees have changed this perception. This was said to be particularly the 
case for people who had been in East Africa, yet you can also encounter returnees from Khartoum 
in such professions.
Moreover, the returnees' new ideas and attitudes were to some extent perceived as something 
positive by the informants. Interestingly, Charles expressed a high appreciation of returnees from 
Khartoum compared to returnees from East Africa:
“People from Sudan are perceived as being very honest and reliable, because of the Islamic,  
religious influence. Even before the war, they had the tendency of being honest,  helpful, 
communicative.  For example,  if  you give an envelop full  of  money to somebody at  the 
airport of Khartoum, telling them to call this number when you reach Juba, they will reach  
Juba  airport  and  call  that  number.  If  you  give  the  envelope  to  somebody  from  East  
Africa...phf...you have given away your money! You see, people returning from East Africa 
have usually developed a more Western, individualistic attitude. They are often seen as more 
dishonest...as crooked! (...) ...if you are cheated by a dinka, you will ask; which Dinka? A 
Dinka from East Africa or a Dinka from Khartoum?”65
This is very interesting, because it challenges the historical resentment against Islamic influence in 
the south. This will be further discussed below in the section on social (re)integration. Yet, it should 
be mentioned that only one informant, government representative Peter, suggested that knowledge 
of Arabic can be a resource. While the lack of English knowledge among returnees from Khartoum 
was repeatedly mentioned as a problem for both social and economic (re)integration (see below 
section 5.3.1), Peter argued that fluency in Arabic can be perceived as a resource; “we even need 
Arabic, we need Arabic to be taught here. It is simple, because it is good to know, because Arabic is  
62 Charles, interview.
63 Jack, interview.
64 In Juba, virtually all households depend on water from the Nile. This is regularly transported in special tank trucks  
from the river to people's houses.
65 Charles, interview.
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an international language. So it is good to know it...”66. 
Maybe the most interesting finding from a peace  studies perspective was the repeatedly 
suggested peacefulness of the returnees.  This was mentioned by both returnees themselves  and 
other actors (both South Sudanese and foreign). South Sudan consists of a great number of ethnic 
groups,  and tribal  affiliation and identification are  strong.  Most  people  live together  with  their 
tribesmen  and  have  their  social  networks  within  their  tribe.  However,  it  was  argued  that  this 
dynamic  changed  considerably  in  Khartoum.  Returnee  Alicia  said  that  “in  Khartoum  all  
Southerners lived together and had no problems with the neighbors”67. Both in the city and in the 
IDP camps people were forced to live together across tribes, and their shared Southern identification 
became emphasized rather than their tribal identity. Eric explained this:
“...they have their exposure to urbanization, most of them live with neighbors who are not 
from their tribe...they can associate with any group. Here in the south, those who stayed 
here,  if  you are  associating with someone that  person has to come from your region or 
from...whatever...in culture-wise... Because they say you have to maintain the security...you 
don't want foreigners, like if somebody comes from outside our region, so that person may 
get the information of our culture, and expose what is good and what is bad about us. So  
privacy is an issue. (...) ...because [the returnees] are more exposed of town life, they are 
peaceful. Because they live there, staying different tribes together. They were not one tribe, 
so they are peaceful...”68
If this attitude is transferred to South Sudan, it can have crucial implications for the future of the 
country; it can lead to increased understanding and acceptance of other people. As the informants 
suggested, returnees from Khartoum have a more open-minded attitude towards people outside of 
their ethnic or tribal group. As Charles argued;
“You  develop  a  cultural  awareness,  you  develop  a  certain  understanding.  You  begin  to 
challenge stereotypes. If a Dinka thinks a person from Central Equatoria eats people, and 
then his neighbor in exile is from Central Equatoria and he sees that he does not eat people...  
It changes people's minds. (...) People modify their ideas, begin to challenge the idea [of  
tribalism]... If somebody says Dinkas are bad, you will say; 'No, I met a good Dinka'.”69
He continued by humorously sharing his own experiences from exile in Egypt:
“I had never met anybody from Darfur before, and I saw them as Arabs...blacks, but Arabs.  
But in Cairo I shared a flat with somebody from Darfur. My friends [from South Sudan] 
thought I was secretly Arabized. They came to my flat to see how these people really were,  
and there they saw them drinking beer! So they thought I had converted them...”70






This development can arguably be perceived as a positive aspect of displacement, and it 
illuminates  the  importance  of  recognizing  the  potential  of  returnee  capital.  Through  living  in 
Khartoum – often for several decades – South Sudanese have acquired new mentalities, attitudes 
and values, including awareness and increasing acceptance of other people. Whether or not these 
impulses  can  be  directly  transferred  to  the  context  of  Juba  is  debatable,  yet  it  is  virtually 
indisputable that these are attitudes  desperately needed in South Sudan.  As former government 
representative  Eric  claimed;  “the  issue  that  is  draining  all  the  resources  of  this  country  is  
tribalism...and these people can live alongside other tribes”71.
5.2.4   Stimuli for Assistance
According to the returnee capital framework,  returnees can furthermore act as stimuli for 
state  capacity-building  and  aid  distribution.  This  argument  was  investigated  during  the  data 
collection process, with diverging results. Both returnees and others disagreed about whether or not 
the presence of returnees impacts the level of attention and assistance from macro actors.
When returnees arrive in South Sudan, they receive a ration card for food and non-food 
items  (NFIs)  for  three  months.  This  is  directed  at  returnees  only,  and  it  is  supposed to  be  of 
temporary assistance until they settle down and are able to provide for themselves. Additionally, the 
informants  mentioned  other  types  of  programs  for  returnees,  usually  provided  by  NGOs,  for 
instance  income  generating  projects,  construction  of  boreholes,  health  care  and  educational 
facilities,  and  hygiene  and  sanitation  awareness.  Several  of  the  informants  argued  that  such 
assistance often also benefit the return communities as well. Two INGO-employees reflected upon 
this:
“ A colleague recently told me when they were visiting a project site, people were expressing 
that,  yes,  the  returnees  strain  resources,  but  they  also  bring  the  benefit  of  bringing 
developments with them...and this is...eh...you know, a somewhat controversial thing to say, 
because there are tendencies of ignoring the host community and issues like that, but... You 
know, any community where there are tensions, conflicts, resources are strained, and these 
are factors that a high influx of returnees bring, it is going to need more attention from the  
humanitarian community. I mean, it just sort of goes hand in hand.”72
“...they bring development, I mean, they attract NGOs and international assistance. This is  
something that everybody says, in all the focus groups and when you talk with them. It is 
like, okay, this community did not have a borehole, but now because there are returnees they 
put a borehole...they did not have a school, but now there are returnees... In the end this  





In accordance with the theory, several respondents claimed that projects usually are aimed at the 
entire community in order to avoid conflicts between returnees and others. Thus, instead of risking 
the  complaints  and  resentment  of  only  targeting  returnees,  some  agencies  rather  seek  to  find 
solutions that will benefit entire communities. This is exactly in line with Helling's argument; macro  
actors perceive the presence of returnees as a threat to scarce resources and stability, and therefore 
seek to balance the situation by providing assistance for all. However, not all respondents agreed 
that returnees promote assistance, as will be demonstrated below.
When speaking about  South Sudan as a whole,  five macro respondents claimed that the 
presence of returnees has definitely led to an increase in NGO activities. The NGOs in this study 
that work specifically towards returnees, said that they tend to look at where the number of returns 
are highest and the needs are most pressing, when determining where to initiate projects. This is, 
however, when speaking about South Sudan in general. When it comes to Juba, the situation is quite 
different. None of the NGOs in this study had projects in Juba. Three NGOs had projects in other 
areas  of  Central  Equatoria  state,  but  not  in  Juba  as  such.  During  the  observation  period  the 
researcher was in fact unable to find any organizations with projects involving returnees in the 
capital, except for the transit areas where people are awaiting onward transportation to their final 
destinations. John explains this by saying that “Juba, being the capital, is a very big hub of these  
returns,  but it  is not where the humanitarian needs are pressing so much”74.  Due to its central 
position, Juba is enjoying a higher level of social and economic development than most places in 
the country. This can be one of the reason why returnees in Juba are not given more attention.
Furthermore,  two  respondents  illuminated  additional  aspects  of  the  humanitarian  and 
development efforts in South Sudan. They argued that the presence of returnees per se is often not 
sufficient for achieving attention in a country like South Sudan. INGO-worker John explained this:
“I think that the humanitarian community as a whole, and this is just me speaking of course, 
it  is  doing  what  it  can  with the resources  that  it  has,  because  there  are  just  all  sort  of  
numerable  needs...(...)  I  would not say that  the virtue of having a high concentration of 
returnees,  that  these places get  more attention. I  mean,  it  is a just  a matter  of  trying to 
prioritize the most urgent needs, for instance with the epidemics recently, Hepatitis E...these 
issues that crop up, that is where the humanitarian focus is.”75
The distinction between returnees and others was further reflected upon by NGO-worker Gabriella:
“...this is not the case in other countries, whereby the gap between those who were displaced 
and those who were not, interpreted often as, you know, that is intermingled with ethnic,  
religious, political... The Tamils in Sri Lanka is obviously an amazing example of a very 




and everybody else, and so in that case you can pursue your singular line for a protective 
framework for the Tamils. But here it would not necessarily make that much sense, because, 
I mean, often the host communities...we find that often those communities can actually be in 
a worse situation than returnees.”76
It may seem that the extremely low levels of development and the myriad of urgent needs around 
the country take the attention away from returnees. Issues like security, access to clean water, food 
security, and health concerns for the population as a whole are often seen as more urgent than the 
(re)integration  of  returnees.  When  analyzing  the  interviews  more  thoroughly,  this  was  further 
visible in the respondents' reflections on the international community's continuing emergency focus 
in  South  Sudan,  rather  than  moving  on  to  a  more  development  oriented  strategy.  Gabriella 
mentioned that many agencies struggle to find financing for (re)integration programs; 
“...it is just an incredibly short-sighted way to look at the issue. I mean, we will get you as 
far as the center, and... I mean, donors make this mistake repeatedly when working with 
returns. (...) I think that is the most frustrating aspect, because when people were returning 
there was a huge amount of support, but now that they have physically returned there is not 
as much support given to the durable solutions part of it.”77
This was in fact complained about by some of the returnee respondents as well. During the focus 
group discussion with Rose, Hope, Helena and Ruth, they all said that they had received support by 
NGOs during the return, but that there was now no assistance to be found, except for the three 
months' rations of food and NFIs.
All  in  all,  the  situation  for  humanitarian  and development  assistance in  South Sudan is 
complex,  and  the  issues  mentioned  here  are  only  a  small  part  of  the  wider  picture.  It  seems 
reasonable to argue that the presence of returnees is acknowledged by national and international 
actors, but that there often are more urgent needs to attend to than the (re)integration of returnees. 
Surprisingly enough, the connection between the two – that lack of (re)integration measures may 
lead  to  urgent  needs  and  new displacement  circles  among  the  returnees  –  seems  to  be  either 
unrecognized or forgotten. As some of the informants suggested, the returnees do seem to act as 
stimuli for increased attention and assistance in some communities, yet not in Juba. The level of 
development and service delivery in the capital, although not sufficient for the amount of people 





Section 5.3: Prevailing Conditions: Can the Returnee Capital be Utilized?
Now that we have established what kind of returnee capital the returnees are bringing from 
Khartoum, it is time to look at the second part of the equation:
returnee integration = returnee capital + prevailing conditions
As we remember, the prevailing conditions are the context, structures and processes surrounding the 
returnees.  According to  the  theoretical  framework, such conditions influence people's  ability to 
utilize  their  human  agency.  More  specifically,  the  prevailing  conditions  enable  or  constrain 
returnees' abilities to utilize their returnee capital. Thus, by drawing on historical and contemporary 
developments  in  South  Sudan,  this  section  seeks  to  investigate  the  prevailing  conditions 
surrounding  returnees  in  Juba.  The  study  has  discovered  many  obstacles  to  the  (re)integration 
process, which subsequently create barriers for the utilization of the available returnee capital.
5.3.1   Livelihoods and Economic Opportunities
We  have  already  established  the  fact  that  many  returnees  possess  various  work  and 
educational skills. This section will now examine if and how these skills can be utilized in Juba. 
Sadly, the main discovery is that the current socio-economic conditions in South Sudan generally 
hinder people's livelihood revival and use of returnee capital.
Every  single  informant  mentioned  the  lack  of  access  to  economic  opportunities  as  the 
number  one  challenge  for  returnees.  Respondents  from  all  levels  spoke  about  the  lack  of 
employment opportunities, the limited formal economy, and the harsh competition for livelihoods in 
both Juba and South Sudan as a whole. Returnee Mary said that  “it is very hard to find work.  
People returned with the plan to get jobs in South Sudan, but it is not happening. Because the  
government has no money, there are few jobs. Most people are doing nothing”78. Previous research 
shows similar findings; returnees came to Juba with “the perception prior to return that the town 
offered easy access to a wide range of employment and livelihood opportunities”, only to become 
disappointed by the economic hardship of the capital (Pantuliano et.al., 2008: 15).
Overview of Livelihoods in Juba
In  Juba  the  main  employers  are  the  government  and  international  organizations  and 
78 Mary, interview.
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companies. In 2011 the South Sudanese business registry suggested that approximately 700 NGOs 
and 8,000 businesses (within manufacturing,  transport,  construction, financing, trade, real  estate 
etc.) were registered in South Sudan (Martin & Mosel, 2011). However, only 10 percent of the total 
economically active population was at the same time estimated to be in formal employment (ibid).  
According  to  Pantuliano  and  colleagues  (2008),  a  large  proportion  of  commercial  trade  is 
dominated by merchants of Northern Sudanese origin, while Ugandans and Kenyans dominate the 
construction sector. In other words, the majority of the South Sudanese people are excluded from 
the formal economy, as this study also suggests. Former referendum observer Kate emphasized this:
“That  is  the biggest,  biggest  challenge.  One of the big challenges.  I  mean,  there are  no 
employment opportunities, there are no jobs here. There is not a single workplace here! I 
mean, there are jobs in the ministries, but those are very few. Otherwise, you have to...you 
have to start your own business, I mean, to sell something in the market. To make soap and 
sell it. To start your own hairdressing salon. Have enough money to buy a sewing machine 
and make clothes. But to do this, you need the skills.”79
However, to have skills is not always sufficient in Juba. Returnee Anna, who had her own clothing 
business in Khartoum, has found it hard to reestablish her business in Juba80. Despite her business 
skills and material capital from Khartoum, she said that high prices, low purchasing power, and lack 
of micro finance institutions81 in Juba have made the reestablishment challenging.
Although  all  the  returnee  informants  were  either  in  jobs  or  university  during  the  data 
collection, they told similar stories of long-term unemployment and lack of suitable jobs. Many 
returnees mentioned that people's educational background is of little value in Juba. The majority 
had been unemployed for a longer period of time before finding work, and the jobs they had found 
were usually not relevant for their skills. Grace said her husband had a higher degree in accounting 
and twenty years of experience as an administrator for a international company in Khartoum, yet he 
could now only find small, temporary positions in Juba unrelated to his background82. Alicia told a 
similar story:
“There are no jobs here, even my sister cannot find work. She has a university degree in 
agricultural forestry, but she cannot find work, because her certificate is in Arabic, so she  
will not find employment in English in Juba. She is now working at an airline counter selling 
tickets, not using her education at all...”83
79 Kate, interview.
80 Anna, interview.
81 There are some micro finance institutions in Juba, yet their lending criteria often restrict returnees' access (e.g. to 
have a business active for three months before the application, to own land, or to have been settled for 12-18 months  





This clearly suggests that there are barriers for the utilization of returnee capital in Juba. Even with  
a university degree and a high level of competence, returnees are struggling to find work – this was 
repeatedly mentioned as a frustration among the returnees.
Overall,  the  majority  of  the  returnee  population  manage  to  make  a  living  through  the 
informal sector of Juba. Table 3 shows the various livelihood strategies people are using to generate 
an income. Adding to the list, respondents of this study mentioned small-scale businesses (e.g. tea 
making), collection and selling of scrap metal, and car washing. Charles suggested that  “people 
become creative,  imaginative.  The informal  economy is  important.  You  have  to  do  things  you  
normally don't do, or things you don't want to do”84. People may manage to survive on such day-to-
day labor, however, it does not provide a stable income or enough money to pay for tuition fees or 
health care.
Table 3: Primary livelihood strategies for residents and returnees in Juba
Source: Pantuliano et.al. (2008: 16)
Moreover, this has a major implication for the national economy, which former government 
representative Eric pointed out; “...most of the people are not working. You can see it if you walk on  
the street, you can see people sitting playing cards, drinking tea... So, it becomes a question of how  
we get [state] revenue...”85. This illuminates a crucial aspect of the returnee capital framework; the 
returnees may be able to contribute economically to their own households on the micro level, yet 
not participate in the economic development on a macro level. When the majority of the population 
–  including  returnees  –  are  unable  to  partake  formally  in  the  national  economy,  it  will  most 
definitely impact the level of tax revenue for the South Sudanese state. If only one tenth of the 
economically active population is paying taxes, this leaves about 90 percent of the potential tax 




Obstacles to Livelihood Revival
In order to illuminate the trouble of finding employment in Juba, this study has identified 
three main reasons for the constraints faced by returnees. Firstly, one rather obvious barrier for the 
returnees from Khartoum is language. Both returnees and other informants mentioned the returnees' 
lack of English skills as a major reason behind their unemployment. During exile in Khartoum, the 
South Sudanese IDPs went to Arabic-instructed schools and lived in an Arabic-speaking society. 
When considering the duration of displacement and the fact that many either came to Khartoum 
very young or were even born there, it is not surprising that Arabic is now their first language. Only 
three out of the eleven returnee respondents in this study had some sort of knowledge of English, 
while some others spoke different local languages in addition to the classical Arabic. And, as argued 
by Charles, “when they are competing for jobs with people being educated in English in East Africa  
[or  other  places],  they  have  a  serious  problem”86. Previous  studies  show that  NGOs and UN 
agencies admitted to often preferring East African staff over returnees from Khartoum because of 
their fluency in English (Martin & Mosel, 2011; Pantuliano et.al., 2008).
Based on this it can be argued that the lack of English skills works as an obstacle for the 
utilization of returnee capital. Eric gave a clear example of this:
“I have one of my cousins, now he is driving a Land Cruiser, he is a driver. And by then, 
when he was in the north he was a project coordinator in Khartoum, for a sugar factory in  
Khartoum. He was the project coordinator, because he is a graduate from university with an 
agricultural degree in sugar cane plantations. So when he came here he applied for jobs 
within agriculture, but he could not get a job, because he knows [only] Arabic. So the only  
thing he can do...when he came, he came with some money, because he was given his salary 
from the north, so he had to buy a car to use it as a public transport.”87
Thus, it is clear that language is a crucial barrier for returnees from Khartoum. Even if people come 
with high academic qualifications and extensive work experience, it can be extremely challenging 
to find work in Juba. As Eric said, “Arabic is discriminating them”88.
Secondly,  several  respondents  mentioned  the  lack  of  social  networks  as  a  barrier  to 
employment. A commonly heard comment was that you need “to know somebody” to get a job. 
According to the informants, this goes hand in hand with tribal affiliation. South Sudanese INGO-
employee Sebit said that when you are looking for work, “people will ask; who are you? Who is  
your  father?  Your  uncle?...”89.  This  will  identify  your  family,  clan  or  tribe,  which  will  then 






Sudan, yet it should be mentioned that several of the returnees emphasized the issue. INGO-worker 
Richard even went as far as to say that “talent has no scope in South Sudan, tribalism has scope”90. 
This is supported by other research, which claims that “workers are reportedly selected on the basis 
of their ethnic affiliation” (Pantuliano et.al., 2008: 16). Reports even claim that some ministries are 
completely dominated by a single tribe (ibid).
Finally, despite the urban context of Juba, surprisingly many respondents also illuminated 
the lack of farming skills among returnees. Jack argued that the government in general wants a 
larger proportion of the population to do agriculture91. As we have seen in chapter 2, only 4 percent 
of South Sudan's arable land is cultivated (Maxwell et.al., 2012). This is unfortunate in a country 
where the vast majority of food is imported, and the government would therefore like people to 
make use of the fertile land's potential. Returnees from Khartoum, however, are according to this 
study often not interested in agriculture:
“...they  don't  want  to  do  it,  they  don't  want  to  do  agriculture,  because  they  have...they 
already know the city, they don't want to return to work under the sun...so, you know, they 
prefer to be hired workers or whatever...”92
“...people move to camps, and people forget how long, you know, people are in camps for...it 
is like, because your grandfather is a farmer, it doesn't make you a farmer...and when you are 
in a camp, you don't necessarily aspire to do what your grandfather did, you aspire to see 
what other people do...”93
Both within Khartoum city and in the IDP camps for Southerners, people experienced a different 
kind of life – a more urban lifestyle with less dependency on agriculture. Jacobsen and colleagues 
(2001)  argue that  this  has  resulted in  a  change of  identity,  by  which  many former  farmers  or  
pastoralists now see themselves as urbanized and are unwilling to return to their rural lifestyles. As 
one informant phrased it, people “adapted to other mechanisms of surviving”94.
In this  regard,  we should also not  forget  the many Southerners who have been born in 
Khartoum, and who have no previous knowledge of the agricultural traditions of the south.  As 
Richard puts it; “[they] were born and brought up in Khartoum, so they have not learned how to  
survive in this land. Just like a tiger in the zoo, after one year if you push him to the jungle he will  
die, because he has not learned the art of surviving”95.  Interestingly,  the lack of digging skills 








Mary exclaimed; “...they don't even know how to dig!”96.
As a result, people are migrating to the urban centers in search for jobs. Juba, being the 
capital, is the aim for many, especially young people. This was expressed as a major concern for the 
government; such migration increases the competition for the few jobs available and puts pressure 
on both housing and social services97. Reports claim that the government is unable to absorb a large 
number of employees into the public  sector, due to funding shortages (Pantuliano et.al.,  2008). 
Salary  payments  are  often  irregular,  and  during  the  data  collection  period  many  government 
officials had in fact not received their salaries for two months98. The government's plans to further 
reduce the size of the public sector,  will  only lead to an even harsher competition for the few 
employment opportunities available.
Returnee Capital and the Prevailing Economic Conditions
Under such circumstances, it seems reasonable to argue that the returnees' expectations for 
urban livelihood revivals in Juba are not met, and that a large proportion of their skills remain  
unused. The extremely few employment opportunities in the formal economy, leave most returnees 
with no choice but to make a living through the informal economy. The growing number of urban 
poor  puts additional  strain on already scarce resources,  at  the  same time as the government is 
loosing out on state revenues. The prevailing conditions make it very challenging, if not impossible, 
for many returnees to make use of their  returnee capital for economic development beyond the 
micro level. Interestingly enough, it seems like other South Sudanese residents of Juba are also 
facing similar hardship. However, the lack of English skills and social networks put the returnees 
from Khartoum in an even more vulnerable situation. Overall, this study suggests that there is a 
need for  several  reforms in Juba,  for  the  returnee  capital  currently  available to  be  utilized;  an 
extensive  development  of  the  formal  economy,  creation  of  employment  opportunities,  harder 
restrictions on foreign workers, and intensive English training.
5.3.2   Access to Land
Access to land can be crucial for a process of (re)settling and (re)integrating into society. 
Lack of land and housing severely limits people's opportunities to restore their livelihoods and more 
generally reestablish their lives. As Mennen (2012:12) claims; “[land] is critical to livelihoods and 





returnees. We may recall from the previous section that only five of the eleven returnee respondents 
had  access  to  land  when  arriving  in  Juba.  Returnees  who  arrive  without  access  to  land  are 
repeatedly reported vulnerable, and it is not an easy task to acquire a place to stay in Juba today. 
Failure  to  access  land  hinders  returnees  to  settle  down  permanently,  and  thus  halts  the 
(re)integration process and the utilization of returnee capital.
The Land Belongs to the People
In 2006, the South Sudan Land Commission (SSLC) initiated the process of developing a 
national land policy (SSLC, n.d.). As an interim measure pending the policy, the Land Act was 
introduced in January 2009, in which section 75 states that “the Government of southern Sudan, 
State Government and private companies shall assist internally displaced persons and returnees in 
their efforts to improve their livelihood” (Land Act, 2009). In accordance with customary law, the 
Land Act identifies  the people of South Sudan as owners of  all  land. Although customs differ 
slightly between the different tribes, the overall rule is that people have the right to land from their 
ancestral communities. Furthermore, “when a person leaves his home for however long a time, with 
the intention of returning, he does not lose his right to the land” (Mennen, 2012: 16). This implies 
that if the returnees return to their original areas, they should according to customary law have 
access to land. 
However, as this study has discovered, not all returnees wish to return to their ancestral land. 
The urban experience of Khartoum and the lack of farming skills have left many South Sudanese 
with no interest in returning to a rural lifestyle. This is where the land issue becomes problematic;  
according to both customary and national law, returnees have no right to be allocated land in urban 
areas based on their returnee status per se (ibid). Based on an overall decentralized strategy, the 
government thus only allocates land to returnees if they return to the area they originally came 
from:
“...you should return to the rural areas, you should not try to come to the cities. And if you 
do it you loose every privilege or whatever...every relation with the government. I mean, you 
can do it, it is not like they are going to stop them, but you cannot claim for nothing after  
you have moved from your area...”99
“You have to go to the local county and process some documents for land in the county you 
came from originally. If you want to live somewhere else, so the government will not help  
you. But according to South Sudanese law anyone can buy land. But the returnees can only  




This  has  major  consequences  for  returnees  who want  to  settle  in  Juba.  More  than half  of  the 
respondents in this study identified access to land in Juba as a serious barrier to the (re)integration 
of returnees. NGO-worker Gabriella further argued that “lack of security of tenure is having a huge  
impact on the search for durable solutions”101.
How to Access Land in Juba
If, then, returnees want to settle down in Juba – and they are not originally from there – they 
have  to  follow  certain  procedures  to  request  to  purchase  land.  The  interviewed  government 
representative  in  Juba  argued  that  the  government  gives  no  special  attention  or  treatment  to 
returnees migrating to the capital:
“Any returnee...you arrive here, and you have to apply like any other person at the Ministry 
of Housing. And then,  when they demarcate land and do allocations, you go and pull a  
lottery. If you get, then you are very lucky. So you apply like any other person, any other  
citizen. We are not going to have special cases that gives land for returnees. You come, you 
apply, you get.”102
According to the returnee respondents, this can be a very long and difficult process. It requires the  
correct  formal  documentation,  money,  and  in  some  instances  approval  by  the  local  chiefs. 
According to Deng (in Martin & Mosel, 2011: 19), some people have been waiting for up to three 
years for an official surveyor to inspect plots. Furthermore, a study by Mennen (2012) claims that 
the Bari, the indigenous people of Juba County, often deny allocations to non-Baris or demand 
additional tenure fees of more than 3,000 SSP. This leads to a situation where, according to Martin 
and Mosel (2011), “in practice only those with money or connections can obtain land”. For most 
returnees, this is a huge amount of money. Taking into account how little material capital most 
returnees from Khartoum bring with them, this can seem an impossible price to pay:
“...the challenge is, when they go [to Juba] they need land, and to get land you need to have  
money. They cannot afford to pay those things, and if you don't have money, how do you 
acquire land? Because land is allocated and you have to pay for it, and most of the land, it 
ranges from 6,000 SSP and up. The cheapest one is at very least 6,000 SSP. Far from the  
city... And if it is 6,000 SSP, how do you pay if you do not have a job? And some of the jobs,  
like now, you cannot earn more than 1,000 SSP a month...”103
As a result, returnees have to make use of other options. Some people rent, yet these prices  
are also often too high to pay. Furthermore, Alicia claimed that many landlords in Juba refuse to 






last couple of years have seen a large-scale expansion of informal settlements in and around Juba:
“Juba  is  expanding  quite  quickly,  and  there  is  a  certain  amount  of  ad  hoc  community 
expansion to it. You have people moving in, their movement was unregulated at the time, 
people would set up structures, and they do not...they are living here, but they do not have 
security of land tenure. In certain areas you are completely fine, you showed up five years  
ago, got yourself some structures and your kids go to the local school. In other areas that are  
supposed to become retail are much more profitable. Suddenly, if you look along the Jebel,  
the UN decided to build its premises outside of Juba and next to the Jebel. Suddenly with  
that road came major property, and then you find that people are being displaced away from 
that road...”105
This demonstrates the vulnerability of many people in Juba. People in informal settlements receive 
no compensation for moving, and they also live in constant risk of having their homes demolished. 
The government and the returnees have so far been unable to agree on settlements, and the issue of 
land is thus a continuing barrier for the realization of returnee (re)integration and returnee capital.
Land Grabbing
As we have already seen, some returnees had land in Juba before they flew to Khartoum. 
Fortunately the ones in this study had relatives looking after their properties, and they could easily 
return to their houses. However, this is not always the case. Many respondents spoke of returnees 
who are experiencing that others have invaded their land while they were away in exile. This is 
often IDPs who have come to Juba for security during the war, or ex-soldiers who need housing  
outside the military barracks. If the intruders refuse to leave, this can become a conflict of interests. 
In most cases it can be challenging to prove ownership due to a lack of documentation; “people  
usually have no papers on their land, but try to identify their land by something else, for example a  
mango tree they planted a certain place a long time ago”106.
Land expert George said that some owners manage to talk to the intruders and regain their 
land, while others refuse to leave107. This can create tensions and government representative Peter 
claimed that many land cases have been taken to court108. The Land Act established a framework for 
reclaiming land as a result of involuntary displacement, including a three years deadline (Martin & 
Mosel, 2011). This has, however, been unknown for most people, and the deadline is now passed. 




107 George (informant #18), interview by Linn Ersland, June 2013.
108 Peter, interview.
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Land and Returnee Capital
Overall, this study shows that inadequate access to land impacts returnees from Khartoum 
severely. Those who previously owned land is, according to customary law, entitled to have their 
land back upon return. This, however, is not always happening in reality, due to land-grabbing and 
an increasing demand for land. Those who wish to buy land in Juba also face several challenges, 
including high prices, ethnic discrimination and bureaucracy. The government's overview is limited, 
some plots are sold to several people simultaneously, and informal settlements are common. The 
issue of female ownership is also contested. According to customary law, women should not own 
land, yet, the formal law acknowledges their right to both inherit, buy and possess land (Land Act, 
2009).  This  puts  women  in  a  vulnerable  situation,  and  creates  an  unfortunate  gap  between 
customary and national law.
All  these  issues  delay  the  chance  for  returnees  to  resettle  permanently,  to  begin  the 
(re)integration process, and to utilize their returnee resources properly. It seems reasonable to argue 
that both national and local authorities have had an unrealistic assumption that people will return to 
their (rural) places of origin. Instead, Juba's informal settlements are growing, official demarcations 
and  allocations  are  delayed,  and people's  insecurity  continue.  This  affects  returnees'  livelihood 
opportunities and choices;
“[p]oor urban dwellers are making significant contributions to the urban economy as casual 
labourers, consumers and small-scale entrepreneurs. Constant fears of relocation preclude 
engagement in more permanent livelihood strategies as well as the establishment of more 
stable living arrangements.”
Martin & Mosel (2011: 21)
Furthermore, Macdonald (2010) highlights the government's refusal to acknowledge the on-going 
process of urbanization, which have and will continue to have alarming effects on the livelihood 
and economic development opportunities in urban areas for both returnees and others. As this thesis 
is written, a new land policy is underway. It remains to be seen if this will lead to improvements for 
returnees' security of land tenure.
5.3.3   State Capacity and Social Services
Adding to the limited access to land and economic opportunities, South Sudan offers its 
population an extremely low level of social services.  As President Salva Kiir stated in November 
2010 (in Maxwell et.al., 2012: 20), “[t]here has been no development in South Sudan. We have no 
roads, no bridges, no water, no power, nothing at all, no hospitals, and no schools – everything is at 
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zero”. As a result of the lack of development described in chapter 2 – both during colonial and war 
times – South Sudan had virtually no service delivery upon independence. Thus, the (re)building 
began from scratch. However, the weak state apparatus and lack of financial and human resources 
have limited the development of both infrastructure and social services. This study shows that the 
lack of social services works as a barrier for returnee (re)integration and a stable life in South 
Sudan.
The Government's Capacity to Deliver
The government of South Sudan (GoSS) faces a huge task; to  provide adequate service 
delivery to an increasing number of people. According to the Local Government Act of 2009, the 
local  governments  in  every  state  have  the  responsibility  to  provide  basic  services  to  people 
(Maxwell et.al., 2012). However, the work they do is rarely sufficient. The governments' capacity is 
usually very low, due to lack of resources, corruption, and limited infrastructure, which results in an 
extremely poor service delivery (ibid). As argued by former government representative Eric,  “the 
government is a premature government, their institutional capacity is not there”109.
One reason for the state's inadequacy to deliver may be its difficult history. According to 
scholars, the international community and NGOs have historically played a major role in service 
delivery in South Sudan (Macdonald, 2010; Tvedt, 1998; Young, 2012). Tvedt (1998: 189) argues 
that NGOs have played a major role in the southern state administration since the 1970s. By taking 
on  functions  that  would  normally  be  the  government's  tasks,  the  NGOs  –  unintentionally  – 
“assumed (…) the welfare functions of an ordinary state” and contributed to the undermining of the 
state apparatus. Thus, when the southern government was established in 2005, it lacked both skills,  
staff and funding, and were unable to meet the demands for service delivery. The large influx of  
people in recent years have only increased the pressure. Former referendum observer Kate reflected 
upon her time in one of the northern states:
“The problem was that the government, the state government, had no apparatus to absorb all 
the returnees. They had...it was said that a large amount of money was set aside to receive 
the returnees in South Sudan (…), but most of them had to manage on their own. There was 
absolutely no national assistance when they came here...”110
The  government's  capacity-building,  on  both  national  and  state  levels,  has  several 
challenges. Service infrastructure is not in place, and more schools, health centers and boreholes 




2012). The quality of the service delivery is further complicated by the lack of qualified personnel – 
both teachers, paramedics, doctors and nurses. According to Maxwell and colleagues (ibid), only 13 
percent of the country's primary school teachers are qualified. Due to urbanization of teachers, the 
rate in Juba is, however, as high as 40 percent (Martin & Mosel, 2011). As this thesis shows, many 
returnee teachers are arriving from Sudan, yet remain unemployed due to their often poor English 
command. This hinders both maintenance and expansion of the South Sudanese educational system.
Furthermore,  the  government  is  also  struggling  to  find  financial  resources  for  service 
provision.  According  to  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (in  IOM,  2013b),  the  government's 
revenue declined significantly in 2012 due to oil  disputes with Sudan,  reducing the GDP from 
$1,765 in 2011 to $1,101 in 2012. This has considerably reduced the public expenditures and the 
government's ability to pay public sector employees. According to Pantuliano et.al. (2008), every 
state receives the same allocation of services and staff, leaving Central Equatoria  state with no 
additional resources for the growing demands of the capital city. However, Eric claimed that the 
government now has a policy of providing a certain amount of services per number of returnees – 
an extra school class, increased drug supply, additional boreholes and so on111. The researcher has 
not been able to confirm this from any other sources, thus the question of the link between service 
distribution and returnees remains.
Lack of Social Services
While adequate education, health and water facilities are almost non-existing in rural areas, 
Juba is also facing a decrease in its service coverage level (Pantuliano et.al., 2008). As Richard said;  
“even Juba does not have any service delivery...no water, no electricity, there is nothing...”112. While 
many NGOs work in other areas of South Sudan, very few seem to work in Juba itself. Possible 
reasons  for  this  has  already  been  discussed,  yet  it  seems  reasonable  to  argue  that  there  is  a 
widespread perception that the capital has a much higher developmental level than the peripheries. 
Both various reports and respondents in this study claimed that Juba has services that do not exist in 
the countryside. Yet, most returnees have been used to a higher degree of service delivery in exile. 
As Charles claimed; “[t]hey came from something to nothing. They came to a different life”113.
In this study the respondents complained about the access to both clean water, electricity, 
education, and health facilities. Interestingly, the returnees continuously emphasized one aspect; in 
Khartoum the services were free, while in Juba they are not. According to the interim constitution, 





of physical capital and the high level of unemployment among returnees into consideration, the 
resentment is thus not surprising. Returnee Mary said that “most children are just sitting at home,  
because there is no money for school fees. If you have money from Khartoum, you can pay for the  
education,  if  not...”114.  The  government  representative  also  admitted  that  there  are  very  few 
educational and health centers available, and that those existing are gradually deteriorating115. He 
emphasized the unbalance between the increasing number of people and the available services:
“In Juba town, where everybody is coming here, the services are not enough. The number of 
the people is more than what we have on the ground, especially in terms of education, and  
we have about a hundred students in a class! Which for a teacher is too much... (...) There  
are  [also]  too many children  who come from areas  where there  are  conflicts,  say from 
Yonglei, from Warrap, from Unity State, from Rumbek, most of these people have migrated 
to Juba. And now it has caused a lot of congestion in Juba town, now it has affected schools,  
affected health centers, affected water, affected sanitation... Because in a town like Juba, at 
least there must be electricity, there must be water, there must be health centers...all these  
things and services must be around here...”116
The strain on the resources was mentioned by many of the other respondents as well. The common 
argument was that as more people are coming to South Sudan, the local institutions and facilities 
get  pressured,  and they  are  usually  unable  to  respond effectively  to  the  rising  demands.  John 
claimed that; “[you have] the lowest ratios of health care professionals to citizens in the world, and  
then you have more people coming in every year which just strains that even further”117. According 
to a recent report, 69 percent of the bomas (the lowest administrative unit) in high return counties 
do not have any health facilities (IOM, 2013b).  NGO-workers with experience from other states 
supported this claim; local institutions are often unable to respond to the rising number of returnees. 
For example in Jonglei, the geographically largest state in South Sudan with a high number of 
returnees, a growing number of people are coming to the state capital Bor, where they are straining 
the available services118. This suggests a countrywide trend of underdeveloped service provision in 
both rural and urban areas.
Interestingly, there has been no reported discrimination in regards to service delivery. This 
study discovered that  access to social services  is  equally challenging for  all  –  “everybody has 
equally poor access”119. None of the returnees felt discriminated against in this regard, and they 
mentioned that only people's economic status determines your access to social services. Gabriella 







120 Gabriella, interview. 
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Financially secure families can pay for services and transport to good facilities, regardless of their  
status as a stayee or returnee.
Basic Services and Returnee Capital
This study identifies lack of service delivery as a barrier for the (re)integration and active 
participation of returnees from Khartoum. The state's inability to provide adequate social services 
prevents  the  returnees  from  exercising  their  social  and  economic  rights,  to  live  stable  and 
productive lives,  and to  make use  of  their  returnee capital.  The amount and quality  of  service 
delivery in South Sudan has not increased with the number of returnees, but rather deteriorated. 
Thus, the returnees are unintentionally putting a strain on the available services, and subsequently 
creating an increased competition with the rest of the population. Service delivery is then not only 
crucial for economic development, but can also be a strategic contribution to stability and peace 
(Pantuliano et.al, 2008; Maxwell et.al., 2012). For community development and rebuilding to take 
place, basic services need to be in place:
“For me, when I have visited the places where these people are living, it has been like... 
They really are in a terrible state, they need the most basic, basic services. And for positive  
changes or to see something positive about they returning, I think they have to have the basic 
social services – like access to health care, schooling for their children and livelihoods – for 
these  kind  of  changes  to  start  to  show.  So,  I  think,  the  provision  of  basic  services  is 
something that is urgent.”121
However, it is noteworthy that this prevailing condition affects not only returnees, but the entire 
population. The returnees' presence may reinforce the shortage of service delivery and illuminate 
the state's lack of capacity, yet the situation impacts every financially poor South Sudanese.
5.3.4   Social (Re)integration
Lastly, the social aspect of (re)integration can also be crucial for the utilization of returnee 
capital. The use of both human and social capital depends on an adequate social (re)integration; to 
find work, to create contacts, to spread attitudes and values. Juba has undergone a major social 
change since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, with rapid urbanization 
and  a  large-scale  influx  of  work  migrants  from  several  countries.  This  has  led  to  what  one 
respondent called  “the South Sudanese equivalent to a multi-cultural city”,  where you can find 




where diverging attitudes, values and norms face each other, and where people's perceptions and 
stereotypes are being contested. Within this context, returnees from Khartoum are facing various 
social challenges which can be argued to hinder their complete utilization of returnee capital.
Are the Returnees Welcome?
During this study, it became evident that the social aspect of the (re)integration process is 
crucial for the returnees. This was a topic the returnees themselves often chose to illuminate, and 
culture, identity and behavior were eagerly discussed. The informants had very diverging opinions 
of the social reception of returnees in Juba and their level of (re)integration.
Overall,  the  majority  of  the  respondents  argued  that  returnees  from  Khartoum  were 
generally welcome in South Sudan. Returnee Mary claimed that most people were welcomed by 
their relatives123, while several others argued that a sense of nationalism drew people together; “[o]f  
course they were Southerners. That card was held very, very high. It is our people who are coming  
back”124.  Peter,  a  government  official,  claimed  that  the  returnees  are  highly  welcomed  by  the 
population:
“Those who come from Khartoum, these are people who were forced by war. (...) Now when 
they come home, people accept them. Yes, people are very happy about it! They are now 
coming home, so that we, we together, can build our country. That is what people want.  
They are saying we do not want people to stay [in Khartoum], you come back and build your 
own country. Because you have been out, and you are not benefiting anything from there. 
You come home, so that we can build together... (...) So, generally we want those who are  
outside to come here, to bring all their skills here, so that we can benefit from it.”125
This,  however,  is  according  to  this  study's  findings,  only  one  side  of  the  story.  Many  of  the 
respondents rather spoke of a shifting trend within the population from openly inviting all South 
Sudanese to return, to becoming more cautious and skeptical towards newcomers due to resource 
scarcity.  The  general  public  can  now feel  the  strain  from the  growing number  of  people,  and 
people's receptiveness has thus decreased correspondingly.
'Children of Arabization'
Adding to the resource scarcity, the returnees from Khartoum are in a complex situation both 
socially and culturally. As described in the previous section, most of the returnees went through an 
extensive change of lifestyle in Khartoum, leaving them with both new attitudes, values and norms 





as returnee capital  – yet this is  not necessarily the case among the population in South Sudan. 
According to Tony, people who stayed in Juba during the war made few changes in their lifestyles,  
while the people in exile experienced a completely new culture and developed new attitudes and 
opinions126.  Then,  when  the  returnees  later  returned to  Juba,  they  were  by  many perceived  as 
different, as foreigners, as someone who did not belong there.
One keyword that every single informant mentioned in this regard, was 'Arab'. It is crucial to  
remember that those who fled to Khartoum in theory fled to the enemy's territory. The reasons for 
this choice of destination is outside this thesis' scope, yet its implications should be reflected upon.  
The returnees' connections to the north, to the Arabic world, were emphasized by many informants 
as something negative. Almost all of the returnee informants claimed that people refer to them as 
'jallaba', a derogatory term for Arabs, or sometimes 'Khartoumers'. The returnees expressed great  
frustration over this, which became particularly evident during the one group interview conducted 
with four female returnees. Social (re)integration and acceptance were clearly sensitive topics, and 
the women constantly repeated the word 'segregation'. Interestingly, they argued that people in Juba 
particularly resent their greetings (in Arabic) when they pass them on the street, and that people 
claim it is a part of Arab culture.
Such negative  perceptions  were,  unfortunately,  extremely  evident  when  talking  to  other 
South Sudanese in Juba. The word 'jallaba' was often mentioned, and people would say things like 
“that is a very Arab/Sudanese thing to do” or “that is not the South Sudanese way”. The respondents 
did not, however, agree on whether or not you could identify a returnee from Khartoum by their 
appearance. Some argued that the returnees' dressing, hairstyles, etc. give them away, yet some 
claimed  that  the  only  identifier  is  the  language.  Yet,  the  role  of  language  should  not  be 
underestimated. According to one informant, the returnees' use of Arabic puts them in a difficult 
position; “people [in South Sudan] have very little to do with Arabic. Arabic is the language of the  
oppressor,  so they decide to  refrain from Arabic  as the mode of  communication...it  leaning on  
Arabic culture...and of course an aspect of resentment”127.
Overall,  South  Sudanese  INGO-worker  Sebit  argued  that  returnees  from  the  north  are 
perceived more negatively than positively; “it is easier for returnees from other countries, they get  
more respect. If you are from the north, people see you as a 'pure Arab'”128. However, the returnee 
respondents constantly tried to claim otherwise:
“I never, never change my culture, that one can not happen. I remain as a Southerner up to  
126 Tony, interview.




“We feel like South Sudanese, so we do not need to be identified otherwise.”130
This demonstrates the sensitivity of the question of identity in South Sudan. The returnees often 
find themselves in a state of limbo in between the South Sudanese in-group and the Arabic out-
group, in which other people do not fully accept them as a member of the in-group. In other words, 
the returnees are in a constant process of trying to convince people that they are South Sudanese.
In  this  regard,  one  informant  highlighted  the  important  historical  reasons  for  this 
discrimination. As chapter 2 suggests, there has been a continuous divide between the north and the 
south of the Sudans since the dawn of history, with clear reflections in identity formation. The north 
and the south have stood in sharp contrast to each other throughout both colonial and war times, 
which has resulted in both resentment, stereotypes, and negative perceptions of the other. Although 
the war is over,  this mentality is obviously still evident today. As Luke described it;  “it is not  
scares, they are wounds”131. Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that any resemblance with the north 
might feel threatening for the South Sudanese, and that the so-called Arabization of the returnees is 
a clear example of that.
One of the most interesting discoveries in this regard, was the feeling of superiority. NGO-
worker Victor argued that people who return from Khartoum often act superior to  “people who 
stayed  back  and  hid  in  the  bush  and  did  nothing”132.  This  became  evident  in  other,  informal 
conversations with the South Sudanese, in which returnees were talked about as patronizing, selfish 
and  superior. South Sudanese Sebit told that; 
“They don't  like being corrected, they tend to know everything. For example when they 
speak the broken English, you cannot correct them. They will be very upset and angry. They 
don't want corrections at all, they see themselves as special, they say 'this is how we live in 
the north'...”133
Surprisingly, this feeling was to some extent experienced by the researcher as well. Especially two 
of the female returnee respondents voiced resentment against people in Juba, and their 'ignorant and 
immoral behavior' (e.g. in dressing). Alicia said;
”Ah, their behavior is not good, they behave like villagers, it is not good. (...) There is no  
understanding. If you step on someone's foot in the street, they will fight you, or if you 
accidentally bump into a table, so somebody's glass falls down. In Khartoum you would pick 
up the glass and say sorry, and it would be okay. In Juba they will be very angry at you and 
129 Tony, interview. 
130  Hope, interview.
131  Luke, interview.
132  Victor, interview.
133  Sebit, interview.
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want to fight you. There is no understanding in Juba...”134
These  statements  demonstrate  an  obvious  suspicion  and  lack  of  trust  between  people.  Both 
returnees and residents are skeptical towards the others, and stereotyped perceptions can be argued 
to have gained foothold in Juba.
A Barrier for Social (Re)integration
With  such  a  starting  point,  the  social  (re)integration  of  returnees  from  Khartoum  can 
arguably be challenging. Adding weak family links, intergenerational gaps and unfamiliarity with 
customary law, the picture becomes even more complex. A few of the returnee respondents claimed 
that they only socialize with other returnees from Khartoum, while others – especially those with 
family ties – seemed to socialize with other groups as well. Thus, the social (re)integration process 
is extremely complex and it is impossible to present one overall description. What we can state, 
however,  is  that the process is far  from complete and that many prevailing conditions work as 
barriers  for  the  returnees'  (re)integration.  The  lack  of  an  open and  honest  interaction  between 
returnees and others prevents the utilization of the social and cultural returnee capital the returnees 
possess:
“...they have skills, that even in the south some people they do not see it...but because of 
hatred and negative perceptions, people see them like enemies, like people who ran away 
from war...They do not see it as potential...the potential they got from the north, because the 
north was the enemy...”135
The skepticism and negative attitudes against the returnees make it extremely difficult for society to 
perceive any social or cultural aspects of the returnee capital  as  positive contributions to South 
Sudan. For instance, returnees' increased understanding and acceptance across ethnic groups are 
unlikely to be spread to others as long as they are not accepted themselves. Moreover, the lack of 
social  (re)integration further complicates returnees'  chances for employment as well.  Instead of 
social inclusion, this study thus discovered that the returnees' new behavior often is perceived as 
unwelcome and not something society wish to adopt.
A Way Forward?
In regards to the use of returnee capital, the question then becomes how to move beyond this 
point; can the returnees' social and cultural resources be utilized with time? One very promising 
finding, was that none of the informants had experienced or heard of direct social conflicts between 
134  Alicia, interview.
135  Eric, interview.
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returnees and other residents. Negative perceptions were there, but no actual visible tensions or 
conflicts  were  reported – conflicts  were  usually  based  on ethnicity  rather  than  returnee  status. 
Returnee Tony strongly believed that the negative sentiments towards returnees from Khartoum are 
about to disappear:
“...that is just a simple thing, even I cannot mind about it. It is just a lack of understanding. 
What they mean is that the people who have been [in Khartoum] have changed their mind 
and become like a 'jallaba', but that is not true. Those who want to be like a 'jallaba' will not 
come here. (...) There is no more problem now, it was just a misunderstanding...”136
If  empirical  experiences  are to  be  repeated,  Tony might  be  proved right.  According to  reports 
returnees  from Uganda  and  Kenya  used to  face  a  similar  resentment  (Martin  & Mosel,  2011; 
Pantuliano et.al., 2008). They were often associated with alcoholism, prostitution and HIV/Aids, 
and were described as uncivilized and non-South Sudanese. However, this has gradually changed 
and returnees from East Africa are now being (re)integrated into society. Informant Eric supported 
this;
“Before it was the East Africans, those who come from East Africa. The problems they were  
said they are drunkards, they like violence, and all those kind of things. But now, the shift 
goes to Khartoumers, because those of East Africa, they settled and they became part of 
society. Now the Khartoumers are the new group...”137
If history is to repeat itself, a similar process might take place for returnees from Khartoum as well. 
Further  speculations  are  outside  the  scope  of  this  study,  yet  it  can  be  argued  that  there  is  a 
possibility that with time the situation can improve. The returnees are expected to gradually settle 
down and time will  give  both  sides  an  opportunity  to  get  to  know each other  and accept  the 
returnees as legitimate citizens of Juba. The idea of a common national identity in South Sudan is 
extremely contested, yet as one respondent argued,  “at least the hope is that it will foster better  
reintegration and loss of this isolation that leads to misinformation and mistrust”138.
A final point is the reverse connection between social (re)integration and returnee capital; if 
the returnees are able to contribute positively to the return community, then they are more easily  
accepted:
“It seems that if the returnees are able to contribute with something positive for the regular 
tribe, family, group in some sense, then they are welcome. But if they are straining resources 
then there has been some more tendencies to see them as outsiders and we have seen some 
resentment.”139
136  Tony, interview.
137  Eric, interview.
138  John, interview.
139  Ibid.
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Thus,  if  the  prevailing  conditions  would  allow returnees  to  contribute  positively  with  returnee 
capital  on the micro level, it could potentially ease the (re)integration process and subsequently 
open up for a greater utilization of returnee capital.
* * *
Section 5.4: Returnee (Re)integration: The Potential of Returnee Capital
After analyzing respectively returnee capital and prevailing conditions in the two previous 
sections, it is now time to illuminate the equation as a whole:
returnee integration = returnee capital + prevailing conditions
Throughout this study it  has become clear that the returnees from Khartoum face an extremely 
complex situation in Juba. The majority of respondents recognized the existence of returnee capital, 
yet  its  utilization  is  more  questionable.  When  systematically  analyzing  the  interview  data, 
statements perceiving returnees both positively and negatively can be found – even within single 
interviews.  However,  even a brief overview will  identify  a  much higher  number  of  statements 
arguing  for  returnees'  potential  as  resources.  The  word  potential  is  particularly  essential  here, 
illuminating the various hindering prevailing conditions discussed above. To clarify these issues, the  
following section will present the final discoveries of returnees' role in the South Sudanese society, 
with emphasis on the overall question if returnees are perceived as a burden or a resource.
5.4.1   “Who is Going to Develop this Country?”
Throughout  conversations  with  the  informants,  returnee  capital  was  both  directly  and 
indirectly singled out as the positive outcome of return migration. As we have seen, all informants 
agreed that returnees bring some sort of resources with them, although of various kind and scope. 
Six of the returnee informants expressed that they themselves were contributing to society, while 
the five remaining argued that they were not given the chance. The opinions were equally diverging 
among the other informants. Yet, all informants claimed, in one way or another, that the returnees 
could be a resource for society. Victor, for example, claimed that returnees' contributions are already  
visible:
“...you can see the skills which they brought along, that will change that place [where they  
settle down]...you know, people who came with different skills, that are things that people 
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were not doing before, but now they are doing it, because of the displacement. (...) So you  
can see their contribution now, because these are people who had the opportunity to [get]  
education and now they can come and contribute...”140
In this regard, both INGO-worker Richard and government official Peter emphasized South Sudan's 
lack  of  internal  human  progress  during  the  wartime.  Lack  of  both  educational  and  economic 
opportunities left  the population with very limited chances of progressing,  while  those in  exile 
experienced other circumstances. Based on this, Peter argued for the importance of bringing these 
skills back to South Sudan:
“Well...I think the return would give progress [for the] people, especially we got enough 
doctors, we got enough teachers, it is already a benefit to our society! Because during the 
war  there  were  very  few  people  who  were  trained,  so  people  were  all  soldiers.  Those 
[skilled] who were inside here were very few, and most of the fellows have gone to northern 
Sudan. So we need now all these skills to be brought back home, because now the soldiers,  
they don't have those skills, they only know how their gun is being shot, that is all. But what 
about the technical things? We need electricians, we need people who work in the petroleum, 
we  need  people  who  work  on  the  roads,  these  are  all  things  too  technical  that  needs 
somebody who is educated. So if they bring all the skills here, then we shall progress, then 
we shall develop. And we cannot develop unless we get these people.”141
Some of the returnees were very clear on this as well. Student Vincent claimed that his choice to 
study geology was to be able to contribute to his country's extraction of natural resources142. Tony 
similarly  argued  that  it  was  his  and other  returnees'  responsibility  to  help  build  up  their  own 
country; “as a father you are supposed to set the foundations for your children (...) Who is going to  
develop this country? It is me! For the future, for the young people who are coming...” 143. This kind 
of motivation can be argued to be crucial for the utilization of returnee capital. Vincent, Tony and 
others are clearly prepared to try to make efficient use of their returnee capital.
To put it briefly, the respondents used words such as benefit, growth, development, and asset 
to describe the returnees' potential contributions in South Sudan. The overall argument was very 
much in line with the theory, that returnees – no matter the circumstances – always bring with them 
their  brains and skills.  And as Richard put it;  “if properly steered it  could turn into assets”144. 
Returnee Anna claimed that she had assisted several other women in setting up their own small 
businesses in Juba; “I have seen successful businesses being set up, the women are in the market  
now, selling maize, maize flour, ground nut paste...making a profit”145. However, this is only one 
destiny, and for most returnees the prevailing conditions are not always conducive to the use of their  
140  Victor, interview.
141  Peter, interview.
142  Vincent, interview.
143  Tony, interview.
144  Richard, interview.
145  Anna, interview.
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returnee capital.
5.4.2   “There is Nothing to Contribute with...”
Regardless  of  the  optimism,  approximately  half  of  the  returnee  respondents  argued that 
despite their returnee capital, they were unable to utilize it in Juba. We have seen how an extremely  
difficult job market as well as widespread discrimination make it almost impossible for returnees 
from Khartoum to find relevant employment for their set of skills.  During the group interview, 
Helena exclaimed; “we have capabilities, but we get no chance!”146. She later frustratedly added; 
“foreigners can even work in the President's office, but not the locals”. This feeling of idleness was 
further supported by other respondents. Former referendum observer Kate shared her experience 
from a different state:
“...many people came back from Khartoum with a high level  of  expertise,  and this was 
something I often discussed with the local governor. I said I thought it was very sad that they 
did not do a proper screening of the returnees, and at least try to make use of the skills that 
are actually available. I remember talking to several returnees trained within craftsmanship,  
they were plumbers and electricians, which is highly needed here, because they hardly have 
any qualified craftsmen... Yet the governor was just talking around it, because it was not in  
line with his political intentions. Yeah, it is a very sad situation...”147
This  clearly  demonstrates  the  situation  for  many  returnees  in  South  Sudan.  They  return  with 
returnee capital and often motivation to work hard, yet the prevailing conditions hinder them in 
doing so. Thus it can be argued that the South Sudanese government has not taken advantage of the 
available  potential  among  the  returnees.  Unfortunately,  this  further  prevents  people  from 
experiencing  the  positive  aspects  of  return  migration  and  rather  highlights  returnees'  negative 
impact on society and reinforces the prejudices. 
5.4.3   “They are Straining the Few Resources we have!”
Several respondents claimed that the negative perceptions of returnees are highly linked to 
the level of resources available. If there are enough resources and the returnees are not creating 
harsh competition with the population, then there can be a much more cooperative relationship. If,  
however, the resources are scarce, there can arguably be more resentment and tensions between the 
two groups. According to Richard, it is all about survival; “...you know, if you are dying with your  
children, and sometimes [more] people are coming in... I mean, what about the relatives you have?  
146  Helena (informant #5), interview by Linn Ersland, June 2013.
147  Kate, interview.
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Your first  priority  is  your  wife  and children”148.  Interestingly,  resource  scarcity  was repeatedly 
mentioned by the macro actors as an argument for the negative perception of returnees, yet not 
mentioned once by the returnees themselves. We should keep in mind the international assistance 
the returnees sometimes attract, which would ease some of this reported burden, yet this is not the 
case in every place where returnees settle down – for instance not in Juba.
Overall,  the  macro informants  argued that  the  returnees  strain the few resources  that  is 
already available,  without  adding anything new. We have seen that  the returnees  are unable to 
contribute due to prevailing conditions, while the weak state apparatus simultaneously is unable to 
keep pace with the increasing number of people. Thus, the returnees rather reinforce the resource 
competition, when it  comes to both natural resources, land and housing, employment, access to 
social services and the general goodwill from the population.
5.4.4   Further Reflections
As a result of the issues discussed in this chapter, many returnees expressed disappointment 
with the return to Juba, and many do actually decide to leave South Sudan anew. Several informants 
spoke of people who have chosen to go back to Khartoum to resume their lives there. One of the 
returnees in this study, Alicia, claimed that she wished to leave South Sudan as soon as she finishes  
her studies. Although the numbers are unknown, it is clear that these re-migrations take place and 
the returnee respondents voiced a concern about the situation facing them in Juba. Especially with 
the newly deteriorating security situation in South Sudan as well, it will not be surprising if some of 
the respondents of this study are considering a new flight.
This issue is rather paradoxical. As Sebit argued;  “the government encouraged people to  
return to South Sudan, but they have nothing to offer the returnees”149. As we have seen in both 
literature and in  this  study,  there is  a  continuous focus  on repatriation  – the  actual  process of  
returning displaced people – while the post-return (re)integration receives limited attention from 
both  authorities,  the  international  community  and  donors.  This  can  create  extremely  difficult 
situations, in which the returnees receive very little assistance in their process of settling down and 
reestablishing their lives. The (re)integration of returnees in Juba is a clear example of this. In this 
regard, we should not ignore the actors who continuously work to improve returnees' and others'  
welfare, yet the overall trend shows an omission of returnees in Juba. This has further implications 
for the field's durable solutions perspective, as pointed out by Gabriella: “...you cannot as soon as  
148  Richard, interview.
149  Sebit, interview.
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you put somebody back on their land, give them some kind of shelter assistance, and then leave,  
assuming that everything is fine for them. Reintegration is a huge problem for returnees...”150. The 
findings of this study highlight exactly this lack of a comprehensive and adequate understanding of 
the durable solutions.
If similar strategies will continue to be applied in the future, it seems fair to argue that the 
returnees' future potential to contribute to their home communities and country is bleak. With an 
estimated  2,5  million  returnees,  South  Sudan  has  experienced  one  of  the  largest  peace-time 
population movements since World War II (IOM, 2013b). Due to the high numbers, it is extremely 
crucial to find good, sustainable solutions to the returnee issue, for the resource competition not to 
escalate and for people not to start new displacement cycles. It is promising that no direct conflicts 
between returnees and others have been discovered in this study, yet the present skepticism and 
resentful perceptions against the other are worrisome.
5.5   Summary
This chapter has examined the existence and use of returnee capital among returnees from 
Khartoum in Juba. It has demonstrated that the returnees possess various forms of returnee capital, 
with  educational  and professional  experience,  and social  skills  being  the  most  prominent.  The 
returnees were also reported to act as stimuli for international assistance in South Sudan's rural  
areas, yet not in the capital Juba. This chapter has further illuminated the various obstacles to the 
utilization of returnee capital, with emphasis on livelihoods, access to land and social services, and 
social issues. Based on this, this chapter argues that the returnees' potential is underutilized by the 
local communities and the government of South Sudan. This further leads to an emphasis on the  
negative and straining aspects of returnee (re)integration.
The next chapter will further summarize the results of this research, discuss its impact on the 
durable solutions paradigm, and propose ways in which local, national and international actors can 
make better use of South Sudan's untapped returnee capital.
150  Gabriella, interview.
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6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
This thesis has investigated returnees' potential to contribute to post-conflict development 
and reconstruction, by examining the process of returnee (re)integration in South Sudan. The study 
has sought to illuminate both micro and macro actors' individual perspectives on returnee capital 
and its potential to contribute positively to society. In this regard, the thesis began by thoroughly 
examining South Sudan's historical background in order to understand the contextual framework, 
including reasons for the forced migration and the contemporary return environment. The following 
methodological  chapter  outlined the tools and techniques  utilized  in  this  research,  with  special 
emphasis on the study's limitations and challenges. Furthermore, chapter 4 outlined the conceptual 
and theoretical frameworks utilized by this analysis, more specifically Dominik Helling's concept 
returnee capital and Ajak, Biar and Larson's following equation:
returnee integration = returnee capital + prevailing conditions
Altogether, these chapters constitute the backdrop for the data presentation and analysis in chapter 
5, in which the study's discoveries were discussed and reflected upon.
This  final  chapter  will  summarize  the  empirical  findings  of  the  research,  based  on  the 
theoretical equation above. It will also discuss the contemporary situation in South Sudan and some 
possible reasons for the country's inability to prioritize the returnee issue. Furthermore, the chapter 
will reflect upon the returnee capital framework's theoretical potential and the future of the durable 
solutions to the world's displacement problem.
6.1   Summary of Empirical Findings
Based on the assumption that human beings have agency, Helling with others argue that 
returnees can act as active agents of change in post-conflict societies. The returnees' possession of  
material and non-material returnee capital can, according to Helling, be utilized for developmental 
and reconstruction purposes within the return areas. This thesis has attempted to investigate this 
claim by examining 1) returnees' actual possession of returnee capital, 2) the prevailing conditions 
enabling or hindering the utilization of the existing returnee capital, and 3) the returnees' subsequent 
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roles in society. The discoveries made will now be summarized in turn.
6.1.1   Returnee Capital
According to this study, the returnees from Khartoum have brought substantial resources to 
South  Sudan.  Based  on  the  concept  of  returnee  capital,  the  returnees  can  be  argued  to  have 
transferred both material capital, human capital, and social/cultural capital to Juba, with the two 
latter categories being the most evident. Every single informant claimed that returnees represent 
resources, yet in different types and scopes. Higher education and work skills were singled out as 
the main returnee capital, as well as social changes in lifestyles, attitudes and values. Interestingly, 
material  capital  among  the  returnees  were  rather  rare,  despite  a  considerably  higher  level  of 
economic development and opportunities in Khartoum. Various prevailing conditions both prior to 
and during the return accounted for this lack of material returnee capital.
Furthermore, this study found that the presence of returnees can, in some instances, work as 
stimuli  for  increased  attention  and  assistance  to  certain  areas.  However,  the  current  state  of 
underdevelopment in South Sudan often seems to undermine this dynamic, in which other urgent 
issues,  such  as  food  relief  and  epidemics,  are  prioritized  above  returnee  settlement  and 
(re)integration. As a result, Juba, being the most developed part of the country, seems to receive 
little additional attention despite the presence of urban returnees.
Overall, the empirical findings from this study conform with the returnee capital framework, 
in  which  returnees  are  understood as  individuals  with  resources  and agency.  The  returnees  do 
possess  various  degrees  of  returnee  capital,  depending  on  their  individual  pre-flight  and  exile 
experiences. The existence of returnee capital was generally acknowledged by the micro and macro 
informants alike.
6.1.2   Prevailing Conditions
The discoveries regarding the prevailing conditions can also be claimed to correspond with 
the critique of the returnee capital framework, referred to by Ajak, Biar and Larson as prevailing 
conditions.  The  empirical  findings  claim  that  there  are  several  aspects  of  the  South  Sudanese 
society  that  severely  hinder  the  utilization  of  returnee  capital,  with  lack  of  employment 
opportunities, limited access to land, poor service delivery, and social discrimination being the most 
prominent.
Lack of economic opportunities was by all respondents seen as the biggest challenge to 
returnee (re)integration. The limited formal economy, the growing rural-to-urban migration, and the 
social discrimination of returnees from Khartoum leave many returnees with no choice but to make 
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a living within the informal economy. Moreover, lack of English skills and social networks are 
further barriers for formal employment. All in all, the findings show a trend of returnees struggling 
to become economically sustainable within the challenging economic environment of Juba. This 
limits their economic (re)integration on a micro level, as well as a further economic contribution on 
the macro level (e.g. through paying taxes).
Access to land is another challenging prevailing condition. Despite the initiated Land Act of 
2009, there are several obstacles to obtaining land in Juba today. The official government policy 
encourages all returnees to return to their ancestral areas in order to be allocated land there, yet this 
is clearly not happening in reality. As a result of the large-scale urbanization process and land-
grabbing of others' properties, we are currently witnessing a land crisis in Juba. It seems reasonable 
to  argue  that  accessing  land  is  difficult  for  the  returnees,  as  well  as  expensive  and  virtually  
exclusively  for  those  with  the  right  contacts.  This  prevents  the  returnees  from  settling  down 
permanently and start utilizing their returnee capital optimally.
Furthermore, the government seems to lack the capacity and finances to provide adequate 
service delivery to its population. According to the empirical findings, the influx of returnees to 
Juba has not been followed by a subsequent increase in social services. Instead, the existing services 
are  deteriorating,  and  the  returnees  are,  unfortunately,  perceived  to  contribute  to  a  growing 
competition for the few existing resources.
Lastly, this study shows that social (re)integration is extremely important for the returnees 
themselves. While the findings claim that the returnees generally were welcome on the surface, 
several  underlying  issues  severely  problematize  their  social  (re)integration.  The  returnees' 
background  in  the  Arabic  culture  in  Khartoum,  including  language,  values  and behavior,  have 
proven to meet resistance in Juba. The returnees are constantly seen as 'jallabas' (Arabs), and they 
are often perceived extremely negatively. It is questionable, however, how far such attitudes reach; 
if  it  is  purely attitudes  or  if  it  translates  into a  systematic  discriminatory behavior  towards the 
returnees. Further research is necessary on the issue.
6.1.3   Returnee (Re)integration
Throughout this study it has become evident that the returnees from Khartoum still have a 
long way to go to become fully (re)integrated into society. Positively, the majority of the informants 
showed a clear acknowledgement of the fact that returnees possess capital. We may therefore claim 
that  return  migration  represents  a  transfer  of  resources  to  the  country  and/or  areas  of  origin. 
However, its utilization and durability are questionable. Based on this study's empirical findings, it  
seems reasonable to argue that there exist several contextual prevailing conditions that hinder the 
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returnees and their communities from exercising their social, economic, civil, and cultural rights,  
and thus subsequently the utilization of returnee capital. The lack of the most basic aspects of life – 
access to employment, land, social services, and social acceptance – make it challenging for the 
returnees to engage in stable, productive activities which can benefit not only themselves, but also 
the society they belong to as well. As a result, the returnees are often perceived as a burden on 
already scarce resources, rather than a potentially contributing factor.
6.1.4   What about the South Sudanese Government?
The reasons behind the South Sudanese inability  to  make use of its  desperately needed 
human resources  is  outside  the  main  scope of  this  study.  However,  some reflections  upon the 
subject seem appropriate. What is the government's perspective on the returnee issue? Why are they 
not utilizing the available human resources to build up South Sudan as a viable and developing 
country?
According to  the empirical  discoveries of  this  study,  the  government  of  South Sudan is 
generally aware of the capital the returnees from Khartoum (and other places) bring with them. As 
we have seen in chapter 5, the government informants highlighted the returnees' human resources 
and  cultural  capital.  Despite  this  acknowledgement,  the  informants  expressed  that  the  returnee 
capital is currently not being utilized, and they rather spoke in future-oriented terms using words 
like 'can', 'could' and 'shall'. What possible conclusions can we draw from this?
In chapter 5 we saw that former government official Eric said that  “the government is a  
premature government, their institutional capacity is not there”. South Sudan is a young state with 
both limited resources, infrastructure and stability. In this regard, Eric particularly emphasized the 
government's lack of financial resources; “the government now, I am seeing it as not a government  
that can deliver services, because most of the money go to salaries”151. Added to accusations of 
corruption, this bears witness of a capacity-weak government with limited economic and political 
leeway.
However, is economic capacity the only reason for the government's deficiency? As we saw 
from  former  referendum  observer  Kate's  statement,  a  central  state  politician  claimed  that  the 
returnee issue was  “not in line with his political intentions”. Does this bear witness of a lack of 
political will in South Sudan? Are there other political issues that overshadow the issue of returnee 
(re)integration? During the wars against the north, the South Sudanese people formed a relatively 




diminished in recent years. In addition to various local conflicts across the country, South Sudan is 
now facing severe internal strife. An intense power struggle is taking place within the ruling party 
SPLM, which puts a large proportion of the population at risk. The conflict also has dangerous 
ethnic affiliations, which can lead to mobilizing oppositions within the population.
Overall, the current situation in South Sudan bears witness of a disintegrated state, in which 
both the capacity and the political will to engage in the returnee issue are limited. Despite limited 
empirical support, it seems reasonable to argue that the issue of returnee (re)integration is neglected 
in  favor  of  other,  more  pressing issues  such as  state  survival.  This,  however,  demands further 
research. 
6.2   Concluding Remarks
Return  migration can  lead to  a  disruption  of  livelihoods and a subsequent  readjustment 
where the returnee settles down. This analysis has demonstrated evidence that returnees bring with 
them returnee capital in this complex process of (re)integration. Moreover, it has demonstrated a 
number of obstacles to the utilization of these vital resources. As such, the actual utilization of 
returnee  capital  is  dependent  on  the  specific  prevailing  conditions  in  the  return  area.  This  is 
problematic in a context where both material and non-material resources are desperately needed in 
order  to  create reconstruction and developmental  changes.  This thesis  recommends that  greater 
attention  is  given  to  the  potential  impact  of  returnees  in  post-conflict  settings,  in  which  their 
presence  arguably  can  have  such  diverging  positive  and  negative  effects  depending  on  the 
circumstances.
The situation in South Sudan is constantly changing and the current conflict (Dec 2013 -) 
demonstrates an uncertain future. Close to a million people have fled their homes since the violence 
broke out  in December 2013, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
estimates (as of March 2014) that 4,9 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 
2014b).  For many returnees the conflict  has disrupted their ongoing (re)integration process and 
utilization of returnee capital. It is not surprising if some of the respondents of this study have 
entered  into  new  displacement  cycles.  As  one  contact  in  Juba  recently  said  in  an  informal 
conversation; “don't get surprised to hear that a good number of the people you met are no more”. 
Such  developments  show  the  importance  of  highlighting  the  post-return  period  and 
developing  a  general  framework  for  both  identification  of  returnee  capital  and  assistance  for 
returnee (re)integration. As the current conflict comes to an end, refugees and IDPs will again return  
to their areas of origin. Without an adequate identification of their potential as productive citizens, 
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the reconstruction and development of South Sudan may again come to a halt.
Despite  the  difficulties  of  generalizing  from  empirical  studies,  this  study  is  aiming  to 
contribute to a greater theorization of returnee capital. So far, the attention within return migration 
has been directed towards the actual transfer of people. If this is the focus of policy makers and 
agencies alike, how then can we direct the effects of return migration towards the development of 
the state? As this study has shown, there is an overall lack of research on returnee (re)integration 
and the effects of the international community's durable solutions. Moreover, there is a lack of both 
theoretical  and practical  frameworks  for  the  assistance  and (re)integration  of  returnees.  In  this 
regard,  this  analysis  has  attempted  to  show  the  returnee  capital  framework's  potential  as  a 
theoretical tool. If  an adequate number of empirical studies are carried out in a similar line of 
thought  as  this  research,  it  will  arguably  be  possible  to  identify  certain  trends  within  returnee 
(re)integration and the utilization of returnee capital in post-conflict contexts. To give an example, if  
certain economic prevailing conditions continuously tend to hinder returnee capital across studies, 
we can feasibly identify such factors as barriers for returnee (re)integration in an overall theoretical  
framework. Furthermore, when such factors are identified, it will be possible to move on to finding 
adequate and durable solutions for the post-return period.
This proposed theorization will require an effort on the part of international and national 
actors to recognize returnees as individuals with agency. As an integral part of the durable solutions, 
we should alter the way we perceive displaced people; they are not passive victims indifferent to 
their surroundings, but active agents with productive lives ahead of them. Their reception both prior 
to and after return, will have a tremendous impact on their present and future ability to contribute on 
both micro and macro levels of society. As this study has demonstrated evidence of, it is time that 
we consider development a fundamental part of returnee programs, and returnees a fundamental 
part of development plans. If repatriation is to continuously be seen as the preferred solution to the 
world's refugee problem, it is crucial to develop sound solutions for it to be efficient and successful.
One obvious limitation to such an approach is the cost; who is willing to add additional 
funding to the already high budgets of returnee transportation, food aid and non-food items? This 
question is outside the scope of this thesis, yet it is also important to recognize the initial costs of  
not linking returnees to a more long-term developmental perspective. Continued relief dependency, 
internal conflicts, and not least renewed displacement cycles are also costly and will continue to 
require efforts from international donors and agencies. Successful (re)integration programs in which 
returnees and their communities alike are able to create long-term sustainable and peaceful lives can 
arguably have a positive impact on the future.
Return  migration  must  give  attention  to  the  post-return  period  and  the  sustainable 
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(re)integration of returnees to ensure the durability of repatriation. Until this can be accomplished, 
the international community should acknowledge the relative failure of the durable solutions and 
recognize the large pool of untapped resources that returnees possess. The potential for post-conflict 
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Appendix 1: Informant Overview









1 - Mary Returnee NGO-employee x F 30-40
2 - Anna Returnee NGO-employee x F 30-40
3 - Rose Returnee Nurse x F 40-50
4 - Hope Returnee Nurse x F 20-30
5 - Helena Returnee Nurse x F 20-30
6 - Ruth Returnee Student (nursing) x F 20-30
7 - Winny Returnee Student (administration) x F 18-20
8 - Vincent Returnee Student (geology) x M 20-30
9 - Tony Returnee Security guard x M 40-50
10 - Alicia Returnee Student x F 18-20
11 - Grace Returnee NGO-employee x F 30-40
12 - John Other INGO-employee M 20-30
13 - Jack Other INGO-employee M 30-40
14 - Hannah Other INGO-employee F 30-40
15 - Richard Other INGO-employee M 40-50
16 - Sebit Other INGO-employee x M 30-40
17 - Victor Other NGO-employee M 30-40
18 - George Other NGO-employee x M 30-40
19 - Kate Other Former referendum observer F 50-60
20 - Gabriella Other NGO-employee F 20-30
21 - Nancy Other NGO-employee F 30-40
22 - Daniel Other NGO-employee M 30-40
23 - Caroline Other NGO-employee F 20-30
24 - Charles Other Professor x M 50-60
25 - Peter Authorities Government official x M 50-60
26 - Eric Authorities Former government official x M 40-50
27 - Luke Authorities Government official x M 20-30
28 - Tim Resident Lecturer M 30-40
Source: Fieldwork June, 2013
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Appendix 2: Interview Guides
Interview guide for interviews with returnees:
Background information:
• basic information about the informant (age, marital status, number of children etc.)
Flight
• When did you leave South Sudan?
• Where did you use to live originally? (place, urban/rural)
• How did you use to support yourself in South Sudan? (livelihood)
• Why did you leave?
• What happened to your land/house when you left? 
• Where did you go to?
Exile
• For how long did you stay there?
• Where and how did you live? (urban/rural, temporary/permanent)
• How did you support yourself there? (job, aid, savings)
• Was your livelihood different in the new country? How? Why?
• Did you remain in contact with relatives or friends in South Sudan?
• Did you gain any new skills while staying in your host country?
• Did your children get the chance to go to school there?
• How would you describe your life there compared to before you left South Sudan?
Return:
• When did you return to South Sudan?
• Why did you return? Was it a voluntary decision? (personal motivation, pressure)
• Did you return through assistance from UNHCR/IOM? Alone? Other?
• How was the process of returning? (documentation, transport, duration)
• Where did you return to? Your home town/area/region?
• If resettled in another part of South Sudan – why?
• Have you settled here permanently now?
Returnee (re)integration:
Economic integration
• What is your livelihood today? Why? How did you end up with this?
• Do/did you receive any help from the government, NGOs or other actors?
• Did you manage to bring any financial resources with you when you returned? Or any other useful 
assets?
• How do you see your financial situation now compared to before you left South Sudan? What has 
changed? Why?
• Has it been difficult to find work after being away for many years? Why do you think?
• Do you have access to the resources, tools etc that you need?
• Are there any opportunities for accessing credit in this area? (micro loans)
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• How do you live now? Was your land/house still available when you returned?
• What is the situation for your family now? (exile, remained, housing)
Social services
• How would you describe the access to social services in this area?
• Do your children go to school? Do you have to pay for their education?
• Do you have access to health care? (public, NGOs)
• What about infrastructure and transportation?
• Has this changes any? (exile, before flight, NGO projects)
Social integration
• Has the return turned out as you thought it would?
• Did you have any family members or friends here when you returned?
• How is your neighborhood made up? (returnees, residents)
• How do you feel about your relationship to other South Sudanese? Other returnees? Residents who 
did not leave South Sudan?
• Who are the people you mostly interact with? Why? (returnees, residents)
• Do people tend to stay together with returnees they know from exile?
• Did you feel welcome when you returned?
• How  was  the  reactions  when  you  returned?  Have  you  seen/heard  any  positive  or  negative 
comments?
• Have you experienced or heard about any tensions or conflicts between returnees and residents?
• Which role do you think language plays in the integration process?
• How does your community solve disputes? Who is responsible?
General
• Do you think returnees can contribute to building up the state of South Sudan? How? Why not?
• Do you feel like you contribute to your community in any way?
• What do you see as positive of returning?
• What do you see as the main challenges of return?
• What do you see as South Sudan's future? (conflict, peace, cohesion)
* * *
Interview guide for interviews with residents:
Background information:
• basic information about the informant (age, marital status, number of children etc.)
Effects of displacement
• Many people fled during the war, but not you. Why?
• Did you ever consider fleeing/moving?
• Did many people from this village/area move?
• What is your opinion about people who left South Sudan?
• How did you experience the large-scale displacement? Any special effects on this village/area?
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Return:
• Have many people returned to this area?
• Is this generally people that used to live here before?
• How is your neighborhood made up now? Compared to earlier? (returnees, residents)
• Who are the people you mostly interact with? Why? (returnees, residents)
• Do people tend to stay together with returnees they know from exile?
• Do you see any big differences between people who left and people who stayed during the war? 
(language, religion, livelihood)
• Are you able to communicate with all returnees? (language)
Returnee (re)integration:
Economic
• What is your livelihood?
• How do you see your financial situation? Have anything changed the last decades? Why?
• Do/did you receive any help from the government, NGOs or other actors?
• How is the employment market today? Are there enough jobs?
• Who have the most problems finding jobs? Why do you think this is the case?
• Do you have access to the resources, tools, etc. that you need?
• What about land?
• Are there any opportunities for accessing credit in this area? (micro loans)
Social services
• How would you describe the access to social services in this area?
• Do your children go to school? Do you have to pay for their education?
• Do you have access to health care?
• What about infrastructure and transportation?
• Have any of this changed lately? Why, do you think?
• Are there any NGOs working in this area? What kind of projects?
Social integration
• What was your initial thoughts when people started returning back to the area?
• How did other people in the area react? (positive/negative experiences)
• What do you think about the people returning? What is your relationship to them?
• Have you experienced or heard about any tensions or conflicts between returnees and residents?
• Which role do you think language plays in the integration process?
• How does your community solve disputes? Who is responsible?
General 
• Do you feel like you contribute to your community in any way?
• What do you see as positive of the return migration?
• What do you see as the main challenges of return migration?
• Do you think returnees can contribute to building up the state of South Sudan? How? Why not?
• What do you see as South Sudan's future? (conflict, peace, cohesion)
* * *
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Interview guide for interviews with other actors:
Background information:
• basic information about the informant
• NGOs: history in South Sudan, activities concerning returnees (Juba?)
• authorities: policies regarding migration
Displacement and return:
• How will you characterize/experience the displacement in Southern Sudan?
• What kind of effects did the large-scale displacement have on South Sudan?
• Was it generally perceived as legitimate to flee?
• Which parts of the country are mostly effected by the return migration? What about Juba?
• Do people tend to return to the areas they came from?
• What about the house/land they had before?
Returnee (re)integration:
Economic and social issues
• How is the employment market today? Are there enough jobs?
• Has this changed with the large influxes of returnees? How?
• Who have the most problems finding jobs? Why do you think this is the case?
• Does people have access to the resources and tools they need to sustain themselves?
• Are there any opportunities for accessing credit in this area? (micro loans)
• What  about  access  to  education,  health  care,  and  infrastructure? Has  this  changed since  people 
started returning?
• Are there more NGO activities due to returnees?
• Do you see any main differences between returnees and other residents when it comes to economic  
and social opportunities?
Social integration
• How was the initial atmosphere when people started returning back to South Sudan?
• Did you see any positive/negative reactions from the population?
• Do people tend to stay together with other returnees, or interact with other residents?
• Have you experienced or heard about any tensions or conflicts between returnees and residents?
• Are there  any big differences between people  who left  and people  who stayed during the war? 
(language, religion, livelihood...)
• Which role do you think language plays in the integration process?
General
• What do you see as positive of the return migration?
• What do you see as the main challenges of return migration?
• What do you see as the main security challenges today?
• How do you see the government's role in all of this?
• How do you think returnees can contribute in South Sudan today?
• What do you see as South Sudan's future? (conflict, peace, cohesion)
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Appendix 3: Informed Consent Statement
MA Research Project: Information for informants
I  am a  student  at  Center  for  Peace  Studies  (CPS)  at  the  University  of  Tromsø,  Norway,  where  I  am 
conducting a master degree in Peace and Conflict Transformation (2012-2014). In this regard, I am now 
writing a thesis about returnee issues in South Sudan. Therefore, I would like to interview informants with  
relevant insight and experience regarding this issue.
The intention of this project is to examine the potential of returnees to participate in the process of post-
conflict reconstruction in South Sudan. The main research aim is to analyze whether returnees impact the 
return  areas  positively  or  negatively,  and  to  identity  the  various  influencing  factors.  The  issue  will  be 
attempted addressed from three different  perspectives; I)  from the returnees point of  view; II)  from the 
residents  in  the  return  areas;  and  III)  from the perspective  of  national/international  actors  (e.g.  NGOs, 
INGOs, national authorities). 
To conduct this research, I wish to undertake interviews with members from all these groups in South Sudan. 
The  topics  will  concern  issues  of  migration,  exile,  return  migration,  and  (re)integration  in  the  South 
Sudanese society. During the interviews I will use audio recorder and take notes. The recorded data will only 
be used for this particular research project and will not be available to anyone other than this researcher.  
Personal  information will  be treated confidentially and the recordings will  be deleted when the study is  
finished.
The participation in this study takes place on a completely voluntary basis, and we will agree on the time and  
place for the interview. You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to justify  
this further.  You also have the right to ask questions at any time. The project is not intended to help or  
evaluate specific projects, but to contribute to a greater understanding of the experiences and challenges 
regarding return migration.
This project is supervised by Christine Smith-Simonsen (christine.smith-simonsen@uit.no) at the  Center for 
Peace Studies (CPS) at University of Tromsø, Norway.





Center for Peace Studies 
University of Tromsø
N-9037 Tromsø, 
Norway
112
